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Abstract	  
Development	  assistance	  is	  a	  vital	  feature	  of	  the	  international	  system	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  better	  
world	  for	  all.	  The	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  form	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  
development	  aid	  donor	  body’s,	  particularly	   in	  the	  championing	  of	  the	  values	  of	  democracy,	  
human	  rights	  and	  rule	  of	  law.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  aid	  has	  been	  a	  central	  theme	  in	  development	  
studies	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  with	  research	  producing	  mixed	  results.	  Aid	  effectiveness	  is	  reliant	  
on	  a	  number	  of	  interlacing	  and	  fragile	  factors,	  therefore	  how	  development	  aid	  is	  delivered	  and	  
what	  forms	  it	  takes	  is	  important.	  	  	  
	  
Conditionality	  has	  been	  used	  as	  mechanism	  to	  help	  achieve	  better	  standards	  of	  these	  values	  
through	   aid,	   particularly	   through	   the	   EU’s	   Aid	   for	   Trade	   (AfT)	   agreements	   such	   as	   the	  
Everything	  but	  Arms	  Agreement	  (EBA).	  The	  EBA	  is	  a	  preferential	  trade	  scheme	  that	  supports	  
Least	   Developed	   Countries	   (LDCs)	   in	   becoming	   economically	   self-­‐sustainable	   through	  
increased	  capacity	  and	  access	  to	  the	  global	  trading	  system.	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  uses	  Cambodia	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  investigate	  whether	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  effective	  at	  
promoting	  the	  values	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  through	  the	  use	  of	  conditionality.	  The	  
question	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  light	  of	  the	  2018	  Cambodia	  Election,	  after	  which	  the	  EU	  launched	  
the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA	  from	  Cambodia	  based	  on	  “serious	  and	  systemic	  violations	  
of	  democratic	  and	  human	  rights	  principles”	  (European	  Commission,	  2019).	  The	  research	  aims	  
to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  effective	  in	  its	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  
and	  human	  rights	  and	  whether	  it’s	  appropriate	  to	  attach	  these	  kinds	  of	  conditions	  to	  aid	  in	  a	  
cross-­‐cultural	   context,	   as	   well	   as	   investigating	   the	   relationship	   between	   preferential	   trade	  
agreements	  and	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	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1.   Introduction	  	  
The	  effectiveness	  of	  conditionality	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  promote	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  
in	  developing	  states	  has	  been	  a	  debatable	  concept	  in	  aid	  policy.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  
the	   case	   of	   Aid	   for	   Trade	   (AfT),	   a	   relatively	   new	   initiative	   formalised	   by	   the	  World	   Trade	  
Organisation	  (WTO)	  in	  2005.	  AfT	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  preferential	  trade	  agreements	  in	  order	  
to	  support	  and	  increase	  the	  exports	  of	  Least	  Developed	  Countries	  (LDCs),	  in	  turn	  stimulating	  
economic	  and	  social	  development	  through	  increased	  capacity	  and	  access	  to	  the	  global	  trading	  
system	  (wto.org,	  2019).	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  aid	  in	  the	  sustainable	  stimulation	  of	  development	  
is	   reliant	   on	   a	   number	   of	   interlacing	   and	   fragile	   factors.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   important	   how	  
development	   aid	   is	   delivered	   and	   what	   forms	   it	   takes.	   The	   European	   Union	   (EU)	   and	   its	  
Member	  States	  are	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  (ODA)	  donors	  
and	  a	  contemporary	  defender	  of	  normative	  values.	  They	  have	  been	  a	  world	  leader	  in	  the	  use	  
of	   conditionality	   to	   promote	   the	   values	   of	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights	   through	   aid,	  
particularly	  in	  AfT.	  The	  research	  question	  for	  this	  thesis	  asks	  whether	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  effective	  
at	  promoting	  the	  values	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  through	  the	  use	  of	  conditionality	  in	  
their	  AfT	  programmes	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  attach	  these	  kinds	  of	  conditions	  to	  aid	  
in	  a	  cross	  cultural	  context.	  	  	  
	  
Using	   Cambodia	   as	   a	   case	   study,	   this	   research	   investigates	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   EU	  
conditionality	   in	   the	  promotion	  of	   the	  normative	  values	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	   in	  
autocratic	  states.	  This	  is	  examined	  during	  the	  timeframe	  of	  the	  2018	  Cambodian	  Election,	  after	  
which	   the	  EU	   launched	   the	  procedure	   to	  withdraw	  their	  preferential	   trade	  agreement,	   the	  
Everything	  but	  Arms	  Agreement	  (EBA)	  with	  Cambodia	   in	  February	  2019.	  This	  was	  based	  on	  
claims	   of	   “serious	   and	   systemic	   violations	   of	   democratic	   and	   human	   rights	   principles”	  
(European	   Commission,	   2019).	   The	   EBA	   withdrawal	   in	   this	   case,	   is	   an	   example	   of	   EU	  
conditionality	  as	  being	  practiced	  through	  their	  AfT	  programmes.	  The	  research	  question	  for	  this	  
study	  is:	  
	  
How	  effective	  is	  EU	  conditionality	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  promote	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  
Cambodia	  though	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Everything	  but	  Arms	  Agreement	  withdrawal?	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This	   research	  will	   contribute	   to	   and	   extend	   on	   existing	   literature,	   examining	   the	   questions	  
surrounding	   aid	   effectiveness	   and	   conditionality	   in	   the	   light	   of	   contemporary	   Cambodian	  
politics.	  A	  contextual	  review	  is	  necessary	  to	  define	  Cambodia’s	  history,	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  
EU,	   and	   a	   description	   of	   the	   EU/Cambodia	   aid	   and	   trade	   partnerships.	   This	   chapter	   also	  
highlights	  current	  events	  that	  help	  to	  put	  the	  research	  question	  into	  context.	  The	  literature	  
review	  chapter	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  deeply	  seated	  problems	  in	  aid	  and	  its	  often	  contradictory	  
nature,	   not	   just	   in	  Cambodia	  but	   in	  many	  aid	   recipient	   countries	   around	   the	  world.	   It	   also	  
discusses,	  potential	  solutions	  to	  these	  problems	  as	  identified	  through	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  
aid	  effectiveness.	  This	  helps	  to	  illustrate	  how	  and	  why	  Cambodia	  is	  in	  the	  position	  it	  is	  in	  now,	  
in	  terms	  of	  its	  dependency	  on	  grant	  and	  loan	  based	  aid,	  and	  AfT	  agreements	  such	  as	  the	  EBA.	  
This	  is	  relevant	  to	  recommendations	  made	  in	  this	  research	  on	  how	  to	  increase	  effectiveness	  of	  
aid	  to	  Cambodia.	  	  
	  
The	   conceptual	   framework	   outlines	   how	   aid	   conditionality	   is	   used	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   promote	  
normative	  principles,	  as	  well	  as	  outlining	  the	  pre-­‐established	  debate	  around	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  conditionality	  at	  promoting	  democracy	  and	  development.	  The	  conceptual	  framework	  builds	  
upon	   the	   effectiveness	   argument,	   as	   outlined	   in	   the	   literature	   review,	   and	   explains	   how	  
conditionality	  is	  used	  in	  practice	  by	  the	  EU.	  This	  chapter	  will	  apply	  theory	  to	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  in	  Cambodia.	  	  
	  
The	  findings	  and	  discussion	  chapter	  contributes	  to	  answering	  the	  research	  question	  through	  
the	  application	  of	  qualitative	  analysis	  to	  primary	  data	  gathered	  through	  interviews	  with	  local	  
and	  international	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Organisations	  (NGOs),	  Civil	  Society	  Organisations	  (CSOs),	  
international	  economic	  and	  political	  institutions,	  and	  government	  officials.	  The	  research	  sub	  
questions	  are	  directly	  addressed	  as	  well	  as	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  effects	  
of	  a	  withdrawal.	  This	  helps	  to	  build	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  understanding	  of	  all	  the	  implications	  and	  
areas	  of	  impact,	  while	  illustrating	  how	  these	  impacts	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  democracy	  and	  human	  
rights	   themselves,	   as	   values	   the	   EU	  are	   trying	   to	  protect.	   Findings	   from	   this	   data	   are	   then	  
supported	   through	   references	   to	   newspaper	   articles,	   joint	   statements,	   press	   releases,	   and	  
official	   government	   statements.	   This	   is	   compared	   to	   previous	   examples	  where	   the	   EU	   has	  
exercised	  a	  similar	  type	  of	  conditionality	  in	  other	  countries.	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Finally,	  the	  summary	  of	  findings	  and	  conclusion	  bring	  together	  all	  research	  gathered	  through	  
previous	  chapters.	  This	  will	  answer	  the	  research	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  effective	  
in	   its	   promotion	   of	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights	   in	   Cambodia	   through	   conditionality	   as	  
employed	  by	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal.	  This	  chapter	  also	  provides	  recommendations	  toward	  more	  
effective	   EU	   action	   in	   Cambodia	   based	   on	   addressing	   the	   Sustainable	   Development	   Goals	  
(SDGs)	   in	  order	   to	  work	   toward	  more	  effective	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	   rights	  
through	  development	  assistance.	  	  
	  
This	  research	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA	  is	  the	  first	  
event	  of	  its	  kind	  and	  the	  final	  decision	  of	  outcomes	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  made.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  remember	  that	  the	  conclusions	  of	  this	  study	  are	  somewhat	  speculative.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  
research	  is	  significant	  in	  that	  it	   investigates	  aspects	  of	  political	  decision	  making	  in	  aid	  policy	  
and	  analyses	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	   implications	  of	  such	  actions.	  A	  considerable	  
amount	  of	   literature	  exists	  on	  aid	  effectiveness	  that	  supports	   the	  conclusion	  that	  aid,	   in	   its	  
current	   form,	   is	  a	  contributor	   to	   the	  problem	   it	   is	  attempting	   to	   relieve.	   It	   is	   imperative	   to	  
understand	  the	  multi-­‐faceted	  implications	  of	  development	  assistance,	  reform	  aid	  policy	  in	  such	  
a	  way	  that	  it	  works	  as	  intended	  and	  reflects	  ideologies	  around	  sustainability,	  ownership,	  and	  
mutual	  respect	  of	  values	  in	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  context.	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2.  Contextual	  Review	  	  
This	  chapter	  outlines	  Cambodia’s	  history	  to	  illustrate	  the	  country’s	  experiences	  in	  the	  past	  and	  
how	   this	   has	   impacted	   its	   economic	   and	   political	   position	   today.	   Cambodia’s	   international	  
partnerships	   in	  both	  aid	  and	   trade	  and	   the	  EU	  and	  Cambodia	   relationship	  will	   be	  of	   focus.	  
Recent	   events	   must	   also	   be	   considered,	   including	   the	   2018	   Cambodian	   election	   and	  
Cambodia’s	  relationship	  with	  China.	  This	  will	  help	  to	  give	  a	  contextual	  understanding	  of	  the	  
many	  factors	  that	  have	  impacted	  the	  EU’s	  decision	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA	  from	  Cambodia	  and	  
how	  Cambodia	  has	  responded	  to	  these	  actions.	  
	  	  	  
2.1   Historical	  Background	  
Cambodia’s	  history	  is	  marked	  with	  periods	  of	  both	  peace	  and	  chaos.	  Despite	  this,	  there	  has	  
not	  been	  strong	  liberal	  or	  democratic	  institutions,	  or	  traditions	  throughout	  Cambodia’s	  past	  
and	  into	  its	  present.	  Instead,	  an	  autocratic	  system	  has	  been	  of	  preference	  based	  on	  “endemic	  
distrust”	  (Chandler,	  1998,	  p.	  43).	  This	  has	  ultimately	  made	  circumstances	  impossible	  for	  stable	  
policy,	  participation	  rights,	  and	  minority	  representation	  to	  exist.	  	  	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   its	   modern	   history,	   Cambodia	   gained	   its	   independence	   from	   France	   in	   1953.	  
Replacing	  French	  colonial	  rule	  with	  a	  constitutional	  monarchy,	  Cambodia	  has	  since	  been	  ruled	  
by	   His	   Majesty	   Norodom	   Sihanouk.	   Throughout	   the	   1960’s,	   Sihanouk’s	   Populist	   Socialist	  
Community	   regime	  began	   a	  movement	   of	   agrarian	   reform.	   This	  was	   achieved	   through	   the	  
commissioning	  of	  various	  agricultural	  and	  construction	  projects	  nationwide,	  as	  well	  as	  placing	  
a	   large	   importance	   on	   state	   owned	   enterprise	   (Ear,	   2007,	   p.	   73).	   For	   this	   period	   of	   time,	  
Cambodia	  enjoyed	  relative	  peace	  and	  prosperity.	  However,	  in	  1970,	  a	  coup	  led	  by	  Sihanouk’s	  
Prime	   Minister	   Lon	   Nol,	   steered	   the	   beginnings	   of	   the	   Khmer	   Republic.	   Cambodia	   then	  
abandoned	  its	  political	  neutrality	  in	  a	  global	  context	  and	  proceeded	  to	  side	  with	  the	  United	  
States	  against	  North	  Vietnam	  during	   the	  Vietnam	  War.	   In	  1975,	  Cambodia’s	   capital	  Phnom	  
Penh	  fell	  to	  a	  Communist	  movement	  (The	  Khmer	  Rouge)	  resulting	  in	  the	  exile	  of	  Sihanouk	  and	  
his	  government.	  	  Under	  the	  Khmer	  Rouge,	  Cambodia	  adopted	  a	  Maoist	  economic	  model	  and	  
implemented	   aspects	   of	   Maoist	   Communist	   Authoritarianism.	   During	   the	   next	   four	   years,	  
approximately	   2	  million	   people	  would	   lose	   their	   lives	   due	   to	   Khmer	   Rouge	   policy.	   Pol	   Pot,	  
leader	  of	  the	  Khmer	  Rouge	  and	  head	  of	  state,	  renamed	  the	  country	  Democratic	  Kampuchea	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and	   banned	   all	   currency	   and	   private	   property.	   The	   Khmer-­‐led	   terror	   ended	   in	   1979	   after	  
Vietnam’s	  victory	  over	   the	  Kampuchea	   regime,	  which	   left	  over	  a	  quarter	  of	   the	  population	  
dead.	  The	  civil	  war	  continued	  until	  1991	  with	  global	  interference	  and	  support	  on	  both	  sides.	  
The	  non-­‐communist	   resistance	  groups	   in	  Western	  Cambodia	  were	  mainly	  backed	  by	  China,	  
Thailand	  and	  the	  United	  States	   (US),	  while	   the	  new	  regime	   led	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Hun	  Sen,	  
depended	  on	  the	  support	  of	  military	  alliance	  from	  Vietnam,	  in	  addition	  to	  financial	  assistance	  
from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  
	  
The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  would	  mark	  a	  period	  of	  relative	  peace	  for	  Cambodia.	  Post-­‐Cold	  War,	  
western	   backed	   peacekeeping	   occurred	   throughout	   the	   country,	   acting	   as	   a	   stabilising	  
influence	   after	   decades	   of	   violent	   conflict.	   Cambodia	   suffered	   considerably	   due	   to	   the	  
turbulent	   circumstances	   throughout	   these	   decades,	   including	   massive	   loss	   of	   human	  
resources,	   countless	   deaths,	   disease,	   and	   famine	   due	   to	   war	   and	   the	   corresponding	  
displacement	  that	  inevitably	  followed.	  Thousands	  of	  Cambodians	  became	  refugees	  with	  many	  
resettling	  in	  neighbouring	  third-­‐world	  countries,	  who	  were	  also	  struggling	  with	  domestic	  and	  
regional	  strife.	  By	  this	  time,	   it	  was	  estimated	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  educated	  population	  of	  
Cambodia	   were	   living	   outside	   the	   country	   as	   a	   result	   of	   being	   considered	   a	   threat	   and	  
therefore,	  targeted	  by	  the	  Khmer	  regime.	  “The	  University	  in	  Phnom	  Penh	  had	  almost	  no	  books,	  
few	  professors	  and	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  classrooms	  that	  weren’t	  shot	   to	  pieces,	  as	   the	  Khmer	  
Rouge	  raged	  into	  Phnom	  Penh”	  (Gibson,	  1993).	  	  
	  
2.2   The	  Paris	  Peace	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Comprehensive	  Political	  
Settlement	  of	  the	  Cambodia	  Conflict	  and	  United	  Nations	  
Transitional	  Authority	  to	  Cambodia	  	  
The	   ‘Paris	   Peace	   Agreement	   on	   the	   Comprehensive	   Political	   Settlement	   of	   the	   Cambodia	  
Conflict’	  was	  signed	  on	  the	  23rd	  of	  October	  1991.	  This	  treaty	  was	  signed	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  
and	  Cambodia	  in	  order	  to	  help	  settle	  conflict	  and	  prepare	  the	  country	  for	  democratic	  elections.	  
In	   February	  1992,	   the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	   authorised	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  
United	  Nations	  Transitional	  Authority	  to	  Cambodia	  (UNTAC).	  The	  USD	  $2-­‐billion-­‐dollar	  mission	  
was	  conducted	  under	  a	  broad	  mandate	  which	  included	  the	  supervision	  of	  ceasefire,	  an	  end	  to	  
foreign	   military	   assistance,	   and	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   foreign	   military	   forces,	   personnel,	   and	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material.	   It	   also	   targeted	   a	   70%	   level	   of	   demobilisation,	   control	   and	   supervision	   of	   all	  
government	  administrative	  structures,	  including	  the	  Cambodian	  police.	  UNTAC’s	  purpose	  was	  
to	  assist	  the	  country	  in	  conducting	  general	  elections	  and	  to	  ensure	  greater	  accountability	  in	  
maintaining	  human	  rights	  responsibilities	  (Peacekeeping.un.org,	  2003).	  
	  
	  UNTAC	  has	  come	  under	  considerable	  criticism	  in	  review.	  It	  is	  now	  suggested	  that	  UNTAC	  did	  
more	  harm	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  democracy	  in	  Cambodia	  than	  good.	  UNTAC’s	  power	  was	  
theoretical	  at	  best	  with	  little	  ability	  to	  compel	  Cambodian	  authorities	  into	  compliance	  with	  its	  
mandate.	  Furthermore,	   the	  broadness	  of	   the	  mandate	   itself	  has	  been	  called	   into	  question.	  
These	  combined	   factors	  have	  been	  cited	  as	   the	  main	  contributors	   to	   the	   ineffectiveness	  of	  
UNTAC	  and	  its	  mission.	  “UNTAC	  sowed	  the	  seeds	  of	  failure	  of	  democracy	  in	  Cambodia”.	  What	  
the	  UN	  seems	  to	  have	  not	  understood	  was	  that	  “an	  election	  alone	  did	  not	  a	  democracy	  make”	  
(Ear,	  2013,	  p.	  5).	  	  
	  
In	  1993,	  the	  National	  Assembly	  of	  Cambodia	  adopted	  a	  new	  constitution	  which	  lead	  to	  the	  first	  
democratic	  elections	  held	  in	  May	  of	  that	  year.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  UNTAC,	  although	  widely	  
boasted	   by	   the	   international	   community,	   failed	   to	   disarm	   the	   Khmer	   Rouge	   leading	   to	  
interference	  in	  the	  voting	  processes	  and	  political	  violence.	  As	  well	  as	  this,	  the	  large	  presence	  
of	  UNTAC	  foreign	  troops	  led	  to	  a	  tripling	  of	  prostitution.	  At	  the	  time	  Hun	  Sen	  stated,	  “The	  most	  
UNTAC	   left	   in	   Cambodia	   was	   AIDS	   disease”	   (Ear,	   2013,	   p.	   4).	   This	   helps	   to	   highlight	   how	  
Cambodians	  viewed	  UNTAC.	  Instead	  of	  delivering	  on	  promises,	  UNTAC	  merely	  added	  to	  further	  
social	  unrest.	  	  
	  
Cambodia’s	  new	  constitution	  reflects	  the	   liberal	  values	  of	  democracy,	  human	  rights,	  rule	  of	  
law,	   and	   the	   separation	   of	   powers.	   However,	   the	   reality	   of	   Cambodia’s	   current	   political	  
situation	  exposes	  the	  dissimilarities	  between	  the	  constitution	  and	  practice.	  The	  United	  Nations	  
Security	  Council	  announced	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  UNTAC	  from	  Cambodia	  following	  the	  deemed	  
‘successful’	   May	   1993	   elections.	   	   Post	   UNTAC	   withdrawal,	   the	   losing	   party	   (Cambodian	  
People’s	  Party	  (CPP))	   lead	  by	  Hun	  Sen	  violently	  forced	  winning	  party	  FUNCINPEC	  (Front	  Uni	  
National	  pour	  un	  Camodge	   Indèpendent,	  Neuture,	  Pacifique,	  et	  Coopèratif)	   into	  a	  coalition	  
government.	   This	   was	   to	   continue	   and	   expand	   of	   the	   control	   they	   already	   had	   over	   state	  
administration	  and	   the	  military	  prior	   to	   the	  election.	   In	  1997,	  Hun	  Sen	   lead	  a	  coup	  against	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FUNCINPEC	  and	  reinstated	  his	  sole	  leadership.	  In	  1998,	  another	  round	  of	  elections	  took	  place	  
with	  violent	  upsurges,	  which	  left	  Hun	  Sen	  and	  his	  party	  unchallenged	  and	  in	  complete	  control.	  
Since	  then,	  each	  scheduled	  election	  has	  suffered	  similar	  circumstances	  and	  has	  continuously	  
proven	   to	   hold	   weak	   democratic	   values,	   which	   in	   turn	   has	   deteriorated	   the	   capacity	   for	  
oppositional	  political	  action	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
2.3   Cambodia’s	  Relationship	  with	  the	  European	  Union	  	  
2.3.1   Trade	  Statistics	  for	  the	  2014-­‐2018	  Period	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  1	  Cambodia	  exported	  €5.3	  billion	  worth	  of	  goods	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  2018	  
making	  up	  0.3%	  of	  the	  EU’s	  total	  imports,	  with	  Cambodia	  representing	  0.2%	  of	  the	  EU’s	  total	  
trade.	  	  
Figure	  1:	  Key	  Figures	  for	  Cambodian	  Trade	  with	  the	  EU	  
Indicator	   	  Unit	  	   Period	   	  Imports	  	   Exports	  	   Total	  trade	  	   Balance	  
Last	  year	  	  	  	   Mio	  
euros	  
2018	   5,360	   774	   6,134	   -­‐4,586	  
Rank	  as	  EU	  partner	  	   2018	   45	   98	   56	   	  
Share	   in	   EU	  
trade	  	  
%	  	   2018	   0.3	   0	   0.2	   	  
(Source:	  Ec.europa.eu,2019).	  
	  
Industrial	  and	  agricultural	  goods	  are	  the	  two	  main	  exports	  between	  Cambodia	  and	  the	  EU,	  with	  
industrial	  goods	  accounting	  for	  96.4%	  of	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  (€4.83	  billion)	  and	  agricultural	  goods	  
(prominently	  rice)	  accounting	  for	  3.6%	  of	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  (€181	  million).	  	  
	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  2,	  the	  top	  three	  categories	  of	  exported	  goods	  were:	  textiles	  (garments)	  
amounting	   to	  €3.47	  billion	   (74.9%)	  of	   total	   exports;	   footwear	   and	  headwear	   amounting	   to	  
€643	  million	  or	  12.8%	  of	  total	  exports;	  and	  transportation	  equipment	  (bicycles)	  €291	  million,	  
or	   5.8%	   of	   total	   exports.	   Cambodia	   accounts	   for	   18%	   of	   all	   EBA	   imports	   into	   the	   EU.	  
Clothing/Garments	   are	   the	  most	   significant	   Cambodian	   export	   to	   the	   EU	   –	   their	   share	   has	  
increased	  from	  0.4%	  in	  2001	  to	  3.8%	  in	  2017	  (i.e.	  of	  total	  EU	  imports	  by	  value).	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Figure	  2:	  Cambodia’s	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  by	  category	  of	  goods	  
	  
(Source:	  Ec.europa.eu,	  2019).	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  this	  data’s	  importance	  to	  Cambodia,	  the	  EU	  is	  the	  largest	  importer	  of	  Cambodian	  
clothing,	  followed	  by	  the	  US	  and	  Japan.	  In	  2016,	  the	  EU	  imported	  more	  than	  40%	  of	  Cambodian	  
garments.	  In	  2017,	  40.3%	  of	  Cambodia’s	  exports	  went	  to	  the	  EU	  Member	  States.	  These	  exports	  
accounted	   for	   approximately	   one	   quarter	   of	   Cambodia’s	   Gross	   Domestic	   Product	   (GDP)	  
(Ec.europa.eu,	  2019).	  The	  clothing	  market	  is	  particularly	  significant	  to	  Cambodia	  as	  it	  supplies	  
jobs	  for	  over	  700,000	  factory	  workers,	  most	  of	  whom	  are	  women	  from	  rural	  areas.	  This	  data	  
shows	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  the	  support	  of	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  this	  demographic.	  
These	  products	  are	  the	  market	  that	  will	  be	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  a	  full	  withdrawal,	  93%	  of	  these	  products	  will	  fall	  under	  the	  Most	  Favoured	  Nation	  (MFN)	  
tariff	  rate	  of	  12%	  (World	  Bank	  Group,	  2019,	  p.g.	  25).	  This	  will	  have	  devastating	  effects	  for	  those	  
working	  in	  the	  industry	  through	  the	  loss	  of	  jobs.	  	  	  
	  
2.3.2   Development	  Assistance	  Statistics	  for	  the	  2014-­‐2020	  Period	  
Dependence	  on	  foreign	  aid	  has	  been	  pointed	  to	  as	  a	  sizeable	  reason	  as	  to	  why	  the	  country’s	  
development	  outcomes	  over	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  have	  been	  disappointing.	  Cambodia	  is	  ‘aid	  
dependant’	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  external	  aid	  percentage	  is	  so	  large	  in	  comparison	  with	  its	  GDP,	  
export	   earnings,	   and	   government	   revenue.	   This	   creates	   a	   distorted	   economy	   and	   hinders	  
government	  incentive	  to	  respond	  to	  economic	  problems	  (Godfrey	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  p.	  335).	  In	  2017,	  
Primary	  
products	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Cambodia	  received	  €751	  million	  in	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  (ODA)	  which	  made	  up	  28%	  
of	  the	  governments	  total	  expenditure.	  This	  ranked	  Cambodia	  43rd	  in	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  net	  
ODA	  and	  official	  aid	  received	  in	  total	  (Data.WorldBank.org,	  2018).	  	  
	  
The	  EU	  has	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  Cambodia’s	  development	  since	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Paris	  
Peace	  Agreements	  in	  1991.	  The	  funding	  from	  the	  EU	  is	  regulated	  through	  the	  EU	  Multiannual	  
Financial	  Framework	  (MFF).	  The	  framework	  determines	  the	  parameters	  for	  the	  EU	  budget	  as	  
well	  as	   the	  timeframes.	  The	  current	  budget	   for	  2014-­‐2020	   is	  set	  at	  €410	  million	   (European	  
Commission,	   2014,	   p.	   11).	   This	   budget	   aims	   to	   support	   regional	   policies,	   in	   particular	   the	  
‘Rectangular	  Strategy	   for	  Growth,	  Employment,	  Equity	  and	  Efficiency	   in	  Cambodia’	  and	   the	  
‘National	   Strategic	   Development	   Plan’	   (NSDP).	   The	  MFF	   also	   follows	   EU	   policy,	   particularly	  
those	   set	   out	   in	   the	   ‘Agenda	   for	   Change’	   adopted	   in	   2011	   which	   sets	   the	   basis	   for	   EU	  
development	  policy	  and	  focuses	  on	  effectively	  facilitating	  poverty	  reduction	  around	  the	  globe	  
(European	  Commission,	  2011).	  	  
	  
The	  EU	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  form	  the	  largest	  percentage	  of	  grant	  development	  aid	  donated	  
to	   Cambodia.	   The	   EU	   financial	   assistance	   to	   Cambodia	   is	   conducted	   through	   bilateral	  
cooperation,	   which	   in	   turn	   forms	   the	   largest	   portion	   of	   EU	   aid.	   ODA	   from	   the	   EU	   and	   its	  
Member	  States	  is	  estimated	  to	  amount	  to	  €892	  million	  for	  the	  period	  of	  2014-­‐2020	  in	  grants	  
and	  €478	  million	  in	  loans.	  This	  equates	  to	  a	  total	  budget	  of	  €1.37	  billion	  (EU	  Development	  Aid	  
in	  Cambodia,	  2015).	  Aside	  from	  the	  EU,	  there	  are	  currently	  10	  Member	  State	  donors	  active	  in	  
Cambodia:	  Czech	  Republic,	  Finland,	  France,	  Germany,	  Hungary,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  Sweden,	  Spain,	  
and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  
	  
For	   the	   period	   of	   2014-­‐2020	   (Figure	   3)	   the	   EU	   will	   be	   spending	   €410	   million	   in	   ODA	   to	  
Cambodia.	   This	   is	   an	   increase	  of	  over	  50%	  as	   compared	   to	   the	  2007-­‐2013	  budget	  of	  €170	  
million.	   Of	   this	   total	   agriculture/natural	   resource	   management	   will	   receive	   €144	   million,	  
education	  and	  skills	  will	  receive	  €140	  million,	  and	  €120	  million	  will	  be	  spent	  on	  governance	  and	  
administration.	  A	  total	  of	  €26	  million	  go	  towards	  additional	  EU/Cambodia	  support	  measures	  
(European	  Commission,	  2014).	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Figure	  3:	  Allocation	  of	  EU	  ODA	  in	  Cambodia	  per	  sector	  as	  percentage	  
	  
(Source:	  European	  Commission,	  2014).	  
	  
2.4   European	  Development	  Cooperation	  Strategy	  for	  Cambodia	  –	  
2014-­‐2019.	  	  
The	  significance	  of	  this	  strategy	  is	  that	  it	  puts	  statistics	  previously	  outlined	  above	  into	  practice	  
through	  policy.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  note	  as	  it	  provides	  both	  a	  timeline	  and	  for	  the	  study	  within	  
the	  current	  MFF	  budget,	  as	  well	  as	   illustrates	  the	  working	  relationship	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  
Cambodia.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  ‘European	  Development	  Cooperation	  Strategy	  for	  Cambodia	  2014-­‐
2019’	   is	   to	   evaluate	   progress	  made	   in	   the	   2016-­‐2018	  period,	  where	  Cambodia’s	   European	  
partners	   provided	   support	   towards	   the	   development	   agenda.	   Its	   focus	   is	   to	   help	   create	  
dialogue	  between	  the	  Royal	  Government	  of	  Cambodia	  (RGC)	  and	  other	  stakeholders,	  as	  well	  
as	   to	   realign	  priorities	  and	   initiatives	  with	   the	  RGCs	   ‘Rectangular	  Strategy	  Phase	   III’	   for	   the	  
upcoming	   period.	   This	   report	   also	   provides	   a	   basis	   for	   the	   upcoming	   ‘Joint	   Cooperation	  
Strategy’	  which	  will	   begin	   in	  2020.	  European	  partners	  prioritise	   support	   to	   the	  governance	  
sector,	  with	  emphasis	  on	  effective	  and	  accountable	  institutions	  and	  increased	  transparency	  in	  
the	  use	  of	  public	  resources	  (EEAS,	  2018).	  	  	  
	  
The	   ‘Joint	  Cooperation	  Strategy’	  outlines	   this	   support	   for	   governance	   through	   six	  points	  of	  
action.	   The	   first	   is	   reform	   which	   aims	   to	   increase	   budget	   credibility	   and	   transparency	   to	  
support	   linkages	   between	   budget	   and	   policy	   priorities.	   This	   will	   should	   help	   increase	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accountability.	   Secondly,	   increase	   decentralisation	   reform	   which	   focuses	   on	   enhancing	  
dialogue	  and	  increasing	  development	  funds	  to	  help	  build	  national	  and	  sub-­‐national	  capacity.	  
Thirdly,	  work	   towards	  electoral	   reform	   through	  voter	  education	  and	  domestic	  observation.	  
Fourthly,	  to	  help	  Extraordinary	  Chambers	  in	  the	  Courts	  of	  Cambodia	  (ECCC)	  operational	  funds	  
to	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Court,	  in	  order	  to	  help	  improve	  standards	  of	  justice,	  reflecting	  international	  
standards.	  The	  fifth	  point	  focuses	  on	  gender	  equality,	  primarily	  looking	  at	  issues	  around	  equal	  
rights	  and	  the	  ability	  for	  women	  to	  participate	  in	  policy	  and	  government	  processes.	  Finally,	  it	  
will	  focus	  on	  increasing	  participation	  through	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  dialogue,	  engagement	  in	  civil	  
society,	  promotion	  of	  civil	  political	  rights,	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  access	  to	  information,	  and	  
support	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  minorities.	  (EEAS,	  2018,	  p.	  6).	  	  
	  
Results	  of	  the	  ‘European	  Joint	  Strategy	  Monitoring	  Report	  for	  2014-­‐2019’	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ‘NSDP	  
Mid-­‐Term	  Review’	  evaluated	  the	  success	  of	  the	  government	  reforms	  as	  outlined	  in	  these	  initial	  
strategies.	  This	  is	  significant	  as	  it	  illustrates	  where	  the	  EU	  is	  focusing	  its	  efforts	  in	  terms	  of	  key	  
development	  areas	  for	  Cambodia,	  as	  well	  as	  shows	  how	  well	  the	  EU	  is	  tackling	  these	  problems	  
through	   budget	   allocation.	   These	   reports	   found	   that	   the	   quality	   of	   governance	   overall	   in	  
Cambodia	  had	  continued	   to	   improve	  over	   this	  outlined	  period,	  however	   further	  efforts	  are	  
necessary	   to	   keep	  on	   target	   for	   the	  2030	  agenda.	   (EEAS,	   2018,	   p.	   10).	   The	   strategy	  briefly	  
mentions	   the	   concerns	   of	   the	   EU	   in	   terms	   of	   Cambodia’s	   recent	   political	   developments	  
including	  the	  2018	  election.	  However,	  the	  EU	  states	  it	  is	  still	  committed	  to	  assisting	  reform.	  	  
	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  above	  through	  Figure	  2,	  governance	  and	  administration	  is	  allocated	  almost	  a	  
third	   of	   the	   overall	   budget.	   The	   effectiveness	   of	   this	   action	   in	   terms	   of	   Cambodia’s	  
improvement	  in	  governance	  quality	  is	  illustrated	  through	  Figure	  3.	  This	  table	  has	  been	  sourced	  
and	   referenced	   from	   Open	   Development	   Cambodia.	   The	   table	   shows	   the	   level	   of	   good	  
governance	   in	  Cambodia	  through	  the	  measurement	  of	  six	  key	   indicators,	  of	  which	   ‘political	  
stability	  and	  absence	  of	  violence/terrorism’	  has	  made	  the	  most	  improvement.	  Despite	  this,	  the	  
country’s	  ‘control	  of	  corruption’	  and	  ‘rule	  of	  law’	  ratings	  remain	  low,	  with	  a	  decline	  in	  ‘voice	  
and	  accountability’	  in	  recent	  years.	  These	  indicators	  suggest	  although	  quality	  of	  governance	  
overall	   has	   improved	   for	   Cambodia,	   key	   indicators	   signifying	   democratic	   practices	   have	  
declined.	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Figure	  4:	  Quality	  of	  Governance	  Trends	  in	  Cambodia	  
	  
(Source:	  Open	  Development	  Cambodia	  (ODC),	  2019).	  	  
Note:	  Measurement	  of	  governance	  performance	  ranges	  from	  -­‐1.5	  (weak)	  to	  5	  (very	  strong).	  	  
	  
2.5   Aid	  for	  Trade	  
In	   an	   attempt	   to	   improve	   development	   mechanisms	   and	   take	   steps	   towards	   more	   self-­‐
sustainable	  development,	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organisation	  (WTO)	  formalised	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  
development	  assistance	  in	  2005.	  Article	  57	  of	  the	  ‘Ministerial	  Conference’s	  Declaration’	  was	  
signed	   calling	   for	  more	   support	   for	   Least	  Developed	  Countries	   (LDC)	   to	  expand	   their	   trade	  
capacity	  and	  encourage	  various	  multilateral	  trade	  agreements	  between	  LDC’s	  and	  developed	  
nations.	  (Bassnet	  et	  al,	  2012).	  The	  signing	  of	  this	  declaration	  marked	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  development	  policy	  by	  defining	  the	  importance	  of	  trade	  as	  a	  sustainable	  mechanism	  
of	  development	  assistance.	  Aid	  for	  Trade	  (AfT)	  encourages	  developing	  countries	  to	  increase	  
their	   trade	   capacity	   and	   infrastructure	   in	   order	   to	   benefit	   from	  market	   openings	   through	  
multilateral	  trade	  agreements	  (wto.org,	  2019).	  The	  function	  of	  AfT	  is	  not	  to	  replace	  ODA,	  but	  
to	  strengthen	  and	  reinforce	  ODA	  efforts	  through	  long-­‐term	  economic	  arrangements	  in	  order	  
to	   support	   LDCs	   in	   becoming	  economically	   self-­‐sustainable	   through	   increased	   capacity	   and	  
access	  to	  the	  global	  trading	  system.	  AfT	  is	  not	  just	  limited	  to	  trade	  agreements	  but	  includes	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  efforts	  between	  development	  partners.	  This	  includes	  technical	  assistance,	  the	  
building	   of	   trade	   related	   infrastructure	   and	   telecommunications,	   investment	   in	   industry,	   a	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reduction	  in	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  trade	  such	  as	  tariffs,	  and	  preferential	  trade	  schemes	  for	  
LDC’s	  over	  developed	  nations.	  Since	  the	  time	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  AfT,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  
increase	  in	  donor	  spending	  on	  development	  related	  programmes	  and	  projects	  related	  to	  trade	  
(Bassnet	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  
	  
	  In	  response	  to	  the	  WTO	  AfT	  initiative,	  the	  EU	  adopted	  the	  ‘Aid	  for	  Trade	  Strategy’	  in	  2007.	  This	  
aims	  to	  help	  LDCs	  integrate	  into	  a	  “rules-­‐based	  world	  trading	  system”	  and	  to	  more	  effectively	  
use	   trade	   as	   a	  mechanism	   to	  help	   in	   the	   goal	   of	   poverty	   eradication	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  (MDGs)	  (Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  2007,	  p.	  2).	  The	  EU’s	  
Generalised	   Scheme	   of	   Preferences	   (GSP)	   is	   a	   mechanism	   of	   this	   strategy	   that	   allows	   all	  
countries	  that	  qualify	  for	  LDC	  status	  to	  pay	  less	  or	  no	  duty	  on	  their	  exports	  into	  the	  EU.	  The	  
GSP	  offers	  tariff	  reductions	  on	  two	  thirds	  of	  all	  product	  categories,	  while	  the	  Everything	  but	  
Arms	  Agreement	  (EBA),	  a	  sub	  category	  of	  the	  GSP	  scheme,	  offers	  full	  tariff	  free	  access	  for	  LDCs	  
on	   all	   export	   products	   except	   for	   arms	   and	   ammunition	   (International	   Cooperation	   and	  
Development	  –	  European	  Commission,	  2019).	  	  
	  
2.6   The	  Everything	  but	  Arms	  Agreement	  
The	  EBA	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  European	  Council	  No.	  416/2001	  under	  the	  EU’s	  
GSP.	  The	  EBA	  grants	  full	  duty	  free	  and	  quota	  access	  to	  the	  EU	  single	  market	  for	  all	  products	  
with	   the	   exception	   of	   arms	   and	   ammunition.	   In	   terms	   of	   its	   conditions,	   a	   country	  may	   be	  
granted	   access	   to	   the	   EBA	   if	   it	   is	   listed	   as	   an	   LDC	   by	   the	   United	   Nations	   Committee	   for	  
Development	   Policy.	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   preferential	   trade	   scheme	   is	   to	   support	   LDCs	   in	  
liberalising	  their	  economies	  and	  allowing	  space	  for	  them	  to	  enter	  the	  global	  trade	  market.	  	  	  
	  
The	  EU	  provides	  a	  transition	  period	  of	  three	  years	  for	  countries	  graduating	  from	  LDC	  status.	  
This	   helps	   to	   alleviate	   any	   negative	   effects	   of	   which	   may	   be	   caused	   by	   the	   removal	   of	  
preferential	  trade.	  To	  date,	  only	  five	  LDC	  countries	  have	  graduated	  from	  LDC	  status,	  of	  which	  
only	  four	  are	  under	  the	  EBA	  scheme:	  Cape	  Verde	  (2007),	  Maldives	  (2011),	  Samoa	  (2014),	  and	  
Equatorial	  Guinea	   (2017)	   (Bhattacharya,	   2018,	   p.	   26).	   There	   are	   currently	   5	   LDC’s	   that	   are	  
expected	   to	   graduate	   between	   2019	   and	   2024	   including:	   Vanuatu	   (2020),	   Angola	   (2012),	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Bhutan	   (2023),	  Sao	  Tome	  and	  Principe	   (2024),	  and	  Solomon	   Islands	   (2024)	   (United	  Nations	  
Economic	  Analysis	  and	  Policy	  Division,	  nd).	  	  
	  
EBA	   status	  may	   also	   be	  withdrawn	  under	   exceptional	   circumstances	   in	   violation	   of	   human	  
rights	   principles	   as	   outlined	   in	   the	   fundamental	   human	   rights	   and	   labour	   conventions	  
(Regulation	  (EU)	  No.	  978/2012).	  In	  the	  event	  of	  serious	  violations	  of	  the	  core	  15	  United	  Nations	  
(UN)	  and	  International	  Labour	  Organisation	  (ILO)	  conventions,	  the	  European	  Commission	  (EC)	  
can	   initiate	   an	   investigation	   if	   it	   believes	   there	   are	   appropriate	   grounds	   to	   justify	   such	  
withdrawal.	  This	  procedure	  is	  built	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  and	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  
each	  country.	  The	  EC	  will	  use	  key	  sources,	  reports	  and	  recommendations	  from	  the	  UN	  and	  ILO,	  
as	   well	   as	   information	   collected	   by	   the	   EU	   Delegation,	   EU	  Member	   States,	   the	   European	  
Parliament,	  CSOs	  and	  other	  international	  human	  rights	  bodies,	  and	  academia	  or	  information	  
gathered	  directly	  from	  the	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  county	  to	  the	  EC	  in	  order	  to	  make	  its	  assessment	  
(European	  Commission,	  2019).	  	  
	  
2.7   2018	  Cambodian	  Election	  	  
The	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  July	  2018	  election	  in	  particular,	  has	  been	  called	  into	  question	  by	  some	  of	  
Cambodia’s	  largest	  development	  assistance	  donors,	   including	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  and	  Japan.	  
During	   the	   lead	   up	   to	   the	   election	   the	   government	   controlled	   courts	   had	   dissolved	   any	  
opposition	  to	  CPP	  by	  banning	  all	  118	  members	  of	  the	  opposition	  party	  from	  participating	  in	  
politics.	   CPP	   took	   over	   all	   media,	   bankrupted	   or	   silenced	   independent	   newspapers,	   and	  
ordered	  independent	  radio	  stations	  to	  cease	  broadcasting	  any	  independent	  news	  broadcasts.	  
Journalists	   in	  the	  country	  were	  jailed	  for	  espionage	  and	  those	  who	  stood	  up	  for	  the	  victims	  
faced	   vitriol.	   Under	   these	   conditions	   the	   CPP	   secured	   a	   landslide	   victory,	   winning	   all	   125	  
parliamentary	  seats.	  In	  response,	  many	  foreign	  donors	  including	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  withdrew	  
aid,	  refused	  to	  send	  election	  observers,	  and	  placed	  sanctions	  upon	  the	  country.	  On	  the	  5th	  of	  
October	  2018,	  the	  EC	  began	  talks	  to	  consider	  temporary	  suspension	  of	  Cambodian	  preferential	  
trade	  access	  to	  the	  EU	  under	  the	  EBA.	  This	  was	  due	  to	  Cambodia’s	  deteriorating	  democratic	  
and	  human	  rights	  situation,	  throughout	  and	  post-­‐election.	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George	  Edgar,	  EU	  Ambassador	  to	  Cambodia,	  stated	  that	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  EBA	  won’t	  affect	  
the	  ongoing	  development	  projects	  in	  the	  country	  funded	  by	  the	  EU.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  country	  
should	  prepare	  for	  dramatic	  consequences	  and	  economic	  hardship	  if	  they	  do	  not	  choose	  to	  
comply.	   This	   may	   include	   the	   loss	   of	   jobs	   for	   thousands	   of	   Cambodians,	   mostly	   from	   the	  
garment	  and	  textile	  industries	  which	  employ	  more	  than	  half	  a	  million	  Cambodians,	  particularly	  
women	  (Suy,	  2018).	  	  
	  
2.8   Launch	  of	  Procedure	  to	  Withdraw	  the	  Everything	  but	  Arms	  
Agreement	  	  
The	  decision	  to	   launch	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA	  was	  officially	  published	  on	  February	  
11th	  2019	  in	  the	  EU	  Official	  Journal.	  This	  hoped	  to	  prompt	  a	  situation	  where	  Cambodia	  moves	  
towards	  alignment	  with	  its	  obligations	  under	  the	  core	  UN	  and	  ILO	  conventions.	  One	  year	  prior	  
to	  the	  launch	  of	  procedure,	  and	  six	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  election,	  the	  High	  Representative	  for	  
Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Vice	   President	   of	   the	   EC,	   Frederica	   Mogherini	   warned	   the	   Royal	  
Government	  of	  Cambodia	   that	  “Without	  more	  conclusive	  action	   from	  the	  government,	   the	  
situation	  on	  the	  ground	  calls	  Cambodia’s	  participation	  in	  the	  EBA	  scheme	  into	  question.	  As	  the	  
EU,	  we	  are	  committed	  to	  a	  partnership	  with	  Cambodia	  that	  delivers	  for	  the	  Cambodian	  people.	  
Our	  support	  for	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  this	  country	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  partnership”	  
(European	  Commission,	  2019).	  	  	  
	  
The	  withdrawal	  began	  with	  a	  six-­‐month	  period	  of	  intensive	  monitoring	  and	  engagement	  with	  
Cambodian	  authorities.	   This	  will	   be	   followed	  by	  another	   three-­‐month	  period	   for	   the	  EU	   to	  
produce	   a	   report	   based	   on	   its	   findings.	   After	   a	   total	   of	   12	   months,	   the	   Commission	   will	  
conclude	   the	   process	   with	   a	   decision	   on	  whether	   to	   partially	   or	   fully	   withdraw	   (European	  
Commission,	  2019).	  
	  
In	  its	  communications	  with	  Cambodia,	  the	  EU	  had	  been	  clear	  about	  the	  issues	  that	  need	  to	  be	  
addressed	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	  withdrawal.	   The	   key	   areas	   that	   have	   led	   to	   the	  withdrawal	  
include:	  denial	  of	  political	  rights,	  restrictive	  actions	  towards	  civil	  society	  and	  trade	  unions,	  and	  
Economic	  Land	  Concessions.	  The	  EU	  has	  also	  outlined	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  in	  which	  Cambodia	  is	  
expected	   to	   work	   towards	   improving.	   These	   include:	   a	   political	   environment	   in	   which	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opposition	  parties,	  civil	   society,	   trade	  unions	  and	  media	  can	  operate	   freely,	  and	  to	  address	  
other	   issues	  including	  an	  inclusive	  and	  transparent	  compensation	  related	  to	  Economic	  Land	  
Concessions	  (Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  2018).	  	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  noted	  by	  the	  EC	  in	  their	  initial	  press	  release	  that	  the	  RGC	  have	  taken	  a	  number	  of	  
positive	  steps	  since	  the	  withdrawal	  procedure	  was	  announced	   in	  2018.	  This	   incorporated	  a	  
number	  of	  steps	  to	  reduce	  restrictions	  on	  civil	  society	  and	  trade	  union	  activities.	  As	  well	  as	  
reviewing	   of	   cases	   of	   a	   number	   of	   detained	   political	   figures,	   civil	   society	   activists,	   and	  
journalists	   in	  August	  and	  September	  2018.	  However,	   it	   is	  not	  expected	   that	   the	  opposition	  
party	  will	   be	   fully	   reinstated,	   as	   this	  would	   be	   a	   costly	   political	  move	   for	  Hun	   Sen	   and	   his	  
government.	   The	   EU	   does	   not	   deem	   these	   steps	   to	   be	   sufficient	   in	   fully	   addressing	  
inadequacies	   previously	   outlined	   in	   these	   areas	   (European	   Commission,	   2019).	   The	   RGC	  	  
remain	  unalarmed	  regarding	  the	  potential	  negative	  impacts	  Cambodia’s	  economy	  may	  face	  if	  
the	  EBA	  is	  lost.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  12th	  of	  February	  2019,	  the	  RGC	  released	  a	  statement	  in	  response	  to	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal.	  
RGC	  stated	  that	  the	  withdrawal	  was	  “an	  extreme	  injustice	  and	  a	  disregard	  of	  the	  concrete	  and	  
substantial	  progress	  made	  by	  the	  RGC	  in	  adherence	  to	  conditions	  set	  out	  by	  the	  EBA	  in	  terms	  
of	   its	  progresses	  with	  the	  strengthening	  of	  civil	  society	  spaces,	  promoting	   labour	  rights	  and	  
addressing	   land	   issues	   and	   sugarcane	   economic	   land	   concession”	   (Royal	   Government	   of	  
Cambodia,	  2019).	  The	  RGC	  also	  expressed	  in	  this	  response	  that	  it	  does	  not	  believe	  the	  EC	  to	  
be	  acting	   in	  “good	  faith”	  and	  “fairness”	  and	  has	  set	  unachievable	  expectations	   for	  “perfect	  
implementation”	  of	  EU	  aid	  conditions.	  The	  RGC	  states	  that	  by	  launching	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal,	  
the	  EU	  is	  risking	  the	  loss	  of	  20	  years	  of	  economic	  development	  efforts.	  	  
	  
Following	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw,	  Prime	  Minister	  Hun	  Sen	  and	  the	  RGC	  have	  
attempted	  to	  propagate	  that	  Cambodia’s	  economy	  and	  people	  will	  not	  be	  adversely	  affected	  
by	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  withdrawal.	  This	  is	  a	  direct	  contradiction	  to	  the	  response	  the	  RGC	  
provided	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  saying	  the	  EU	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	  “the	  fate	  of	  nearly	  1	  million	  female	  
workers”	  and	  the	  “interests	  of	  EU	  businesses	  in	  Cambodia”	  (Heng	  and	  Var,	  2019).	  Hun	  Sen	  has	  
been	  quoted	  to	  have	  said	  that	  he	  and	  his	  government	  regards	  this	  as	  an	  act	  of	  interference	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with	  national	  sovereignty	  and	  that	  “Cambodia	  with	  not	  exchange	  sovereignty	  with	  aid”	  (Heng	  
and	  Var,	  2019).	  	   	  	  
	  
2.9   Cambodia	  and	  China	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  address	  the	  relationship	  between	  Cambodia	  and	  China	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  
study	  for	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  Cambodia	  and	  China’s	  bilateral	  relations	  in	  terms	  of	  aid	  and	  trade	  
have	  increased	  significantly	  post	  Khmer	  Rouge.	  Secondly,	  Cambodia’s	  relationship	  with	  China	  
affects	   its	  relationship	  with	  the	  EU,	   in	  that	  China	  also	  provides	  aid	  to	  Cambodia	  and	  has	  an	  
impact	   on	   Cambodia’s	   dependency	   problem.	   Economically	   speaking,	   China	   significantly	  
contributes	  to	  Cambodia’s	  development	  as	  a	  foreign	  investor,	  aid	  donor,	  and	  trading	  partner.	  
A	   vast	  majority	   of	   China	   aid	   comes	   to	   Cambodia	   in	   the	   form	  of	   corporate	   investment	   and	  
concessional	  loans.	  As	  China	  doesn’t	  donate	  its	  aid	  through	  traditional	  channels	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
track	  exact	  figures.	  Open	  Development	  Cambodia	  estimates	  that	  China’s	  official	   investment	  
into	   the	  Cambodian	  economy	  has	   totalled	  nearly	   €4.3	  billion	   since	   it	   began	   in	   2004	   (Open	  
Development	  Cambodia,	  2016).	  	  	  	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  EU’s	  actions	  over	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal,	  China	  has	  pledged	  €520	  million	  to	  
Cambodia	  for	  the	  period	  of	  2019-­‐2021,	  has	  called	  to	  increase	  its	  rice	  imports	  from	  Cambodia,	  
vowed	  to	  push	  bilateral	  trade	  to	  €9	  billion	  by	  2023,	  and	  encourages	  more	  Chinese	  investment	  
(Reuters,	  2019).	  On	  top	  of	  this,	  China’s	  ‘Belt	  and	  Road	  Initiative’	  which	  aims	  to	  boost	  trade	  and	  
economic	  growth	  across	  Asia	  through	  infrastructure	  development,	  is	  a	  very	  attractive	  concept	  
for	  undeveloped	  Asian	  nations.	  Cambodia	  has	  committed	  its	  support	  to	  this	  initiative	  through	  
the	  signing	  of	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MoU)	  in	  2015	  (Xinhuanet,	  2017).	  Cambodia	  
expresses	   it	   sees	   China	   not	   as	   a	   threat,	   but	   as	   a	   balancing	   power	   against	   foreign	   political	  
interference	  and	  military	  threats	  (Chanborey,	  2019).	  	  
	  
With	   both	   the	   EU	   and	   China	   playing	   major	   roles	   in	   the	   development	   of	   Cambodia,	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   look	   at	   how	   this	   effects	   Cambodia’s	   responses	   towards	   the	   EBA	  withdrawal.	  
Chinese	   aid	   is	   particularly	   attractive	   to	   Cambodia	   because	   of	   its	   non-­‐conditional	   nature	   in	  
terms	  of	  normative	  values,	  unlike	  that	  of	  the	  EU’s.	  A	  major	  reason	  for	  Cambodia’s	  negative	  
response	  to	  the	  EU	  may	  well	  be	  the	  fact	  that	  increasing	  Chinese	  aid	  and	  trade	  to	  the	  country	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means	   that	   Cambodia	   is	   no	   longer	   as	   dependent	   on	   the	   EU	   for	   these	   resources.	   This	   has	  
resulted	   in	   a	   loss	   of	   EU	   leverage	   affecting	   its	   ability	   to	   successfully	   exercise	   conditionality	  
clauses	   in	   the	  EBA	   in	   terms	  of	   democratic	   reform	  and	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	  principles.	  
Politically,	  China	  has	  been	  one	  of	  Cambodia’s	  oldest	  and	  closest	  allies.	  More	  importantly,	  due	  
to	   their	   long	  diplomatic	   relationship,	  Cambodia	  and	  China	  have	  much	  stronger	  cultural	   ties	  
than	  Cambodia	  and	   the	  EU	   (Pheakdey,	  2012,	  p.	  58).	  This	  poses	  a	   threat	   to	   the	  democratic	  
governance	  model	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  attempting	  to	  promote	  in	  Cambodia.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  
none	   of	   the	   countries	   surrounding	   Cambodia	   practice	   a	   liberal	   democratic	  model.	   So	   it	   is	  
unsurprising	  that	  the	  RGC’s	  interests	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  own	  governing	  model,	  rejects	  that	  of	  the	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3.  Literature	  Review	  –	  Aid	  Architecture	  in	  Cambodia	  	  	  
	  
The	  benefits	   of	   development	   assistance	   have	   been	  widely	   debated	   for	   a	   number	   of	   years.	  
Arguments	  have	  been	  made	  that	  aid	  can	  produce	  largely	  positive	  effects	  under	  a	  particular	  set	  
of	  conditions	  and	  is	  a	  necessary	  asset	  for	  accelerated	  development	  in	  third	  world	  countries.	  
The	  opposite	  is	  also	  widely	  disputed	  as	  aid	  is	  not	  programmed	  to	  induce	  self-­‐sustainability	  in	  a	  
recipient	  country	  after	  a	  period	  of	  time.	  Because	  of	  this	  it	  often	  does	  more	  harm	  than	  good	  to	  
the	   economic	   and	   political	   welfares	   of	   these	   countries.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   important	   how	  
development	  aid	  is	  delivered	  and	  what	  forms	  it	  takes.	  	  
	  
Historically,	  the	  large	  amounts	  of	  EU	  aid	  in	  Cambodia	  do	  seem	  to	  reflect	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  
its	   aid	   dependency,	   which	   can	   be	   associated	   with	   the	   country’s	   increase	   in	   corruption,	  
worsening	  bureaucratic	  systems,	  and	  erosion	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  Development	  aid	  in	  Cambodia	  
has	  been	  largely	  donor	  driven.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this,	  Cambodia	  has	  not	  received	  enough	  ownership	  
over	  its	  development	  objectives	  which	  largely	  effects	  the	  results	  of	  development	  programmes	  
within	  the	  country,	  both	  when	  donor	  governments	  are	  present	  and	  once	  they	  are	  withdrawn.	  	  
	  
Self-­‐sustainability	   has	   arguably	   been	   a	   liable	   factor	   of	   failure	   in	   Cambodia’s	   development	  
problems,	   despite	   its	   large	   amount	   of	   development	   investment.	   In	   light	   of	   these	   past	   aid	  
mechanisms,	  a	  new	  initiative	  has	  been	  called	  into	  place.	  Aid	  for	  Trade	  (AfT)	  is	  a	  more	  modern	  
solution	  to	  the	  problems	  ODA	  seems	  to	  have	  caused	  in	  terms	  of	  self-­‐sustainable	  development.	  
It	   was	   found	   that	   countries	   which	   follow	   an	   investment	   and	   trade	   liberalisation	   route	   to	  
development	  have	  been	  far	  more	  successful	  in	  terms	  of	  growth	  (Jayasuriya,	  2006,	  p.	  60).	  Donor	  
countries	  sign	  LDC’s	  into	  preferential	  trade	  agreements	  that	  give	  LDC’s	  preferential	  access	  to	  
their	   markets	   through	   the	   cutting	   of	   tariffs	   on	   export	   products.	   How	   effective	   these	  
agreements	  are	  at	  promoting	  sustainable	  development	  practices	  in	  LDC’s	  are	  also	  reliant	  on	  a	  
particular	  set	  of	  conditions	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  agreements.	  This	  literature	  review	  outlines	  
several	   important	  aspects	  within	  the	  nature	  of	  development	  assistance	  and	  puts	   it	   into	  the	  
context	  of	  Cambodia.	   It	   is	   important	  to	  understand	  these	  factors	   in	  answering	  the	  research	  
question	  as	  it	  helps	  to	  illustrate	  Cambodia’s	  position	  with	  the	  EU	  in	  terms	  of	  it	  dependency	  and	  
the	   influencing	   factors	   that	   have	   contributed	   to	   Cambodia’s	   responses	   towards	   the	   EBA	  
withdrawal.	  	  
	   27	  
3.1   The	  Problem	  of	  Donor	  Driven	  Aid	  	  
Cambodia’s	   experiences	   since	   1993	   have	   shown	   that	   programme	   design	   in	   terms	   of	  
development	  aid	  have	  been	  largely	  donor-­‐driven	  in	  its	  planning,	  design,	  and	  implementation	  
stages.	  This	  ultimately	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  capacity	  for	  development	  in	  Cambodia.	  ODA	  
supported	  development	  programmes	  often	  have	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  recipient	  government,	  
this	   complicates	   project	   implementation	   and	   threatens	   post-­‐project	   financial	   sustainability	  
(Godfrey	   et	   al.,	   2002,	   p.	   371).	   Berg	   critiques	   the	   donor	   driven	   nature	   of	   development	  
assistance.	  He	  argues	  that	  excessive	  supply	  driven	  aid	   leads	  to	   inefficient	  aid	  allocation	  and	  
weak	  local	  ownership,	  instigating	  a	  lack	  of	  commitment	  from	  the	  recipient	  government.	  This	  
leads	  to	  poor	  decision	  making	  and	  further	  contributes	  to	  aid	  dependence	  which	  weakens	  local	  
institutions	  and	  capacities,	  and	  stifles	  economic	  growth.	  (Berg,	  1993,	  p.	  246).	  Other	  effects	  of	  
donor	  driven	  aid	  include	  weakening	  state	  bureaucracies	  as	  foreign	  aid	  crowds	  out	  local	  sectors,	  
which	  in	  turn	  de-­‐industrialises	  the	  economy.	  	  
	  
Commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   ‘Dutch	   Disease’,	   donor	   projects	   have	   deterred	   government	  
incentive	   in	  Cambodia,	  by	  placing	   foreign	  agencies	   in	   charge	  of	  what	  would	  usually	  be	   the	  
government	   area	  of	   services	   and	  provisional	   responsibilities	   (Ear,	   2007,	   p.	   70).	   Cambodia’s	  
scarcest	  resource	  –	  educated	  people,	  are	  being	  siphoned	  away	  from	  locally	  owned	  businesses	  
and	   toward	   employment	   with	   donor	   agencies	   and	   NGOs.	   Working	   for	   donors,	   these	  
employee’s	  incentives	  will	  naturally	  become	  donor	  driven.	  While	  the	  general	  goal	  for	  aid	  may	  
be	  development,	   in	  bilateral	  aid	   this	  serves	   the	  donor	  countries	   foreign	  policy	  and	  national	  
interest	  more	  (Ear,	  2007,	  p.	  76).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  donors	  and	  NGOs	  virtually	  take	  over	  the	  
funding	   for	   projects	   in	   education,	   health	   care,	   social	  welfare,	   and	   rural	   development.	   This	  
leaves	  no	  incentive	  for	  the	  government	  to	  take	  on	  these	  responsibilities,	  and	  so	  spend	  ODA	  
mostly	  on	  military	  and	  security	  (Godfrey	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  p.	  123).	  
	  
3.2   Aid	  Dependence	  	  
Donor	  driven	  aid	  in	  this	  context	  results	  in	  aid	  dependence,	  which	  has	  been	  directly	  linked	  to	  
questions	  of	  worsening	  quality	  of	  governance	  in	  recipient	  countries.	  Bräutigam	  and	  Botchwey	  
(1999,	  p.	  2)	  argue	  that	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  quality	  of	  governance	  determines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
aid	  undermines	  institutions.	  This	  hypothesis	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  a	  case	  study	  conducted	  by	  Knack	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(2001),	   which	   found	   a	   negative	   correlation	   between	   aid	   dependence	   and	   quality	   of	  
governance.	  Knack	  (2001,	  p.	  253)	  states,	  	  
	  
“Aid	   dependence	   worsens	   quality	   of	   governance	   by	   weakening	   institutional	  
capacity,	   siphoning	   off	   scarce	   talent	   from	   the	   bureaucracy,	   weakening	  
accountability,	  encourages	  rent	  seeking	  and	  corruption,	  stimulating	  conflict	  over	  
control	   of	   aid	   funds,	   and	   alleviating	   pressures	   to	   reform	   inefficient	   policies	   and	  
institutions”.	  	  
	  
Knack’s	  (2001)	   findings	  help	  to	   legitimise	  the	  reality	  of	  some	  very	  serious	  problems	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  international	  development	  aid.	  The	  World	  Banks	  report	  entitled	  ‘Cambodia	  at	  the	  
Crossroads’,	  includes	  a	  chapter	  on	  ‘Improving	  Aid	  Effectiveness’	  which	  offers	  some	  insight	  into	  
this	  issue.	  The	  World	  Bank	  (2004,	  p.	  108)	  states;	  	  
	   	  
“There	  is	  much	  that	  donors	  can	  and	  should	  do	  to	  make	  their	  assistance	  to	  Cambodia	  
more	   effective.	   There	   are	   numerous	   examples	   of	   how	   donors	   have	   behaved,	  
individually	  and	  collectively,	  which	  result	  in	  inefficient	  and	  ineffective	  aid;	  or	  which	  
even	  make	  things	  worse	  by	  contributing	  to	  (or	  exacerbating)	  a	  culture	  of	  corruption	  
and	  patronage	  in	  the	  use	  of	  public	  resources.	  Poorly	  managed	  aid	  can	  inadvertently	  
impede	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  coherent	  Government	  vision	  of	  long-­‐term	  development	  
or	  undermine	  the	  capacity	  of	  institutions	  or	  the	  state	  and	  de-­‐legitimise	  civil	  society	  
organisations”.	  	  
	  
Corruption	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  Cambodia’s	  past	  and	  aid	  dependence	  only	  seems	  to	  intensify	  
and	  reinforce	  these	  problems	  into	  its	  future.	  What	  seems	  to	  be	  lacking	  is	  the	  political	  will	  
from	  both	  donor	  and	  recipient	  governments	  to	  change	  this	  ethos	  of	  corruption	  that	  has	  
become	   so	   deeply	   embedded	   within	   the	   institutions	   and	   society	   of	   Cambodia.	   This	  
contributes	  to	  its	  dependency	  and	  illuminates	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  RGC	  and	  the	  EU	  have	  
come	  to	  an	  impasse	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal.	  According	  to	  Post	  et.	  al.	  (2008,	  p.	  114)	  
“Political	  will	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   support	   from	  political	   leaders	   that	   results	   in	   policy	  
change”.	  Hammergren	  (1998,	  p.	  12)	  defines	  political	  will	  as	  the	  “’sine	  qua	  non’	  of	  policy	  
success	  which	  can	  never	  be	  defined	  except	  in	  its	  absence”.	  These	  quotes	  help	  to	  illustrate	  
	   29	  
what	  is	  fundamentally	  broken	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  aid	  relationships	  and	  capacity	  building.	  
By	  no	  means	  is	  this	  relationship	  a	  simplistic	  one,	  however,	  one	  must	  lead	  by	  example.	  	  
	  
3.3   Ownership	  	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ‘Paris	  Declaration	  on	  Aid	  Effectiveness’	  (The	  Paris	  Declaration)	  and	  the	  
‘Accra	  Agenda	  for	  Action’,	  ownership	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  recipient	  countries	  capacity	  to	  carry	  out	  
two	   main	   objectives.	   Firstly,	   to	   practice	   effective	   leadership	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   development	  
policies	  and	  strategy.	  Secondly,	   to	  be	  able	   to	  co-­‐ordinate	  efforts	  made	  by	   the	  multitude	  of	  
development	  actors	  within	  these	  programmes	  (OECD/DAC,	  2005/2008,	  p.3).	  The	  operational	  
ability	   of	   a	   country’s	   development	   strategy,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   ability	   to	   pursue	   country	   wide	  
development	  policy,	  and	  whether	  these	  priorities	  and	  policies	  are	  linked	  with	  a	  budget,	  are	  all	  
important	  features	  of	  most	  effectively	  and	  efficiently	  using	  development	  resources.	  	  
	  
Van	  de	  Wall	  and	  Johnson	  (1996	  p.	  54)	  state	  that	  “a	  recipient	  government	  can	  be	  said	  to	  ‘own’	  
aid	  activity	  when	  they	  believe	  it	  empowers	  them,	  and	  serves	  their	  best	  interests”.	  To	  elaborate,	  
this	  means	  that	  ownership	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  extent	  which	  the	  recipient	  government	  plays	  an	  
active	   role	   in	   the	   design	   and	   implementation	   stages	   of	   a	   development	   programme.	   The	  
Cambodian	  Development	   Resource	   Institute	   (CDRI)	   conducted	   interviews	  with	   government	  
officials,	   project	   managers,	   agency	   heads,	   technical	   assistance,	   and	   other	   development	  
counterparts	   in	   Cambodia.	   The	   results	   of	   these	   interviews	   showed	   that	   a	   majority	   of	   its	  
respondents	   felt	   that	   the	   Cambodian	   Government	   had	   only	   partial	   ownership	   in	   terms	   of	  
project	  design	  and	  implementation,	  particularly	  in	  multilateral	  projects,	  which	  were	  demand-­‐
driven	   by	   donors	   as	   opposed	   to	   national	   policy	   (Godfrey	   et	   al,	   2002	   p.	   363).	  Government	  
ownership	  in	  this	  sense	  depends	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  department	  officials	  are	  able	  to	  
exert	   control	   over	   these	   programmes.	   The	   tight	   control	   that	   donors	   tend	   to	   exude	   over	  
development	  programmes	  funded	  by	  them,	  demonstrates	  not	  only	  the	  recipient’s	  low	  capacity	  
to	  obtain	  ownership,	  but	  also	  the	  donors	  trust	  in	  the	  recipient	  governments	  capacity.	  	  
	  
Recipient	   ownership	   is	   an	   important	   concept	   for	   several	   reasons.	   Conditionality	   as	   a	  
mechanism	  of	  pressure	  used	  by	  donors	  to	  enforce	  specific	  values,	  undermines	  recipients	  claim	  
to	  ownership	  over	  policy	  reforms.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  as	  it	  helps	  to	  connect	  Cambodia’s	  
	   30	  
aid	   effectiveness	   problems	  with	   the	  question	  of	   effectiveness	   of	   conditionality	   to	   promote	  
development.	   If	   recipient	   ownership	   has	   been	   identified	   as	   a	   potential	   solution,	   then	  
conditionality	  directly	  undermines	   this.	  A	   study	  conducted	  by	  Adam	  et.	  al.	   (2004,	  p.	  1060),	  
state	  that	  the	  efficiency	  of	  budgetary	  aid	  lies	  in	  recipient	  ownership	  in	  that	  strong	  recipient	  
ownership	   benefits	   all	   parties	   in	   aid	   transactions.	   They	   state,	   this	   is	   firstly	   as	   the	   donor	  
government	  is	  only	  able	  to	  exert	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  control	  over	  recipient	  government,	  it	  is	  
within	   the	   donor’s	   best	   interests	   that	   both	   priorities	   align.	   Secondly,	   it	   benefits	   domestic	  
ownership	   is	   that	   it	  may	  help	   to	   initiate	  quicker	   response	   times	   in	   the	   case	  of	  unexpected	  
economic	  and	  political	  events	  or	  problems,	   that	  may	  have	  not	  been	   identified	   in	   the	   initial	  
policy	  programme	  drafting.	  Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  ownership	  is	  vital	  for	  local	  
democratic	   accountability	   to	   retain	  meaningfulness	   in	   the	   recipient	   country,	   particularly	   in	  
retaining	  legitimacy.	  
	  
Sjöstedt	  (2013,	  p.	  114)	  reiterates	  the	  above	  points	  in	  stating	  that	  there	  are	  two	  main	  features	  
that	  are	  newly	  emerging	  in	  terms	  of	  aid	  architecture.	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  
recipient	   country	   ownership	   of	   development	   strategy,	   where	   donors	   must	   align	   and	  
coordinate	   themselves.	   This	   new	   approach	   is	   highlighted	   by	   the	   ‘Paris	   Declaration	   on	   Aid	  
Effectiveness’,	  which	   aims	   to	   instigate	   a	  move	  away	   from	  donor	   fragmentation	   and	   forced	  
conditionality.	  The	  second	  main	  feature	  is	  also	  echoed	  by	  the	  Paris	  Declaration.	  Sjöstedt	  (2013)	  
states	  that	  aid	  needs	  to	  be	  allocated	  based	  on	  performance	  of	  a	  country’s	  policy	  and	  be	  driven	  
by	   measurable	   results.	   David	   Booth	   (2011,	   p.	   534)	   in	   his	   article	   titled	   ‘Aid	   effectiveness:	  
bringing	   country	   ownership	   (and	   politics)	   back	   in’,	   restates	   this	   in	   suggesting	   that	  
“development	  aid	  should	  be	  coordinated	  and,	  for	  example,	  channelled	  directly	  into	  the	  central	  
budget	  of	  the	  recipient	  government	  in	  line	  with	  its	  priorities”.	  	  
	  
Commitments	  have	  been	  made	  by	  both	  the	  RGC	  and	  external	  aid	  donors	  to	  improve	  upon	  the	  
management	  functions	  of	  ODA.	  EU	  frameworks	  such	  as	  ‘The	  European	  Cooperation	  Strategy	  
for	  Cambodia’	  aligns	  with	  the	  RGC’s	  ‘Rectangular	  Strategy	  Phase	  III’	  which	  is	  operationalised	  
by	   the	   NSDP.	   Theses	   have	   been	   put	   into	   place	   in	   order	   to	   mitigate	   the	   issues	   of	   ODA	  
functionality	  and	  coordination	  in	  Cambodia.	  In	  this	  framework,	  donors	  to	  Cambodia	  tend	  to	  
agree	   that	   aid	   can	   be	   most	   effective	   when	   it	   is	   closely	   linked	   with	   the	   countries	   own	  
development	  policy	  and	  strategy.	  The	  NSDP	  and	  the	  Cambodia	  Sustainable	  Development	  Goals	  
	   31	  
(CSDGs)	  reiterate	  this,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  an	  aim	  to	  build	  government	  capacity	  and	  strengthen	  
national	  institutions.	  
	  
3.4   A	  New	  Approach	  -­‐	  Aid	  for	  Trade	  
The	  previous	  topics	  discussed	  traditional	  forms	  of	  ODA	  and	  the	  paradoxical	  problems	  these	  
mechanisms	  seemed	  to	  have	  caused.	  An	  emphasis	  on	  more	  modern	  solutions	  to	  development	  
assistance	  will	  now	  be	  of	  focus.	  Historically,	  aid	  has	  been	  the	  most	  favoured	  tool	  in	  terms	  of	  
supporting	   development	   in	   LDCs,	   as	   it	   was	   seen	   to	   be	   extremely	   effective	   at	   supporting	  
economic	  growth.	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  countries	  which	  follow	  an	  investment	  and	  
trade	  liberalisation	  route	  to	  development	  have	  been	  far	  more	  successful	  in	  terms	  of	  growth	  
(Jayasuriya,	   2006,	   p.	   60).	   This	   realisation	   prompted	   a	   shift	   in	   development	   policy	   to	  more	  
heavily	  consider	  the	  benefits	  of	  trade	  on	  the	  route	  towards	  development.	  	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  aid	  effectiveness,	  self-­‐sustainability	  has	  been	  a	  common	  problem	  in	  the	  past.	  ODA	  
alone	   as	   a	  means	   for	   development	   has	   led	   to	   issues	   around	  dependency,	   lack	   of	   recipient	  
ownership,	   and	   fragmentation.	   Gradeva	   and	  Martinez-­‐Zarzoso	   (2009,	   p.	   3-­‐4),	   examine	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  AfT	  as	  a	  new	  form	  of	  development	  assistance.	  They	  compared	  this	  form	  of	  
assistance	  with	  ODA	  and	  found	  that	  the	  effectives	  of	  an	  EBA	  scheme	  at	  encouraging	  economic	  
growth	  alone	  was	  low.	  However,	  when	  combined	  with	  ODA,	  the	  effect	  on	  economic	  growth	  
was	  much	  higher.	  Their	  findings	  indicate	  that	  for	  development	  assistance	  to	  be	  fully	  effective,	  
it	   must	   include	   elements	   of	   both	   aid	   and	   preferential	   trade	   assistance.	   ‘The	   European	  
Development	  Cooperation	  Strategy	  for	  Cambodia	  2014-­‐2019’	  does	  reference	  this.	  It	  commits	  
to	   including	   both	   mechanisms	   in	   its	   current	   strategy	   as	   it	   recognises	   the	   importance	   of	  
sustainability	  in	  terms	  of	  growth.	  It	  also	  mentions	  concerns	  around	  the	  current	  political	  affairs	  
of	   the	   RGC	   and	   so	   is	   in	   the	   process	   of	   considering	   a	   withdrawal	   of	   the	   EBA,	   leaving	   only	  
traditionally	  funded	  development	  assistance	  programmes	  in	  place	  (EEAS,	  2019,	  p.	  8).	  	  
	  
Trade	  preferences	  act	  as	  a	  counterbalance	  to	  aid	  distributions	  by	  helping	  to	  offset	  some	  of	  the	  
comparative	  disadvantages	  that	  come	  with	  aid.	  It	  also	  helps	  to	  increase	  incentive	  for	  recipient	  
governments	  to	   invest	   in	   industry	  and	  regain	  ownership	  over	  their	  development	  objectives.	  
AfT	  must	  also	  come	  with	  the	  right	  political	  incentives.	  The	  sustainable	  aspect	  of	  preferential	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trade	   relies	   on	   sustainable	   industries	   in	   LDCs.	   Gradeva	   and	   Martinez-­‐Zarzoso	   (2009,	   p.7)	  
explain	  that	  GSP	  programmes	  do	  not	  necessarily	  cover	  all	  products.	  Countries	  then	  tend	  to	  
lean	  towards	  the	  production	  and	  exporting	  of	  products	  that	  provide	  the	  highest	  profit	  margin	  
rather	  than	  those	  that	  can	  be	  produced	  most	  efficiently.	  Promoting	  industries	  that	  have	  little	  
potential	  for	  growth	  outside	  of	  these	  schemes	  means	  that	  once	  preferential	  trade	  is	  withdrawn	  
from	  the	  country’s	  main	  export	  market,	  there	  is	  nowhere	  for	  these	  products	  to	  go.	  This	  can	  
cause	  industry	  collapse	  as	  preference	  schemes	  lock	  beneficiary	  countries	  into	  unsustainable	  
industry,	  a	  particular	  problem	  for	  LDC’s	  such	  as	  Cambodia,	  where	  worker	  skill-­‐set	  is	  low.	  When	  
these	  industries	  collapse	  people	  lose	  their	  jobs.	  With	  low	  skill	  sets,	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  
these	  people	  to	  shift	  into	  other	  industries.	  LDC’s	  export	  earnings	  and	  national	  income	  are	  now	  
dependant	   on	   these	  preferential	   trade	   schemes	   as	   they	   are	   not	   competitive	   on	   the	   global	  
market	   due	   to	   investing	   in	   inefficient	   industries.	   Another	   issue	   that	   arises	   here	   is	   that	  
preferential	  trade	  schemes	  tend	  to	  divert	  trade	  flows	  rather	  than	  create	  new	  ones.	  Based	  on	  
the	  fact	  that	  production	  diversity	  is	  relatively	  similar	  in	  many	  LDC’s,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  growth	  
of	   some	   countries	   will	   come	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   others	   (IMF/World	   Bank,	   2001,	   p.	   4	   and	  
Messerlin,	   P.,	   Neilson,	   J.	   and	   Zedillo,	   E.,	  2005,	   p.172).	   Another	   problem	   that	   surfaces	  with	  
preferential	  trade	  is	  that	  it	  is	  driven	  by	  developed	  countries,	  causing	  a	  similar	  problem	  to	  donor	  
driven	  aid.	  Developed	  countries	  are	  free	  to	  design	  these	  schemes	  however	  it	  suits	  them.	  As	  a	  
consequence,	  LDC’s	  have	  little	  input	  and	  security	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  longevity	  of	  these	  agreements	  
and	  what	  they	  will	  include	  (Gradeva	  and	  Martinez-­‐Zarzoso,	  2009,	  p.8).	  
	  
Another	  point	  of	  controversy	  in	  terms	  of	  preferential	  trade	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  development	  is	  the	  
that	   these	   agreements	   are	   often	   subject	   to	   a	   set	   of	   conditions.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	  
preferential	  access	  is	  tentative	  for	  LDCs	  and	  subject	  to	  change	  or	  withdrawal	  from	  donors	  in	  
terms	  of	  non-­‐trade	  conditionality	  (Messerlin,	  P.,	  Neilson,	  J.	  and	  Zedillo,	  E.,	  2005,	  p.	  171).	  These	  
agreements	   can	   be	   used	   as	   a	   bargaining	   tool	   for	   LDC’s	   to	   comply	  with	   a	   particular	   set	   of	  
conditions	  set	  by	  the	  donor	  country	  across	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  areas.	  Conditions	  may	  include	  trade	  
or	  unrelated	  political	  issues	  and	  can	  be	  temporarily	  withdrawn	  at	  any	  time.	  For	  example,	  the	  
EBA	  scheme	  contains	  a	  clause	  that	  allows	  the	  EU	  to	  temporality	  withdraw	  access	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
“serious	   and	   systematic	   violations	   of	   principles	   as	   laid	   down	   in	   certain	   international	  
conventions	  concerning	  core	  human	  rights	  and	  labour	  rights,	  so	  as	  to	  promote	  the	  objectives	  
of	  those	  conventions”	  (Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  978/2012	  Clause	  24).	  The	  non-­‐reciprocal	  nature	  of	  
	   33	  
these	  agreements,	  as	  well	  as	  tying	  trade	  preferences	  to	  conditions	  unrelated	  to	  trade,	  turns	  
these	   schemes	   into	   a	   type	   of	   tied	   aid,	   in	   that	   the	   aid	   is	   ‘tied’	   to	   particular	   performance	  
outcomes	  or	  conditions.	  Lack	  of	  supply	  capacity,	  diversification,	  high	  production	  costs,	  poor	  
infrastructure,	   weak	   institutions,	   low	   skill	   capacity,	   lack	   of	   ownership,	   and	   risky	   political	  
environments	  are	  all	  major	  issues	  for	  LDC’s	  in	  the	  export	  trade	  market	  (Gradeva	  and	  Martinez-­‐
Zarzoso,	  2009,	  p.	  9).	  All	   these	  combining	   factors	  make	   it	  difficult	   for	  LDC’s	   to	  become	  self-­‐
sustainable	  once	  they	  enter	  the	  global	  trading	  market	  through	  these	  schemes.	  It	  creates	  an	  
unstable	   environment	   for	   their	   economies	   while	   removing	   ownership	   of	   their	   own	  
development	  objectives.	  Economies	  become	  reliant	  on	  these	  preferential	  trade	  schemes	  and	  
when	  withdrawn	  may	  have	  disastrous	  effects	  not	  only	  on	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  country,	  but	  the	  
people	  whose	  livelihoods	  are	  reliant	  on	  these	  markets.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  modern	  solutions	  
to	  aid	  effectiveness	  that	  are	  supposedly	  provided	  by	  AfT	  are	  directly	  undermined	  by	  its	  own	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4.  Conceptual	   Framework	   –	   Conditionality	   as	   a	  Mechanism	   to	  
Promote	  Democracy	  and	  Development	  	  
	  
4.1   What	  is	  Conditionality?	  	  
Conditionality	   has	   been	   chosen	   for	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   as	   it	   represents	   the	   specific	  
action	  or	  mechanism	  the	  EU	  uses	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  development	  outcomes	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
key	  principles	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  Therefore,	  determining	  whether	  this	  kind	  of	  
conditionality	   is	   effective	   is	   of	   both	   practical	   and	   theoretical	   importance	   to	   this	   research.	  
Although	   other	   definitions	   for	   the	   concept	   of	   conditionality	   exist,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  
research,	  conditionality	  will	  be	  defined	  by	  using	  two	  definitions.	  The	  first	  definition	  comes	  from	  
Saltnes	  (2013,	  p.	  1)	  who	  states	  “Political	  conditionality	  refers	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  validity	  
of	  an	  international	  agreement	  is	  made	  dependent	  on	  the	  partner’s	  mutual	  respect	  for	  certain	  
principles,	   normally	   related	   to	  human	   rights,	   democracy,	   good	   governance	   and	   the	   rule	  of	  
law”.	  The	  second	  definition	  comes	  from	  Stokke	  	  (n.d,	  p.	  12)	  who	  states	  that	  conditionality	  is	  
“the	  use	  of	  pressure	  by	  donors	  through	  threatening	  to	  terminate	  aid,	  or	  actually	  terminating	  
or	  reducing	  it,	  if	  such	  conditions	  are	  not	  met	  by	  the	  recipient”.	  
	  
Conditionality	  has	  been	  commonly	  separated	  into	  two	  main	  types,	  ex-­‐post	  and	  ex-­‐ante,	  and	  
positive	  and	  negative.	  Dipama	  and	  Parlar	  Dal	  (2015,	  p.	  113)	  explain	  that	  ex-­‐ante	  conditionality	  
is	   defined	   whereby	   conditions	   must	   be	   fulfilled	   before	   the	   conclusion	   of	   an	   agreement	  
between	  donor	  and	  recipient.	  Ex-­‐post	  conditionality	  means	  that	  the	  donor	  imposes	  conditions	  
within	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   framework	   of	   such	   arrangement	   or	   agreement.	   Subsequently,	   the	  
relationship	  between	  donor	  and	  recipient	  becomes	  dependent	  of	  the	  recipient’s	  fulfilment	  of	  
such	  conditions.	  Ex-­‐post	  conditionality	  is	  widely	  deemed	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  as	  it	  gives	  the	  
donor	  more	   leverage	   and	   capacity	   to	   act	   in	   situations	   where	   the	   recipient	   country	   is	   not	  
showing	   positive	   results	   in	   terms	   of	   pre-­‐agreed	   conditions.	   It	   also	   helps	   solve	   issues	   of	  
sovereignty	   violation	  and	  donor	   credibility.	   Therefore,	   arrangements	  must	  be	  agreed	   to	  by	  
both	  parties	  prior	  to	  commencement	  in	  turn	  giving	  them	  a	  stronger	  legal	  standing.	  The	  second	  
main	  distinction	  according	  to	  Dipama	  and	  Parlar	  Dal	  (2015,	  p.	  113-­‐114),	   is	  between	  positive	  
and	  negative	  conditionality.	  Negative	  conditionality	  is	  the	  practice	  of	  reducing,	  suspending	  or	  
terminating	  aid	  or	  trade,	  or	  diplomatic	  benefits	  as	  a	  form	  of	  punishment	  for	  violating	  terms	  of	  
	   35	  
conditions.	  This	  form	  of	  conditionality	  is	  widely	  criticised	  because	  of	  its	  potential	  effects	  on	  the	  
most	  vulnerable	  of	   the	  recipient	  country’s	  population	  as	  opposed	  to	  achieving	  government	  
targets.	  Positive	  conditionality	  is	  the	  practice	  of	  rewarding	  a	  country’s	  democratic	  performance	  
through	  increased	  allowance	  of	  aid.	  In	  other	  words,	  increased	  levels	  of	  democratic	  governance	  
and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  is	  rewarded.	  This	  helps	  tie	  aid	  to	  positive	  change,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
allocation	   as	   per	   pre-­‐existing	   levels	   of	   democratic	   governance.	   These	   distinctions	   are	  
important	  in	  defining	  the	  context	  of	  the	  research	  question	  further.	  The	  EU	  employs	  a	  negative	  
ex-­‐post	  form	  of	  conditionality	  through	  the	  EBA	  agreement	  with	  Cambodia.	  	  
	  
Research	  into	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  conditionality	  has	  been	  studied	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years.	  In	  
the	  early	  1960’s	  the	  ‘Naïve	  Theory	  of	  Sanctions’	  was	  devised	  by	  a	  Norwegian	  sociologist	  and	  
mathematician,	  Johan	  Galtung.	  This	  theory	  states	  that,	  
	  
“Economic	  sanctions	  are	  actions	  initiated	  by	  one	  or	  more	  international	  actors	  (the	  
“senders”)	   against	   one	   or	   more	   others	   (“receivers”)	   with	   either	   both	   or	   two	  
separate	  purposes:	  to	  punish	  the	  receivers	  by	  depriving	  them	  of	  some	  value	  and/or	  
to	  make	   the	   receiver	   comply	  with	   certain	   norms	   the	   senders	   deem	   important”	  
(1967,	  pg.	  379).	  
	  
	  In	  this	  case	  the	  senders	  are	  the	  EU,	  the	  receiver	  is	  Cambodia,	  and	  the	  norms	  are	  principles	  of	  
democracy,	  human	  rights,	  and	  rule	  of	  law.	  This	  theory	  states	  that	  economic	  sanctions	  should	  
act	  as	  leverage	  in	  order	  to	  pressure	  the	  receiver	  into	  policy	  or	  political	  change.	  Criticism	  of	  this	  
theory	  states	  there	   is	  no	  direct	  connection	  between	  effectiveness	  of	  economic	  sanctions	   in	  
inducing	  economic	  hardship,	  as	  this	  is	  subject	  to	  recipient	  country’s	  economic	  reliance	  on	  the	  
sender	   country	   in	   question.	   A	   second	   subfield	   into	   conditionality	   theory	   formulated	   by	  
Drezner,	  is	  called	  the	  ‘Sanctions	  Paradox’.	  As	  quoted	  by	  Morgan	  (2000,	  p.	  762)	  in	  his	  review,	  
this	  theory	  suggests	  that	  sanctions	  are	  more	  effective	  at	  encouraging	  political	  change	  under	  
the	  premise	  of	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  sender	  and	  receiver.	  If	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  
of	  conflict,	  the	  sender	  will	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  impose	  sanctions,	  and	  the	  receiver	  will	  be	  less	  
willing	   to	   compromise.	   Sanctions	   between	   allies	   will	   be	  more	   effective	   but	   less	   likely	   and	  
sanctions	  between	  adversaries	  will	  be	  less	  effective	  but	  more	  likely.	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Specific	  to	  the	  EU	  case,	  research	  into	  conditionality	  in	  the	  past	  has	  found	  that	  aid	  providers	  like	  
the	  EU,	  were	  predominantly	  ‘reactive’	  aiming	  to	  sanction	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  cases	  of	  
democratic	  decay.	  Post	  millennium,	  donor	  governments	  were	  seen	  to	  “broaden	  the	  scope”	  of	  
conditionality,	   allowing	   it	   to	   be	   both	   a	  method	   of	   reward	   or	   punishment.	   In	   2007,	   the	   EC	  
published	  the	  ‘Governance	  Incentive	  Tranche’.	  This	  proposed	  an	  increase	  in	  amount	  of	  aid	  as	  
a	  reward	  if	  the	  recipient	  government	  is	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  EU	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  
political	  reforms.	  (Molenares	  and	  Nijs,	  2008).	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  proposal	  was	  to	  implement	  a	  way	  
of	  applying	  democratic	  governance	  as	  an	  objective,	  but	  also	  a	  condition	  of	  EU	  aid.	  This	  denotes	  
that	  EU	  conditionality	  can	  both	  reward	  and	  sanction	  recipient	  behaviour,	  and	  so	  be	  both	  pro-­‐
active	   and	   re-­‐active	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   recipient	   governments	   domestic	   affairs.	   The	   EU	   also	  
imposes	  ex-­‐post	  conditionality	  in	  its	  preferential	  trade	  agreements	  such	  as	  the	  EBA.	  As	  stated	  
previously,	  the	  EU’s	  EBA	  scheme	  contains	  a	  clause	  that	  allows	  the	  EU	  to	  temporality	  withdraw	  
access	  in	  the	  case	  of	  “serious	  and	  systematic	  violations	  of	  principles	  of	  core	  human	  rights	  and	  
labour	   rights,	   so	   as	   to	   promote	   the	   objectives	   of	   those	   conventions”	   (Regulation	   (EU)	   No	  
978/2012	  Clause	  24).	  	  
	  
The	  1997	  the	  ‘World	  Development	  Report’	  looked	  at	  reassessing	  the	  role	  of	  governments	  in	  
development.	  It	  states	  that	  good	  governance	  should	  not	  be	  a	  luxury	  only	  available	  to	  already	  
developed	  nations	  but	  an	  important	  precondition	  towards	  development	  in	  any	  country	  (World	  
Bank,	  1997).	  This	  was	  seen	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  growing	  consensus	  between	  policy	  makers	  and	  
researchers	  that	  destructive	  institutions,	  corruption,	  and	  the	  support	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  
damage	  both	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  reforms	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  economic	  growth	  and	  
development.	  Although	  there	  has	  been	  no	  proven	  correlation	  between	  democratic	  regimes	  
and	  development,	  generally	  the	  western	  consensus	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  governing	  
model	   states	   that	   democratic	   regimes	   are	   more	   effective	   than	   autocratic	   regimes	   at	  
stimulating	  development	  in	  terms	  of	  good	  governance.	  The	  ‘Assessing	  Aid	  Report’	  (Dollar	  and	  
Pritchett,	  1998)	  shows	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  foreign	  aid	  on	  development	  is	  pre-­‐conditioned	  
by	  the	  recipient	  countries	  quality	  of	  governance.	  This	  includes	  not	  only	  economic	  policy	  and	  
financial	  management,	  but	  also	  the	  level	  of	  democracy.	  However,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  to	  
base	   the	   giving	   of	   aid	   on	   already	   established	   settings	  would	   be	   contradictory	   to	  what	   the	  
nature	   of	   aid	   should	   be.	   If	   aid	   is	   given	   in	   this	   case,	   then	   it	   would	   leave	   a	  majority	   of	   the	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undeveloped	  world	  behind,	  including	  Cambodia.	  Thus	  defeating	  the	  purposes	  and	  promises	  of	  
globally	  accepted	  goals	  such	  as	  the	  SDGs.	  	  
	  
4.2   Does	  Democracy	  Equal	  Development?	  	  
Democracy	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  debate	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  asking	  the	  question	  
of	   how	   we	   increase	   development	   in	   the	   third	   world.	   Montinola’s	   (2010,	   p.	   360)	   research	  
suggests	   that	   the	   efficiency	   of	   conditionality	   depends	   on	   the	   recipient	   countries	   level	   of	  
democracy,	  as	   the	  value	  of	  aid	   to	   these	  governments	  depends	  on	  regime	  type.	  This	   theory	  
suggests	  that	  if	  governments	  primarily	  seek	  to	  maintain	  power,	  then	  aid	  should	  be	  of	  value	  to	  
them.	  As	   it	   creates	  an	   incentive	   to	  abide	  by	  aid	   conditions,	   to	  whatever	  degree	   it	  helps	   to	  
preserve	  their	  power.	  This	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  aid	  on	  political	  survival	  is	  greater	  
for	   democrats	   than	   autocrats,	   as	   political	   competition	   encourages	   democratic	   leaders	   that	  
wish	   to	   maintain	   power	   to	   spend	   all	   aid	   received.	   Conversely,	   autocratic	   leaders	   tend	   to	  
“stockpile”	  aid	   for	   future	  use	  and	  still	  maintain	  power	   (Bueno	  de	  Mesquita	  et	  al,	  2003	  and	  
Yuichi	   Kono	   and	   Montinola,	   2009).	   As	   aid	   disbursement	   is	   more	   vital	   for	   democrats	   than	  
autocrats,	  this	  suggests	  conditionality	  is	  more	  effective	  in	  democratic	  countries	  where	  donors	  
would	  have	  greater	  leverage	  over	  recipient	  governments.	  Montinola’s	  conclusions	  suggest	  that	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  conditionality	  in	  itself	  is	  conditional,	  as	  per	  recipient	  government	  regime	  
type.	   This	   supports	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   conditionality	   in	   Cambodia	   in	   not	   an	   effective	  
mechanism	  for	  development	  because	  of	  its	  autocratic	  regime.	  Cambodia’s	  government	  does	  
not	  hold	  much	  incentive	  to	  comply	  with	  conditions	  of	  democratic	  reform	  as	  these	  conditions	  
do	  not	  promote	  the	  political	  survival	  of	  the	  CPP	  government.	  This	  presents	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  
EU	   when	   asking	   the	   question	   of	   how	   effective	   EU	   conditionality	   is	   in	   Cambodia	   in	   the	  
promotion	   of	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights.	   The	   above	   explanation	   would	   suggest	   that	  
conditionality	   is	   futile	   in	   this	   sense	   due	   to	   Cambodia’s	   regime	   type.	  However,	   the	   issue	   of	  
Cambodia’s	  economic	  dependency	  on	  aid	  also	  comes	  into	  play.	  The	  factor	  that	  Montinola	  did	  
not	   observe	  was	   that	   conditionality	   effectiveness	   not	   only	   relies	   on	   regime	   type,	   but	   their	  
overall	  dependence	  on	  donors	  to	  survive	  in	  a	  global	  economic	  context.	  For	  Cambodia	  this	  a	  
prominent	   concern.	   Their	   development	   has	   largely	   been	   focused	   on	   liberalisation	   and	  
integration	  into	  the	  world	  economy	  based	  on	  export,	  particularly	  to	  the	  EU	  through	  the	  EBA	  
scheme.	  This	  should	  suggest	  that	  the	  Cambodian	  government	  does	  in	  fact	  hold	  an	  incentive	  to	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perform	   under	   aid	   conditions,	   as	   withdrawal	   of	   this	   agreement	   would	   drastically	   effect	  
Cambodia’s	   ability	   to	   perform	   economically.	   The	   anomaly	   in	   this	   case	   is	   that	   the	   RGC	   has	  
seemed	  to	  respond	  completely	  contradictory	  to	  what	  would	  have	  been	  predicted	  in	  light	  of	  
both	  existing	  theory,	  and	  potential	  consequences.	  This	  may	  be	  due	  to	  other	  players	  in	  the	  game	  
such	  as	  China.	  China	  plays	  a	  large	  role	  in	  Cambodia’s	  development	  assistance	  as	  described	  in	  
the	  contextual	  review.	  This	  impacts	  issues	  of	  dependency	  which	  directly	  influences	  Cambodia’s	  
responses	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  threat	  of	  an	  EBA	  withdrawal.	  This	  is	  interesting,	  particularly	  as	  it	  
provides	  potential	  for	  a	  new	  narrative,	  or	  evidence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  size	  does	  not	  fit	  all.	  In	  
light	   of	   current	   circumstances,	   the	   EU	   may	   not	   be	   successful	   in	   their	   application	   of	  
conditionality	  through	  the	  withdrawal.	  
	  
Another	   problem	   that	   arises	  when	   looking	   at	   this	   research	   is	   that	   there	   are	   an	   increasing	  
number	   of	   recipient	   countries	   that	   now	   sit	   in	   the	   ‘grey	   area’	   between	   democracy	   and	  
autocracy.	  It	  is	  vital	  that	  aid	  addresses	  the	  gradual	  shift	  in	  governmental	  dimensions.	  Figure	  5	  
illustrates	  these	  shifts	  through	  a	  table	  of	  Freedom	  House	  democracy	  ratings	  in	  South	  East	  Asian	  
countries	  over	  a	  20-­‐year	  period,	  with	  a	  score	  of	  1	  being	  the	  most	  democratic	  and	  a	  score	  of	  7	  
being	  total	  autocracy.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Democracy	  ratings	  in	  South	  East	  Asian	  Countries	  over	  the	  period	  of	  1999-­‐2019	  	  
Country	  	   Democracy	  rating	  in	  1999	   Democracy	  rating	  2019	  
Cambodia	   6	   5.5	  
Indonesia	  	   	   3.5	   3	  
Vietnam	   7	   6	  
Thailand	   2.5	   6	  
Malaysia	  	   5	   4	  
Singapore	   5	   4	  
Philippines	  	   2.5	   3	  
Laos	   6.5	   6.5	  
Myanmar	  	   7	   5	  
Brunei	   6	   5.5	  
Timor-­‐Leste	   5	   2.5	  
(Source:	  Freedomhouse.org,	  2019).	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The	   transition	   from	   an	   autocracy	   to	   democracy	   is	   not	   linear	   or	   uniform,	   and	   quite	   often	  
recipient	   countries	   act	   under	   different	   combinations	   of	   hybrid	   regimes.	   For	   example,	  
anocracies	  or	  illiberal/defective	  democracies	  (Santiso,	  2001,	  p.	  8).	  Literature	  in	  this	  area	  on	  aid	  
effectiveness	   has	   suggested	   that	   aid	   should	  be	   selectively	   given	   to	   countries	  with	   a	   higher	  
democracy	  rating,	  and	  should	  function	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  political	  and	  institutional	  change.	  However,	  
this	  solution	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  acceptable	  to	  ignore	  some	  of	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  populations	  
in	  the	  world,	  through	  selectively	  given	  aid	  as	  per	  their	  already	  existing	  regimes	  and	  institutions.	  
This	  would	  be	  contradictory	  of	  the	  normative	  values	  the	  EU	  aid	  is	  built	  on	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
	  
4.3   Does	  Aid	  Increase	  Democracy?	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  above	  paragraph,	  we	  must	  now	  ask	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  increase	  democracy	  
in	  developing	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  aid	  effectiveness?	  Here	  we	  have	  somewhat	  of	  a	  
causality	  dilemma.	  Knack	  (2001,	  p.	  251),	  explains	  that	  development	  aid	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  
democratisation	  of	  a	  country	  in	  three	  ways.	  The	  first	  being	  via	  technical	  assistance	  in	  focusing	  
on	  electoral	  processes,	  helping	  to	  strengthen	  legislatures	  and	  judiciaries,	  and	  the	  promotion	  
of	  CSOs	  and	  free	  press.	  Secondly,	  through	  conditionality.	  Finally,	  by	  improving	  education	  and	  
increasing	   income	   per	   capita.	   This	   is	   correlated	   with	   a	   civil	   demand	   increase	   for	  
democratisation.	   However,	   aid	   can	   also	   have	   adverse	   effects	   on	   good	   governance	   by	  
undermining	   accountability,	   deterring	   incentives,	   and	   even	   promoting	   violence	   or	   political	  
coups.	  Many	  foreign	  aid	  donors,	  particularly	  the	  EU,	  include	  democratic	  reform	  as	  a	  condition	  
to	  which	   the	   recipient	  government	  must	  adhere	   to	   in	   terms	  of	   receiving	  aid.	  Knack’s	   study	  
provides	  an	  analysis	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  conditionality	  and	  democratisation	  in	  a	  large	  sample	  of	  
recipient	  countries	  over	  the	  period	  of	  1975-­‐2000.	  His	  findings	  suggest	  that	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
several	  different	  democracy	   indexes	  and	  measures	  of	  aid	   intensity,	   that	  there	   is	   little	  to	  no	  
evidence	  to	  show	  that	  aid	  specifically	  promotes	  democracy.	  However,	  he	  does	  state	  that	  this	  
evidence	  does	  not	  necessarily	  show	  that	  democracy	  promoting	  programmes	  funded	  by	  ODA	  
don’t	  work	  as	  intended.	  The	  programmes	  that	  are	  successful	  in	  this	  function	  are	  too	  few	  to	  
impact	   the	   data	   significantly.	   Aid	   can	   influence	   democratisation	   through	   the	   promotion	   of	  
modernisation	   in	   the	   funding	  of	  programmes	  related	  to	  health	  and	  education.	  Literacy	  and	  
increased	   incomes	   in	   particular,	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   demand	   for	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democratisation.	  The	  problem	  here	  remains	  around	  the	  circular	  causality	  of	  the	  variables	  of	  
increased	  democracy	  and	  increased	  aid	  effectiveness.	  	  
	  
Molenares	  et	  al.	  (2015,	  p.	  4)	  suggests	  that	  “aid	  should	  be	  given	  selectively	  to	  those	  countries	  
that	  are	  well	   governed	   in	  order	   to	   increase	  aid	  effectiveness	  because	   the	   impact	  of	  aid	  on	  
growth	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  is	  mediated	  by	  regime	  characteristics”.	  This	  is	  a	  form	  of	  ex-­‐post	  
selectivity,	   as	   aid	   in	   this	   context	   is	   disbursed	  during	  or	   after	   the	   recipient	   government	  has	  
reached	  these	  political	  reforms.	  Santiso	  (2001,	  p.	  13)	  suggests	  that	  using	  this	  form	  of	  selection	  
constructs	   democratic	   governance	   as	   a	   pre-­‐condition	   for	   aid.	   Such	   aid	   can	   then	   be	  
implemented	   in	   a	   fully	   donor	   driven,	   low	   interference	  manner,	   since	   the	   donors	   can	   now	  
decide	  which	  criteria	  to	  implement	  when	  disbursing	  aid.	  Thus	  facilitating	  local	  ownership	  of	  
development	   objectives.	   Santiso	   (2001,	   p.	   9)	   furthers	   this	   argument	   in	   saying	   that	  
conditionality	  may	  also	  be	  used	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  leverage.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  support	  of	  
democratic	  reform	  is	  an	  objective	  rather	  than	  a	  condition,	  which	  is	  a	  more	  productive	  approach	  
to	  promoting	  or	  supporting	  political	  reform	  in	  recipient	  countries.	  Dollar	  and	  Pritchett	  (1998,	  
p.	  50-­‐53)	  argue	  that	  conditionality	  has	  ultimately	  failed	  in	  the	  past	  as	  it	  concentrated	  on	  an	  ex-­‐
ante	  system	  of	  aid	  disbursed,	  based	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  future	  political	  reform.	  Which	  in	  turn	  
gave	   the	   recipient	   little	   ownership	   over	   their	   development	   plans.	   Subsequently,	   ex-­‐post	  
techniques	   were	   adopted,	   so	   conditions	   could	   be	   negotiated,	   consensual,	   and	   results	  
orientated.	   This	   helps	   to	   reduce	   the	   ownership	   difficulty,	   as	  well	   as	   helping	   to	   implement	  
increased	  pluralism	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  making	  and	  implementation.	  The	  general	  consensus	  here	  
was	  to	  ‘get	  the	  incentives	  right’,	  which	  has	  ultimately	  led	  to	  a	  more	  diverse	  way	  of	  approaching	  
support	  and	  promotion	  for	  democratic	  reform	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  
	  
The	  EU	  has	  adopted	  the	  ex-­‐post	  system,	  in	  order	  to	  link	  aid	  and	  performance.	  Performance	  
here	  is	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  definitive	  objectives	  rather	  than	  performance	  measured	  against	  
intermediate	  targets.	  For	  example,	  reduced	  infant	  mortality	  rates	  as	  opposed	  to	  number	  of	  
children	   receiving	   treatment.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   2001,	   the	   European	   financing	  mechanisms	   for	  
countries	  supported	  by	  their	  development	  programmes	  included	  at	  least	  some	  element	  of	  ex-­‐
post	   conditionality	   through	   mechanisms	   such	   as	   the	   EBA.	   However,	   in	   the	   nature	   of	  
bureaucratic	   reform,	   some	   countries	   experienced	   traditional	   conditionality	   being	   practiced	  
alongside	  this	  amendment.	  This	  resulted	  in	  some	  countries	  not	  being	  able	  to	  fully	  experience	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the	   potential	   for	   improvement	   in	   domestic	   ownership	   and	   accountability,	   and	   improved	  
coordination	  between	  donors	  (Adam	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  
	  
4.4   A	  Violation	  of	  Sovereignty?	  	  
To	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  conditionality	  on	  national	  sovereignty,	  it	  is	  important	  first	  to	  
define	  what	  sovereignty	  means	  in	  an	  aid	  partnership	  context.	  Brown	  (2013,	  p.	  266)	  investigates	  
the	  relationship	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  conditionality,	  addressing	  three	  main	  definitions.	  “A	  
state	  of	  self-­‐containment	  or	  inviolateness	  that	  exists	  before	  intervention”	  (Harrison,	  2004,	  p.	  
25),	   “The	   freedom	   of	   a	   nation	   or	   society	   to	   pursue	   its	   ends	   without	   external	   control	   or	  
intervention”	   (Williams,	   2008,	   p.	   36),	   and	   “A	   realm	   of	   political	   action	   free	   from	   foreign	  
influence”	  (Whitfield	  and	  Fraser,	  2009,	  p.	  7).	  What	  these	  three	  definitions	  have	  in	  common	  is	  
that	   sovereignty	   ultimately	   means	   a	   government’s	   ability	   to	   exercise	   control	   over	   a	   given	  
territory,	   and	   for	   that	   government	   to	   enjoy	   constraint	   free	   control	   over	   policy	   outcomes.	  
Brown	   (2013,	   p.	   267)	   states,	   conditionality’s	   impact	   on	   sovereignty	   in	   an	   aid	   partnership	  
context	  can	  be	  looked	  at	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  two	  claims.	  Firstly,	  “sovereignty	  is	  being	  eroded	  
by	   aid	   policy”	   and	   secondly,	   “the	   politico-­‐legal	   independence	   of	   the	   state	   itself	   is	   being	  
challenged”.	  Historically,	  the	  former	  has	  undeniably	  been	  the	  case	  while	  the	  second	  has	  not.	  
From	  a	  legal	  standpoint	  as	  explained	  by	  Zormelo	  (1996,	  p.	  18),	  sovereignty	  means	  that	  states	  
should	  obey	  the	  international	  laws	  they	  formulate	  or	  accede	  to.	  Zormelo	  discusses	  the	  legal	  
standing	  upon	  an	  International	  Financial	  Institution	  (IFI)	  perspective.	  This	  definition	  can	  still	  be	  
applied	  to	  the	  EU,	  although	  not	  an	  IFI.	  The	  EBA	  is	  an	  agreement	  approved	  to	  by	  both	  parties	  
and	  the	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  clauses	  are	  built	  into	  and	  agreed	  upon	  by	  both	  parties	  
from	   its	   establishment.	   On	   a	   strictly	   legal	   basis,	   the	   EU	   is	   not	   going	   beyond	   its	   powers	   in	  
exercising	  conditionality	  through	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  from	  Cambodia	  as	  per	  the	  original	  
agreement.	  However,	  Zormelo	  (1996,	  p.	  18)	  considers	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  often	  no	  alternative	  
for	  the	  recipient	  country.	  In	  this	  case	  they	  often	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  agree.	  Following	  from	  
this,	  the	  recipient	  country	  cannot	  negotiate	  with	  the	  donor	  country	  from	  an	  equal	  standpoint	  
in	   terms	   of	   strength.	   The	   desperate	   positions	   of	   the	   recipient	   countries	  make	   them	  more	  
willing	   to	   adopt	   such	   policies.	   Further,	   Zormelo	   states	   that	   is	   it	   not	   uncommon	   for	   donor	  
countries	  to	  use	  this	  to	  their	  advantage	   in	  the	  promotion	  of	  their	  own	  national	   interests	  by	  
using	  policy	  to	  steer	  the	  recipient	  country	  in	  preferred	  directions.	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  donor	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countries	  over	  aid	  policy	  is	  high,	  and	  so	  questions	  the	  neutrality	  of	  conditionality	  clauses	  in	  the	  
EBA	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  legal	  standpoint	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  truly	  recognised.	  	  	  
	  
4.5   Is	  Conditionality	  Effective?	  
The	  answer	  to	  whether	  conditionality	  works	  varies	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  level	  of	  political	  and	  
economic	  leverage	  between	  donor	  and	  recipient.	  This	  is	  subject	  to	  change	  over	  time.	  A	  study	  
conducted	   by	   Donno	   and	  Neureiter	   (2017,	   p.	   336)	   found	   that	   conditionality	   clauses	   in	   EU	  
political	   and	   economic	   agreements	   with	   developing	   countries,	   that	   specifically	   inforce	  
democratic	   reform	   and	   human	   rights,	   are	   only	   provisionally	   effective	   in	   promoting	   these	  
values.	  The	  study	  found	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  conditionality	  is	  only	  effective	  in	  countries	  that	  are	  
heavily	   reliant	  on	   the	  EU	   for	  aid	  and/or	   trade.	   In	  other	  words,	  as	  a	  catalyst	   for	  democratic	  
reform	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  conditionality	  is	  increased	  the	  more	  
dependent	  the	  country.	  The	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
EU’s	  normative	  power	  identity.	  The	  question	  arises	  around	  whether	  conditions	  pertaining	  to	  
the	   promotion	   of	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights	   that	   are	   imbedded	   in	   EU’s	   aid	   and	   trade	  
agreements	  are	  actually	  effective	  in	  reducing	  repression,	  and	  secondly,	  should	  conditionality	  
be	  implemented	  in	  this	  sense	  at	  all?	  
	  
The	  Donno	  and	  Neureiter	  study	  found	  that	  human	  rights	  clauses	  in	  EU	  aid	  agreements	  are	  in	  
fact	  associated	  with	  improved	  respect	  for	  both	  political	  and	  physical	  integrity	  rights,	  but	  only	  
at	  higher	  levels	  of	  aid	  dependence.	  Trade	  dependence	  does	  not	  exert	  such	  an	  effect.	  This	  study	  
also	  found	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  of	  conditionality	  enforcement	  due	  to	  violations	  of	  political	  rights,	  
political	  coups,	  and	  flawed	  elections	  EU	  aid	  suspension	  is	  the	  typical	  form	  of	  punishment.	  These	  
are	   correlated	   with	   improved	   human	   rights	   conditions,	   again	   more	   so	   in	   aid	   dependent	  
countries.	   Evidence	   collected	   in	   this	   study	   suggests	   that	   the	   governments	   of	   more	   aid	  
dependent	   states	   are	   forced	   to	   take	   external	   pressure	   more	   seriously.	   Suggesting	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  such	  mechanisms	  is	  entirely	  subject	  to	  the	  country’s	  level	  of	  external	  economic	  
vulnerability.	  The	  economic	  dependence	  of	  Cambodia	  on	  the	  EU	  has	  most	  definitely	  been	  a	  
factor	   in	   the	   past.	   However,	   as	   suggested	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   this	   dependence	   has	  
dissipated	  with	  the	  increased	  presence	  of	  China	  in	  Cambodia.	  Directly	  impacting	  the	  effectives	  
of	  conditionality	  mechanisms	  employed	  by	  the	  EU	  in	  this	  circumstance.	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The	  EU	  defines	  itself	  as	  a	  ‘normative	  power’	  in	  a	  global	  political	  context	  as	  its	  influence	  relies	  
on	  its	  “ability	  to	  shape	  conceptions	  of	  normal	   in	   international	  relations”	  (Manners,	  2002,	  p.	  
239).	  These	  values	  are	  typically	  listed	  as	  democratic	  principles,	  respect	  for	  human	  rights,	  and	  
rule	  of	   law	  (Donno	  and	  Neureiter,	  2017,	  p.	  338).	  The	  EU	  aims	  to	  promote	   its	  norms	  though	  
socialisation	  and	  control	  of	  monetary	  power	  in	  interest	  of	  spreading	  these	  norms	  and	  values	  
(Manners,	  2002,	  p.	  245).	  This	  has	  sparked	  debate	  on	  whether	  we	  can	  classify	  normative	  values	  
as	  global	  values.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU	  relationship	  with	  Cambodia	  and	  the	  conditionality	  
clauses	  in	  their	  aid	  and	  trade	  frameworks,	  it	  may	  well	  be	  that	  the	  ‘EU	  way’	  is	  not	  the	  best	  way	  
forward	  for	  Cambodia.	  Acceptance	  of	  alternative	  governing	  models	  could	  be	  a	  more	  efficient	  
route	  towards	  development,	  with	  the	  examples	  of	  Singapore	  and	  China	  having	  enjoyed	  steady	  
economic	   development	   in	   the	   last	   few	   decades,	   under	   capitalist	   autocratic	   regimes.	  
Conditionality	   is	  used	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   achieve	   the	  adoption	  of	   certain	  political	   values	  by	  many	  
donors.	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  donors	  use	  it	  in	  the	  broad	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  employs	  such	  
tools	  which	  helps	  with	  a	  more	  general	  enforcement	  over	  a	  broader	  spectrum	  of	  issues.	  Since	  
1995,	   this	  conditionality	  clause	  has	  been	   included	   in	  all	  new	  EU	  economic	  agreements	  and	  
partnerships.	  The	  incentives	  for	  developing	  countries	  to	  come	  to	  such	  arrangements	  with	  the	  
EU	  are	  high	  as	  it	  grants	  access	  to	  preferential	  trade.	  Signing	  onto	  these	  types	  of	  arrangements	  
enables	  a	  direct	   link	  between	  aid	  and	  trade	  benefits,	  and	  the	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  
democracy.	   Agreements	   such	   as	   the	   EBA	   help	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   framework	   for	   aid	   and	   trade	  
benefits.	   Cooperation	   agreements	   are	   primarily	   linked	   with	   trade.	   This	   includes	   aid	   as	   a	  
mechanism	  for	  political	  dialogue	  and	  cooperation	  (Wu,	  2013	  p.	  348	  and	  Miller,	  2004,	  p.	  21).	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5.  Methodology	  	  
This	  research	  examines	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  promoter	  of	  normative	  values	  through	  
the	  use	  of	  conditionality	  attached	  to	  their	  aid	  and	  trade	  agreements.	  Both	  conditionality	  and	  
AfT	  models	  are	  relatively	  new	  concepts	  in	  aid	  policy.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  mechanisms	  in	  
the	  delivery	  of	  development	  outcomes,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  promotion	  of	  democratic	  and	  human	  
rights	  principles	  are	  still	  in	  question.	  To	  examine	  these	  issues,	  this	  research	  will	  investigate	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  EU	  conditionality	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  normative	  values	  of	  democracy	  and	  
human	   rights	   in	   autocratic	   states,	   using	   Cambodia	   as	   a	   case	   study.	   This	   question	   will	   be	  
examined	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  political	  events	  of	  the	  2018	  Cambodian	  Election,	  after	  which	  
the	  EU	  launched	  the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA	  with	  Cambodia	  based	  on	  “serious	  and	  
systemic	   violations	   of	   democratic	   and	   human	   rights	   principles”.	   To	   reiterate,	   the	   research	  
question	  for	  this	  study	  is:	  
	  
How	  effective	  is	  EU	  conditionality	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  promote	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  
Cambodia	  though	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Everything	  but	  Arms	  Agreement	  withdrawal?	  	  	  
	  
To	  provide	  clarity	  and	  cohesiveness	  in	  answering	  the	  research	  question,	  there	  are	  5	  sub-­‐
questions	  to	  consider	  to	  help	  reflect	  the	  main	  areas	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  study.	  	  
	  
1.   Has	  the	  EBA	  been	  effective	  at	  promoting	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia	  in	  
the	  past?	  	  
2.   How	  will	  a	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  effect	  Cambodia’s	  economy?	  	  
3.   How	  will	  a	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  effect	  Cambodia’s	  society?	  
4.   How	  will	  a	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  effect	  standards	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  
Cambodia	  in	  the	  future?	  
5.   How	  can	  the	  EU	  improve	  in	  its	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia	  
through	  development	  assistance?	  	  
	  
Data	  has	  been	  collected	  through	  means	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  held	  in	  Cambodia	  with	  
employees	  and	  experts	  from	  local	  and	  international	  NGOs,	  CSOs,	  international	  economic	  and	  
political	  institutions,	  and	  government	  officials,	  of	  which	  there	  were	  15	  in	  total.	  The	  participants	  
were	   selected	   based	   on	   their	   field	   of	   work	   and	   expertise.	   It	   was	   important	   to	   include	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participants	   in	   all	   working	   sectors,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   mix	   of	   both	   Khmer	   and	   international	  
participants,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  sample	  from	  differing	  perspectives.	  Interviews	  
were	  recorded	  on	  a	  password	  protected	  recording	  device,	  then	  downloaded	  and	  transcribed	  
using	  NVivo.	  NVivo	  was	  chosen	  as	  it	  aids	  in	  the	  structuring	  and	  organising	  of	  data	  collected,	  as	  
well	  as	  helping	  in	  the	  efficiency	  of	  analysis	  through	  securely	  storing	  all	  primary	  data.	  NVivo	  was	  
chosen	  particularly	  for	  its	  transcription	  software	  which	  aided	  in	  the	  collection	  and	  transcribing	  
of	  all	  20	   interviews.	   It	  also	  helped	  to	   improve	  the	  accuracy	  of	  qualitative	  study	  collected	  to	  
ensure	  nothing	  was	  missed.	  The	  analysis	  process	  was	  broken	  down	  into	  three	  main	  sections.	  
Firstly,	  answers	  were	  read	  through	  thoroughly	  and	  main	  points	  extracted	  and	  organised	  into	  
category	  of	  the	  research	  question	  with	  key	  themes	  summarised.	  Secondly,	  answers	  were	  then	  
colour	  coded	  to	  show	  either	  a	  positive,	  negative,	  or	  neutral	  response.	  Some	  questions	  were	  
not	  of	  this	  nature,	  so	  interesting/main	  points	  were	  highlighted	  for	  analysis.	  Due	  to	  the	  sample	  
size	  and	  the	  type	  of	  analysis,	  quantitate	  analysis	  was	  not	  possible.	  Findings	  from	  this	  data	  is	  
then	  supported	   through	   references	   to	  newspaper	  articles,	   joint	   statements,	  press	   releases,	  
and	  official	  government	  statements	  as	  well	  as	  a	  comparison	  to	  previous	  examples	  where	  the	  
EU	  has	  exercised	  a	  similar	  type	  of	  conditionality	  in	  other	  countries.	  Findings	  are	  then	  supported	  
by	  previous	  research	  identified	  in	  the	  contextual,	  literature,	  and	  conceptual	  review	  chapters.	  
This	  research	  analyses	  societal,	  economic,	  and	  political	  effects	  of	  the	  withdrawal,	  and	  helps	  to	  
conceptualise	   the	   withdrawals	   usefulness	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   promote	   normative	   values	   such	   as	  
democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  an	  autocratic	  state	  such	  as	  Cambodia.	  The	  use	  of	  qualitative	  
analysis	   in	   this	   study	   helps	   to	   contextualise	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   withdrawal,	   through	   the	  
perspective	  of	  those	  working	  and	  living	  in	  Cambodia.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  data	  
collected	  in	  this	  study	  is	  based	  on	  personal	  opinion	  of	  participants.	  Although	  all	  were	  chosen	  
due	  to	  their	  expertise	  in	  the	  area	  of	  study,	  answers	  provided	  are	  still	  speculative.	  This	  is	  still	  
helpful	   in	  answering	  the	  research	  question	  in	  that	   it	  provides	  perspective	  into	  the	  potential	  
effects	  that	  are	  not	  obvious	  or	  quantifiable.	  	  
	  
Considerable	  literature	  exists	  examining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  aid	  in	  Cambodia,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
use	   of	   aid	   conditionality	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   promote	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights.	   However,	   no	  
literature	   has	   been	   found	   that	   examines	   these	   variables	   in	   light	   of	   the	   recent	   events	   in	  
Cambodia,	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   negative	   ex-­‐post	   conditionality.	   At	   present,	   it	   has	   been	  
observed	  by	   the	  EU	  that	   there	  has	  been	  serious	  violations	  of	   respect	   for	  human	  rights	  and	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democracy	  in	  Cambodia,	  particularly	  in	  throughout	  the	  2018	  Cambodian	  election	  period.	  With	  
just	  over	  20	  years	  of	  international	  assistance	  and	  attempts	  from	  the	  international	  community	  
to	  encourage	  reform	  in	  these	  areas,	  the	  question	  is	  raised	  of	  why	  these	  efforts	  have	  not	  been	  
effective	  in	  achieving	  such	  outcomes.	  There	  is	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  
of	  aid	  effectiveness	  that	  supports	  the	  conclusion	  that	  aid	  (in	  its	  current	  form)	  is	  a	  contributor	  
to	  the	  problem	  it	  is	  attempting	  to	  relieve,	  hence	  why	  it	  is	  important	  to	  reform	  aid	  policy	  in	  such	  
a	  way	  that	  it	  works	  as	  intended.	  	  
	  
For	   scoping	   purposes,	   this	   research	   will	   primarily	   focus	   on	   the	   most	   recent	   development	  
strategies	  in	  both	  the	  EU	  and	  Cambodia	  (period	  of	  2014-­‐2020),	  2018	  Cambodian	  Election,	  and	  
the	  current	  situation	  unfolding	  with	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal.	  The	  EU	  is	  renowned	  as	  a	  leading	  force	  
in	  the	  use	  of	  conditionality	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  promote	  the	  normative	  values	  or	  democracy	  and	  human	  
rights.	  Evidence	  so	  far	  suggests	  that	  recent	  events	  such	  as	  the	  threat	  of	  withdrawal	  shows	  a	  
lack	  of	  priority	   in	  actual	   implementation	  of	  these	  values	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  EU	  development	  
assistance	  in	  Cambodia,	  as	  a	  withdrawal	  will	   likely	  damage	  the	  protection	  of	  these	  values	  in	  
the	  future.	  	  
	  
5.1   Limitations	  
Due	  to	  the	  contemporary	  nature	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  research	  is	  only	  able	  to	  speculate	  about	  the	  
possible	  effects	  of	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal.	  It	  is	  also	  limited	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  no	  previous	  
studies	  on	  this	  topic	  and	  so	  comparison	  is	  not	  possible.	  Current	  information	  and	  research	  is	  
limited	  to	  interviews	  held	  during	  the	  data	  collection	  stages	  of	  this	  research,	  as	  well	  as	  official	  
government	   statements,	   newspapers,	   and	   press	   releases	   on	   the	   activities	   and	   discussions	  
between	  the	  EU	  and	  Cambodia.	  No	  theoretical	  or	  analytical	  studies	  on	  Cambodia’s	  experiences	  
with	  the	  EBA	  and	  potential	  withdrawal	  have	  been	  found.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  first	  time	  the	  EU	  has	  
launched	  the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  EBA	  agreement	  from	  any	  country	  under	  these	  
circumstances.	  Its	  uniqueness	  poses	  a	  limitation	  as	  there	  are	  no	  other	  examples	  to	  draw	  from	  
when	   looking	  at	  potential	   impacts.	  As	   the	  withdrawal	   is	  a	  12-­‐month	   long	  process,	   the	   final	  
decision	  of	  whether	  the	  EU	  will	  withdraw	  partially,	  completely,	  or	  at	  all	  will	  not	  be	  made	  until	  
February	  2020.	  This	  also	  poses	  a	  limitation	  to	  the	  research	  in	  that	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  submitted	  
in	  June	  2019,	  approximately	  six	  months	  before	  the	  withdrawal	  decision	  date.	  It	  is	  important	  to	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remember	   that	   conclusions	   made	   throughout	   this	   study	   are	   speculative	   and	   focus	   on	  
researching	  the	  impacts	  of	  multiple	  potential	  outcomes.	  At	  the	  time	  this	  thesis	  is	  submitted,	  
the	  EU	  has	  already	  launched	  the	  12-­‐month	  long	  procedure	  to	  withdraw.	  This	  has	  been	  met	  
negatively	  by	  Cambodian	  government	  in	  stating	  it	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  comply	  with	  EU	  requests.	  	  
The	  importance	  of	  this	  research	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  investigates	  aspects	  of	  political	  decision	  
making	   in	   aid	   policy	   and	   analyses	   the	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   implications	   of	   such	  
actions.	  	  
	  
Another	  limitation	  for	  this	  study	  is	  due	  to	  its	  qualitative	  nature,	  the	  language	  barrier	  between	  
researcher	  and	  participants	  was	  substantial.	  A	  translator	  was	  used	  in	  all	  interviews	  where	  the	  
first	   language	  was	  Khmer,	  to	  ensure	  context	  was	  not	  lost	  or	  confused	  in	  the	  data	  collection	  
process.	  Difference	  in	  culture	  also	  proved	  to	  be	  limiting	  in	  the	  planning	  and	  collection	  of	  this	  
data	  as	  there	  was	  a	  difference	  in	  expectation	  of	  the	  organising	  and	  scheduling	  of	  interviews.	  
Not	  only	  did	  the	  language	  barrier	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  schedule	  interviews,	  but	  at	  many	  points	  
there	  was	  confusion	  around	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  verbal	  confirmation	  versus	  written	  confirmation.	  
A	   large	   restriction	   to	   this	   study	   was	   the	   sensitive	   nature	   of	   this	   research	   and	   interview	  
questions.	  This	  meant	  that	  participants	  were	  less	  able	  to	  speak	  freely	  due	  to	  the	  socio-­‐political	  
situation	  of	  Cambodia	  and	   the	  positions	   they	  held	   in	   their	  organisations.	  Most	  participants	  
indicated	  they	  would	  like	  their	  identity	  to	  be	  kept	  completely	  confidential,	  which	  presents	  a	  
challenge	   in	   the	   findings	   section	   as	   the	   quotations	   are	   not	   able	   to	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	  
participant.	  Any	  further	  details	  about	  the	  participants	  cannot	  be	  shared	  in	  this	  research.	  	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   implications	   of	   Brexit	   marks	   another	   large	   limitation.	   Brexit	   may	   have	   large	  
implications	  on	  EU	  ODA	  as	  Britain	  is	  one	  of	  only	  four	  Member	  States	  that	  meet	  the	  0.7%	  or	  
more	  of	  Gross	  National	  Income	  towards	  the	  EU	  ODA	  requirement.	  Brexit	  is	  purposefully	  not	  
discussed	  in	  this	  study	  as	  developments	  in	  this	  area	  fluctuate	  so	  heavily	  at	  this	  given	  time.	  Any	  
claim	  to	  implications	  of	  Brexit’s	  effect	  on	  Cambodia’s	  situation	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  
irrelevant	  and	  may	  take	  away	   from	  the	  solidity	  or	   relevance	  of	  others	  points,	  particularly	   if	  
arguments	  of	  Brexit	  are	  used	  to	  build	  or	  validate	  other	  conclusions	  made	  in	  this	  research.	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6.  Empirical	  Findings	  and	  Discussion	  	  
This	   study	  explores	  how	  effective	  EU	  conditionality	   is	   at	  promoting	  democracy	  and	  human	  
rights	  in	  Cambodia	  through	  the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  EBA	  agreement	  as	  used	  in	  an	  AfT	  framework.	  
Using	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal	  as	  context,	  this	  research	  investigates	  whether	  the	  EU	  shows	  political	  
will	  in	  terms	  of	  helping	  Cambodia	  towards	  democratic	  reform	  and	  improved	  respect	  for	  human	  
rights.	  As	  well	  as	  how	  the	  EU	  is	  perceived	  in	  Cambodia	  as	  a	  development	  partner.	  This	  research	  
examines	  possible	  societal,	  economic,	  and	  political	  effects	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  will	  have.	  
This	  helps	  build	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  understanding	  of	  all	  the	  implications	  and	  areas	  of	  impact,	  as	  
well	   as	   illustrating	   how	   these	   impacts	   have	   a	   large	   effect	   on	   human	   and	   social	   rights	  
themselves,	  as	  values	  the	  EU	  are	  trying	  to	  protect.	  Finally,	  this	  sections	  will	  conclude	  with	  a	  
rationale	  for	  a	  better	  approach	  to	  ODA	  assistance	  in	  the	  form	  of	  support	  for	  democracy	  and	  
human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia.	  	  
	  
Primary	   data	   collected	   through	   interviews	   in	   the	   field	   is	   used	   in	   answering	   the	   research	  
questions,	  as	  well	  as	  using	  examples	  from	  press	  releases,	  official	  statements,	  and	  newspaper	  
articles	  to	  further	  support	  recommendations	  and	  conclusions.	  These	  results	  are	  presented	  as	  
a	  narrative	  to	  discuss	  the	  relationship	  between	  Cambodia	  and	  the	  EU,	  how	  the	  EBA	  is	  intended	  
to	  work,	  and	  compares	  this	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  that	  is	  unfolding	  in	  Cambodia	  around	  the	  
EBA	  withdrawal.	  Firstly,	  this	  research	  looks	  at	  the	  current	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	   EU	   and	  Cambodia.	   An	   important	   pretext	   for	   understanding	   EU	  perceptions	   and	  how	  a	  
withdrawal	  might	  affect	  the	  diplomatic	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  in	  the	  future.	  Secondly,	  
how	  effective	  the	  EBA	  has	  been	  at	  promoting	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	   in	  the	  past	  and	  
how	   a	  withdrawal	  may	   effect	   these	   variables	   in	   the	   future	   is	   considered.	   This	   leads	   into	   a	  
discussion	  on	  the	  economic	  impacts	  that	  a	  withdrawal	  may	  cause	  and	  the	  effects	  this	  has	  on	  
democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia.	  Finally,	  this	  research	  presents	  data	  collected	  on	  EU	  
perceptions	   in	  Cambodia	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal,	  whether	  or	  not	  people	  tend	  to	  
agree	  with	  the	  EU’s	  decision	  to	  withdraw,	  and	  suggestions	  on	  how	  the	  EU	  can	  improve	  on	  these	  
in	  order	  to	  help	  Cambodia	  achieve	  better	  standards	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	   in	  the	  
future.	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6.1   Perceptions	  on	  the	  Relationship	  Between	  the	  European	  
Union	  and	  Cambodia.	  	  
Perceptions	   of	   the	   EU	   in	   Cambodia	   is	   an	   important	   variable	   as	   it	   provides	   insight	   into	   EU	  
rhetoric	  versus	  reality,	  in	  terms	  of	  EU	  aid	  effectiveness.	  The	  consensus	  between	  participants	  
studied	  indicates	  the	  relationship	  between	  Cambodia	  and	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  past	  has	  been	  positive	  
and	  is	  appreciated	  in	  civil	  society,	  NGO,	  and	  governmental	  settings.	  It	  is	  recognised	  that	  the	  EU	  
plays	  an	  important	  role	  and	  is	  a	  strong	  development	  partner	  for	  Cambodia.	  The	  EU	  has	  opened	  
a	  window	  for	  Cambodia	  through	  the	  EBA	  in	  terms	  of	  trade	  and	  economic	  growth	  through	  the	  
textile	  industry,	  which	  as	  stated	  by	  one	  participant	  has	  become	  “somewhat	  of	  a	  backbone	  for	  
the	  economy”.	  Evidence	  of	  the	  EU’s	  commitment	  to	  Cambodia	  can	  be	  seen	  through	  the	  EU’s	  
financial	  support	  following	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  ‘Paris	  Peace	  Agreements’,	  as	  well	  as	  frameworks	  
such	   as	   the	   EU’s	   ‘Agenda	   for	   Change’,	   ‘EU	   Aid	   for	   Trade	   Strategy’,	   and	   the	   ‘European	  
Development	   Cooperation	   Strategy	   for	   Cambodia’.	   Participants	   from	   all	   working	   sectors	  
interviewed	  believe	   that	   the	  potential	  of	   the	  EBA	  withdrawal	  has	  created	   tensions	   in	   some	  
areas.	  However,	  outside	  of	  the	  EBA	  there	  are	  still	  many	  positive	  working	  relationships	  within	  
European	   industries	   in	   Cambodia,	   political	   dialogue,	   cultural	   relationships,	   and	   tourism.	  
Development	   assistance	   also	   offers	   leverage	   for	   discussion	   as	   the	   EU	   provides	   budgetary	  
support	  that	  also	  address	  the	  challenges	  in	  the	  governments	  support	  to	  CSOs,	  and	  reform	  of	  
the	  country.	  The	  EU	  has	  stated	  will	  continue	  this	  assistance	  if	  the	  EBA	  is	  withdrawn.	  	  
	  
Participants	  representing	  the	  CSO	  and	  NGO	  sectors	  expressed	  some	  concerns	  about	  the	  recent	  
activity	  around	  the	  EBA	  and	  how	  this	  is	  going	  to	  effect	  the	  future	  of	  Cambodia’s	  economy,	  as	  
well	  as	  flow	  on	  consequences	  of	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  EU	  perception	  in	  Cambodia.	  There	  is	  a	  general	  
feeling	   of	   fear	   that	   a	  withdrawal	  will	   affect	   the	  Cambodian	   economy	  negatively	   and	   cause	  
economic	   downturn.	   Over	   700,000	   of	   the	   population	   are	   factory	   workers	   in	   the	   garment	  
industry,	  most	  of	  whom	  and	  women	  from	  rural	  areas.	  They	  will	  be	  heavily	  effected	  through	  
the	  loss	  of	  jobs	  if	  the	  EU	  choses	  to	  withdraw	  their	  preferential	  trade	  access	  in	  these	  areas.	  One	  
CSO	  participant	  commented,	  
	  
“Politics	  in	  Cambodia	  is	  difficult	  right	  now,	  because	  of	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal	  which	  
has	  prompted	  a	  large	  concern	  for	  factory	  workers	  and	  farmers.	  It	  all	  challenges	  the	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way	  we	  maintain	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia.	  I	  think	  the	  EU	  should	  
put	  more	  effort	  into	  this	  and	  find	  a	  concrete	  solution	  on	  how	  to	  solve	  these	  kinds	  
of	  issues”	  (Participant	  1).	  	  
	  
This	  comment	  is	  important	  in	  highlighting	  the	  potential	  for	  negative	  flow	  on	  effects	  not	  only	  in	  
terms	  of	  Cambodia’s	  economy	  but	  also	  EU	  perceptions	  as	  a	  development	  partner	  in	  Cambodia.	  
Not	  only	  does	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  withdrawal	  negatively	  affect	  the	  EU’s	  relations	  with	  the	  RGC,	  but	  
also	  may	  have	  negative	  consequences	  on	  societies	  perceptions	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  their	  role	  within	  
Cambodia	  as	  a	  champion	  of	  normative	  values.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  conceptual	  framework,	  this	  
is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  EU’s	  development	  assistance	  agenda	  in	  terms	  of	  EU	  expansion.	  One	  
NGO	  representative	  reflected	  this	  in	  stating	  “Cambodia	  is	  prone	  to	  negative	  perception	  being	  
spread	  around	  easily	  and	  people	  get	  really	  panicked.	  The	  perception	  could	  add	  to	  the	  negative	  
impact	  overall”	  (Participant	  2).	  	  	  
	  
The	  position	  of	  the	  RGC	  can	  be	  summarised	  by	  an	  official	  statement	  released	  in	  response	  to	  
the	  EC’s	  decision	  to	  launch	  the	  procedure	  to	  withdrawal.	  The	  RGC	  argued	  that	  a	  withdrawal	  of	  
the	  EBA	  based	  on	   its	  current	  grounds	  would	  be	  an	   intrusion	   into	   international	   sovereignty.	  
“The	  EC	  has	  not	  shown	  due	  respect	  to	  Cambodia’s	  sovereignty	  when	  their	  EBA	  demands	  are	  
tantamount	   to	   acts	   of	   interference	   with	   the	   political	   development	   in	   the	   country”	   (Royal	  
Government	  of	  Cambodia,	  2019).	  This	  reflects	  the	  deteriorating	  relationship	  that	  participants	  
seem	  to	  be	  perceiving	  in	  light	  of	  the	  events	  unfolding	  around	  the	  EBA.	  	  
	  
To	  understand	  these	  comments	  from	  the	  RGC	  we	  should	  consider	  Zormelo’s	  (1996,	  p.	  16-­‐17)	  
arguments	  on	  conditionality	  and	  sovereignty.	  Once	  a	  recipient	  country	  voluntarily	  signs	  on	  to	  
an	  agreement	  like	  the	  EBA	  there	  can	  be	  no	  legal	  standing	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  statement.	  However,	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  happening	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  these	  agreements	  such	  as	  
power	  balance	  and	  coercion.	  If	  we	  define	  sovereignty	  as	  stated	  by	  Whitfield	  and	  Fraser	  (2009,	  
p.	  7)	  “a	  realm	  of	  political	  action	  free	  from	  foreign	  influence”,	  the	  moment	  a	  country	  accepts	  
assistance	  in	  any	  form	  from	  a	  donor	  body,	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  free	  from	  foreign	  influence,	  as	  
discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  chapter	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  dependency	  and	  ownership.	  
The	  way	   in	  which	  aid	  policy	   is	   built	  makes	   it	   impossible	   for	   these	   systems	   to	  be	   free	   from	  
foreign	   influence.	   Under	   this	   definition,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   have	   total	   sovereignty	   over	  
	   51	  
development	   objectives	   in	   the	   acceptance	   of	   development	   assistance.	   Another	   important	  
perspective	   to	   understand	   the	   RGC	   claim	   from,	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   Cambodia	   and	   the	   EU	   are	  
culturally	  very	  different.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  RGC	  rejects	  the	  EU’s	  promotion	  
of	   their	  own	  governing	  model.	  None	  of	  Cambodia’s	  neighbours	   follow	  a	   liberal	   democratic	  
model,	   despite	   success	   in	   economic	   development	   under	   autocratic	   systems.	   The	   RGC	   also	  
expressed	  in	  the	  official	  statement	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  acting	  “unfairly”	  towards	  Cambodia	  as	  there	  
are	  many	   other	   countries	   that	   enjoy	   EBA	   preferences	   that	   do	   not	   fully	   comply	  with	   these	  
international	  conventions	  and	  to	  which	  the	  EU	  has	  “closed	  a	  blind	  eye”	  (Royal	  Government	  of	  
Cambodia,	   2019).	   This	   may	   support	   Zormelo’s	   claim	   that	   donor	   countries	   tend	   to	   use	  
conditionality	  to	  their	  advantage	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  political	  interests.	  We	  have	  seen	  from	  
the	  lack	  of	  compliance	  from	  the	  RGC	  that	  the	  leverage	  the	  EU	  is	  attempting	  to	  exercise	  here	  
may	  not	  be	  working	  as	  intended.	  	  
	  
6.2   Has	  the	  Everything	  but	  Arms	  Agreement	  Been	  Effective	  at	  
Promoting	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Cambodia	  in	  
the	  Past?	  
When	   discussing	   the	   question	   of	   how	   effective	   the	   EBA	   has	   been	   at	   directly	   promoting	  
democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia,	  a	  majority	  of	  participants	  felt	  that	  it	  is	  not	  directly	  
effective	  at	  promoting	  these	  ideals,	  however	  it	  is	  a	  good	  basis	  to	  set	  standards.	  The	  EBA	  is	  seen	  
in	  Cambodia	  as	  more	  of	  a	  mechanism	  for	  economic	  growth	  through	  the	  creation	  of	   jobs	  as	  
opposed	  to	  a	  tool	  that	  solidly	  imposes	  democratic	  reform	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights.	  One	  
participant	  stated	  “The	  EBA	  at	  the	  least	  provides	  some	  pressure.	  It	  doesn’t	  directly	  affect	  the	  
government	  as	  much	  as	  it	  does	  the	  population”	  (Participant	  3).	  
	  
There	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  distinct	  gap	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  use	  of	  the	  EBA	  as	  an	  ideal	  
promoter	  and	  how	  this	  mechanism	  actually	  works	  in	  practice.	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  through	  
looking	  at	  the	  the	  connection	  between	  trade	  agreements	  and	  human	  rights.	  This	  relationship	  
was	  described	  by	  one	  participant	  as	  “ambiguous	  at	  best”	  (Participant	  4).	  Trade	  measures	  are	  
imposed	  to	  try	  and	  improve	  certain	  political	  rights,	  but	  this	  may	  be	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  economic	  and	  
social	   rights,	   as	   all	   rights	   are	   interdependent	   and	   interrelated.	   The	   EU	   attempts	   to	   inforce	  
measures	  to	  improve	  democratic	  performance	  and	  human	  rights	  standards,	  but	  this	  could	  be	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at	   the	   expense	   of	   Cambodian	   people’s	   livelihoods	   through	   the	   loss	   of	   jobs	   and	   salary	   that	  
support	  not	  only	   the	  workers	   in	  affected	   industries,	  but	  also	   their	  dependants.	  Connecting	  
government	   performance	   of	   these	   values	   with	   a	   market	   that	   supplies	   the	   livelihood	   of	   a	  
population,	  results	  in	  this	  demographic	  suffering	  the	  repercussions	  through	  a	  loss	  of	  jobs	  and	  
stable	  income,	  while	  the	  government	  remains	  unpersuaded	  to	  reform.	  Most	  participants	  in	  the	  
study	   agree	   that	   the	   EBA	   contributes	   toward	   the	   support	   for	   democracy,	   but	   hasn’t	   been	  
directly	  effective	  at	  imposing	  it	  in	  the	  past	  as	  development	  strategy	  and	  the	  economic	  actions	  
of	  a	  country	  are	  not	  necessarily	  directly	  linked.	  	  
	  
The	  EBA	  functions	  as	  an	  ex-­‐post,	  negative	  form	  of	  AfT	  conditionality,	  which	  previous	  studies,	  
as	   indicated	   in	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   chapter,	   have	   shown	   to	   be	   only	   provisionally	  
effective	  at	  promoting	  democratic	  reform	  in	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  These	  results	  show	  that	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  Cambodia,	  this	  form	  of	  conditionality	  has	  not	  been	  productive	  at	  achieving	  these	  
goals,	  as	  the	  RGC	  has	  not	  responded	  positively	  towards	  the	  launch	  of	  procedure	  to	  withdraw.	  
The	  reason	  behind	  this	  may	  be	  explained	  through	  Drezner’s	  “Sanctions	  Paradox”	  theory	  which	  
indicates	  that	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  correlation	  between	  effectiveness	  of	  economic	  sanctions	  at	  
inducing	  economic	  hardship,	  as	  this	  is	  reliant	  on	  the	  recipient	  countries	  economic	  reliance	  on	  
the	  donor	  country	  in	  question	  (Morgan,	  2000,	  p.	  762).	  As	  Donno	  and	  Neureiter	  (2017,	  p.	  336)	  
found,	  conditionality	  clauses	  in	  EU	  political	  and	  economic	  agreements	  that	  specifically	  enforce	  
democratic	  values	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights,	  are	  only	  effective	  in	  countries	  that	  are	  heavily	  
reliant	  on	  the	  EU	  for	  both	  aid	  and	  trade.	  Evidence	  collected	   in	   this	  study	  suggests	   that	   the	  
governments	   of	   more	   aid	   dependent	   states	   are	   forced	   to	   take	   external	   pressure	   more	  
seriously,	   which	   suggests	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   such	   mechanisms	   is	   entirely	   subject	   to	   the	  
countries	  level	  of	  external	  economic	  vulnerability.	  Although	  dependency	  on	  the	  EU	  may	  have	  
been	  the	  case	  for	  Cambodia	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  RGC	  has	  been	  seen	  to	  be	  taking	  measures	  towards	  
addressing	  the	  dependency	  issue	  through	  liberalising	  its	  trade	  portfolios	  with	  countries	  such	  
as	  China	  and	  Vietnam.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  EU	  may	  no	  longer	  hold	  the	  leverage	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  
successfully	  enforce	  this	  kind	  of	  conditionality	  through	  the	  EBA.	  Further,	  studies	  have	  shown	  
there	   is	   little	   to	   no	   evidence	   that	   conditionality	   directly	   impacts	   democratisation.	   One	  
participant	  noted,	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“You	  can’t	  bring	  democracy	  from	  the	  outside.	  It	  can	  be	  a	  good	  basis	  for	  dialogue	  
and	  for	  trying	  to	  encourage	  reform,	  but	  as	  to	  something	  that’s	  going	  to	  create	  a	  
democratic	   state	   if	   there	   is	   no	   willingness.	   But	   there	   has	   to	   be	   a	   minimum	   of	  
standards	  kept.	  So	  in	  saying	  this,	  there	  is	  limited	  impact	  overall	  in	  the	  EBA	  imposing	  
democracy	  here”	  (Participant	  1).	  	  
	  
AfT	  may	  be	  effective	  at	  promoting	  the	  modernisation	  of	  a	  countries	  economy,	  however	  it	  may	  
only	   impact	   democratisation	   as	   a	   flow	  on	   effect	   of	   this.	   As	   democracy	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	  
definitive	  outcome	  of	  modernisation.	  Effectiveness	  of	  conditionality	  at	  promoting	  democracy	  
and	   human	   rights	   also	   comes	   down	   to	   recipient	   governments	   political	   will	   to	   engage	   and	  
compromise	  on	  such	  topics,	  which	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  low	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Cambodia.	  	  	  
	  
6.3   How	  Will	  a	  Withdrawal	  Effect	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  
Rights	  Standards	  in	  Cambodia	  in	  the	  Future?	  
Participants’	  response	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  a	  withdrawal	  will	  affect	  the	  current	  standards	  of	  
democracy	   and	  human	   rights	   in	  Cambodia,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  protection	  of	   these	   rights	   in	   the	  
future,	   were	   overwhelmingly	   negative.	   All	   participants	   seemed	   to	   share	   the	   view	   that	   a	  
withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  will	  not	  work	  as	  intended	  as	  it	  will	  remove	  any	  leverage	  the	  EU	  currently	  
possesses	  in	  being	  able	  to	  have	  an	  influence	  in	  this	  area.	  One	  participant	  stated,	  
	  
“There	   is	   a	   large	   concern	   for	   the	   future	   of	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights	   in	  
Cambodia.	  There	  is	  currently	  one	  ruling	  party,	  which	  is	  not	  a	  democracy.	  Under	  this	  
model,	  I	  don’t	  think	  a	  withdrawal	  will	  help	  with	  the	  opportunity	  for	  democracy	  now	  
and	   will	   not	   be	   good	   for	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights	   going	   into	   the	   future”	  
(Participant	  5).	  	  
	  
Another	  participant	  affirmed	  “If	  the	  EU	  is	  unable	  to	  apply	  pressure	  on	  the	  government,	  then	  
any	  hope	  for	  democracy	  will	  be	  lost	  in	  this	  country.	  A	  withdrawal	  removes	  any	  hope	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  fix	  that”	  (Participant	  6).	  	  Participants	  seem	  to	  feel	  that	  the	  only	  hope	  of	  a	  withdrawal	  having	  
a	  positive	  effect	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  in	  the	  country,	  is	  if	  it	  is	  successful	  in	  pushing	  
the	   government	   towards	   judicial	   reform	   of	   the	   118	   banned	   political	   activists,	   as	   well	   as	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successfully	  helping	   to	  promote	   increased	  space	   for	  dialogue	  between	  civil	   society	  and	   the	  
government.	  One	  participant	  expressed	  positivity	   towards	   this	   in	   stating	   that	  “The	  EBA	  has	  
prompted	   this	   institutional	   dialogue,	   so	   in	   this	   way	   it	   could	   have	   a	   positive	   influence	   on	  
democracy,	  public	  participation	  and	  dialogue”	  (Participant	  4).	  The	  possibility	  of	  judicial	  reform	  
is	  unlikely.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  incorrect	  to	  assume	  this	  absolutely	  won’t	  happen.	  The	  EBA	  
withdrawal	  process	  is	  built	  on	  a	  timeline	  of	  12	  months,	  so	  at	  this	  point,	  there	  is	  still	  time	  for	  
these	  circumstances	  to	  change	  as	  one	  participant	  affirmed,	  	  
	  
“There	  is	  still	  a	  way	  for	  the	  government	  to	  buy	  time	  from	  the	  EU.	  They	  might	  not	  
improve	  on	  conditions	  now,	  but	  in	  the	  next	  six	  months	  they	  might	  decide	  it	  is	  time	  
to	  compromise.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  government	  sees	  these	  18	  months	  as	  a	  process	  of	  
buying	  more	  time”	  (Participant	  7).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  a	  withdrawal	  will	  have	  the	  opposite	  effect	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  hoping	  for	  in	  
that	  it	  could	  prompt	  the	  government	  to	  recede	  and	  further	  take	  away	  space	  for	  free	  speech.	  
This	  could	  widen	  the	  gap	  between	  civic	  and	  political	  participation,	  further	  worsening	  the	  space	  
for	  dialogue	  and	  so	  reform	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy.	  	  
	  
“Once	  people	  feel	  they	  have	  been	  punished	  for	  the	  wrong	  reasons,	  the	  government	  
could	  react	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  they	  could	  put	  more	  distance	  in	  the	  space	  between	  
civic	  and	  political	  participation	  and	  that	  would	  be	  negative.	  If	  people	  are	  losing	  their	  
jobs,	   or	   if	   there	   is	   panic	   in	   the	   market,	   this	   will	   create	   a	   much	   more	   complex	  
challenge	  to	  manage”	  (Participant	  2).	  	  
	  
There	  is	  also	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  full	  withdrawal	  could	  prompt	  the	  government	  to	  take	  more	  
serious	  measures	  when	  following	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  the	  China	  model,	  a	  direction	  Cambodia	  
already	  seems	  to	  be	  headed	  towards.	  The	  following	  quote	  noted	  the	  importance	  of	  China	  in	  
this	  narrative.	  
	  
“The	  government	  is	  playing	  a	  game	  between	  China	  and	  the	  EU.	  They	  have	  stated	  
they	  are	  prepared	  for	  a	  withdrawal	  and	  they	  don’t	  care,	  China	  has	  stated	  they	  will	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fill	  in	  the	  gaps.	  But	  what	  will	  happen	  to	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia	  
then?	  China	  does	  not	  care	  about	  this”	  (Participant	  3).	  	  	  
	  
Prime	  Minister	  Hun	  Sen	  commonly	  referrers	  to	  “The	  Model”	  when	  addressing	  media	  about	  the	  
issue	   of	   the	   EU’s	   democracy	   promotion	   in	   Cambodia.	   At	   the	   2019	   Cambodia	   Outlook	  
Conference	  in	  Phnom	  Penh,	  Hun	  Sen	  responded	  to	  calls	  from	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  for	  Cambodia	  
to	  respect	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  by	  stating	  “Cambodia	  has	  its	  own	  laws,	  you	  eat	  bread	  
and	  I	  eat	  rice”	  (Sokhean,	  2019).	  He	  explains	  that	  you	  can	  implement	  one	  kind	  of	  system	  in	  a	  
country,	  but	  that	  doesn’t	  mean	  it	  will	  work	  everywhere.	  Insinuating	  that	  Cambodia	  works	  best	  
as	  a	  one	  party	  system.	  This	  mind	  set	  seems	  to	  be	  reflected	  frequently	  in	  Hun	  Sen’s	  responses	  
to	  the	  EU’s	  decision	  to	  launch	  the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw.	  It	  paints	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  the	  RGC’s	  
stance	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  therefore	  shows	  how	  the	  government	  may	  intend	  on	  responding	  if	  a	  
full	  withdrawal	  does	  occur.	  The	  interests	  of	  the	  Cambodian	  government	  are	  far	  better	  reflected	  
in	  the	  Cambodia/China	  relationship	  than	  they	  are	   in	  the	  EU/Cambodia	  relationship	  through	  
culture,	  governance,	  and	  economic	  models.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  forecast	  the	  effects	  that	  a	  withdrawal	  may	  have	  on	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  
Cambodia,	  it	  is	  worth	  investigating	  instances	  of	  conditionality	  being	  used	  in	  the	  past.	  Although	  
the	  EBA	  has	  never	  been	  withdrawn	  under	   these	   circumstances	  before,	  we	  may	  be	   able	   to	  
understand	   the	   consequences	   of	   exercising	   this	   kind	   of	   conditionality	   through	   different	  
circumstances.	   Dipama	   and	   Parlar	   Dal	   (2015),	   conducted	   a	   case	   study	   comparing	   the	  
effectiveness	   of	   EU	   conditionality	   at	   promoting	   democratic	   reform	   and	   respect	   for	   human	  
rights	  in	  three	  countries:	  Zimbabwe,	  Ivory	  Coast,	  and	  Niger.	  Conditionality	  is	  exercised	  in	  these	  
three	   countries	   through	   the	   suspension	   of	   development	   cooperation	   due	   to	   violations	   of	  
democratic	   and	   human	   rights	   principles,	   as	   stated	   in	   the	   Cotonou	   Partnership	   Agreement.	  
Dipama	  and	  Parlar	  Dal	   (2015,	  p.	  124)	   found	  that	  except	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Niger,	  conditionality	  
practiced	  through	  means	  of	  political	  dialogue,	  consultations,	  and	  sanction	  measures	  were	  not	  
effective	  at	  creating	  sufficient	  pressure	  for	  democratic	  reform	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights.	  
Although	   each	   case	   significantly	   differs,	   all	   share	   different	   circumstances	   not	   dissimilar	   to	  
Cambodia’s.	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In	  2000,	   the	  EU	  criticised	   the	  Zimbabwean	  government	  on	  a	  number	  of	   issues,	  particularly	  
pertaining	   to	   the	   free	   and	   fair	   elections	   promised	   to	   be	   held	   in	   May	   of	   that	   year.	   The	  
Zimbabwean	  government	   in	  response	  to	  threats	  of	  sanctions	  by	  the	  EU,	  refused	  to	  comply.	  
After	  nearly	  a	  decade	  of	   little	  to	  no	  changes	   in	  terms	  of	  democratic	  reform	  and	  respect	  for	  
human	  rights	  principles,	  the	  ‘Global	  Political	  Agreement’	  was	  signed	  by	  both	  governments	  in	  
2009.	  This	  lead	  to	  progress	  being	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  rights,	  democracy,	  and	  civil	  liberties	  
within	   the	   country	   (2015,	   p.	   119-­‐120).	   The	   EU	   in	   this	   case	   used	   negative	   ex-­‐post	   form	   of	  
conditionality	  based	  on	  violations	  of	  democratic	  and	  human	  rights	  principles,	   just	  as	   in	   the	  
current	  situation	  in	  Cambodia.	  This	  examples	  shows	  that	  negative	  conditionality	  did	  work	  in	  
Zimbabwe,	  but	  only	  after	  nearly	  a	  decade	  of	  political	  and	  civil	  unrest.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Ivory	  Coast,	  following	  the	  political	  coup	  of	  1999,	  the	  EU	  imposed	  positive	  ex-­‐
post	  measures.	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  improvement	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  democracy,	  political,	  
and	   civil	   rights.	   Following	   the	   coup,	   the	   openness	   and	   accountability	   of	   the	  October	   2000	  
elections	   was	   criticised	   and	   ended	   in	   a	   series	   of	   violent	   clashes	   between	   running	   parties.	  
Another	  round	  of	  elections	  was	  held	  in	  2001	  regulated	  by	  the	  EU.	  This	  was	  also	  followed	  by	  
civil	  and	  political	  violence	  as	  political	  leaders	  continued	  to	  fail	  to	  keep	  promises.	  Three	  rounds	  
of	  consultations	  were	  opened	  by	  the	  EU	  during	  this	  time,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  serious	  of	  failed	  elections.	  
In	  summary,	  although	  the	  measures	  imposed	  by	  the	  EU	  on	  the	  Ivory	  Coast	  were	  softer	  than	  
those	  imposed	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  there	  was	  little	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  political	  situation	  of	  the	  
Ivory	  Coast	  during	  this	  time	  (2015,	  p.	  120-­‐121).	  Again,	  there	  are	  many	  similarities	  to	  this	  case	  
and	   that	   of	   Cambodia’s	  mostly	   pertaining	   to	   issues	   around	   free	   and	   fair	   elections	   and	   the	  
political	   violence	   that	   followed.	   Although	   in	   this	   case	   the	   EU	   used	   positive	   measures,	   as	  
opposed	  to	  negative	  measures,	  we	  are	  seeing	  the	  same	  mixed	  and	  rather	  delayed	  results	  in	  
effectiveness	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  EU	  intervention.	  	  
	  
The	  experiences	  of	  Niger	  as	  described	  by	  Dipama	  and	  Parlar	  Dal	  are	  far	  more	  positive	  than	  that	  
of	  Zimbabwe	  and	  the	  Ivory	  Coast.	  However,	  because	  of	  this	  stark	  difference	  in	  experiences,	  it	  
is	   important	   to	   note	   the	   Niger	   experience	   in	   order	   to	   see	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	  
conditionality	  may	  work.	  The	  political	  experiences	  of	  Niger	  were	  relatively	  positive	  during	  the	  
first	  and	  second	  term	  of	  President	  Tandja	  from	  2005	  to	  2009,	  until	  the	  impending	  expiry	  of	  his	  
second	   term.	   Political	   rights	   and	   civil	   liberties	   began	   to	   worsen	   during	   this	   time	   as	   the	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opposition	  parties,	  media,	  and	  members	  of	  civil	  society	  were	  harassed	  by	  the	  party	  in	  power	  
in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  elections.	  Due	  to	  this,	  the	  EU	  opened	  consultation	  and	  cooperation	  was	  
suspended.	  A	  second	  round	  of	  consultation	  was	  opened	  by	  the	  EU	  in	  2010	  and	  elections	  held	  
successfully	  in	  2011	  (2015,	  p.	  121).	  This	  is	  another	  form	  of	  positive	  ex-­‐post	  measures	  taken	  by	  
the	  EU,	  which	  in	  this	  case	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  constructive	  and	  timely	  influence	  on	  democracy	  
and	  human	  rights	  in	  Niger.	  	  
	  
The	  limit	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  this	  comparison	  between	  these	  three	  examples	  and	  Cambodia	   is	  
substantial	  as	  the	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  nature	  of	  conditionality	  being	  used	  differs	  
greatly.	  As	  well	  as	  the	  difference	  in	  geo-­‐political	  factors.	  However,	  under	  the	  circumstances	  
that	  the	  EBA	  has	  never	  been	  withdrawn	  in	  the	  past,	  this	  is	  the	  best	  available	  approach	  in	  using	  
past	  examples	  to	  examine	  the	  potential	  effectiveness	  of	  an	  EBA	  withdrawal	  on	  the	  future	  of	  
democracy	   and	   human	   rights	   in	   Cambodia.	   All	   three	   examples	   share	   similarities	   with	  
Cambodia’s	  case,	  however	  none	  are	  precisely	  similar.	  Because	  of	  the	  disparity	  between	  these	  
three	   examples,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   difference	   between	   these	   three	   examples	   and	   Cambodia’s	  
experiences,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   include	  details	  of	   them	  all	   in	  order	   to	  produce	  a	  more	  well-­‐
rounded	  picture	  of	  the	  potential	  future	  effects	  of	  a	  withdrawal.	  As	  this	  study	  revealed,	  apart	  
from	  the	  case	  of	  Niger,	  political	  dialogue,	  consultations,	  and	  sanctions	  (in	  Zimbabwe’s	  case)	  
did	  not	  produce	  positive	  outcomes	  in	  terms	  of	  democracy	  promotion.	  Dipama	  and	  Parlar	  Dal	  
(2015,	  p.	  124)	  state	  that	  a	  reason	  for	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  consistency	  and	  coherence	  
which	   damages	   the	   EU’s	   credibility	  when	   attempting	   to	   enforce	   normative	   values.	   The	   EU	  
seemed	   far	  more	   reluctant	   to	   impose	   harsh	  measures	   on	   the	   Ivory	   Coast	   and	  Niger,	   even	  
though	  the	  violations	  of	  principles	  were	  similar.	  The	  EU	  seems	  to	  contradict	  its	  own	  stance	  on	  
normative	  principles	  by	  not	  acting	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  all	  three	  examples.	  This	  may	  tell	  us	  why	  
the	  RGC	  may	  not	  be	  feeling	  pressure	  from	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  way	  it	  is	  intended.	  The	  RGC	  in	  their	  
official	  response	  to	  the	  launch	  of	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  has	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  
not	  exhibiting	  the	  same	  moral	  stance	  for	  other	  countries	  showing	  similar	  violations.	  It	  is	  clear	  
the	  integrity	  of	  the	  EU	  is	  coming	  into	  question	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  inforce	  conditionality	  based	  
on	  normative	  principles,	  which	  effects	  the	  way	  their	  actions	  are	  perceived	  by	  their	  developing	  
counterparts.	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6.4   How	  Will	  a	  Withdrawal	  Effect	  Cambodia’s	  Economy?	  	  
Most	   participants	   predict	   that	   a	   withdrawal	   will	   have	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   Cambodia’s	  
economy.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  there	  will	  be	  both	  short	  and	  long	  term	  impacts.	  The	  
short	  term	  impacts	  are	   likely	  to	  be	  substantial.	  Economies	  are	  resilient	  and	  Cambodia’s	  will	  
likely	  recover	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  particularly	  if	  the	  government	  expands	  its	  trade	  portfolio	  not	  
only	  with	  China,	  but	  also	  with	  other	  countries.	  	  
	  
“If	  it	  is	  a	  broad	  suspension	  a	  withdrawal	  will	  have	  significant	  impacts.	  Growth,	  which	  
is	  currently	  hovering	  around	  7%	  will	  likely	  diminish	  to	  around	  4%,	  with	  impacts	  on	  
workers	  and	  poverty	  levels”	  (Participant	  4).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  in	  Cambodia’s	  case,	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  the	  population	  is	  ‘near	  
poor’	  and	  it	  would	  only	  take	  a	  minor	  economic	  shock	  to	  shift	  that	  population	  back	  into	  poverty.	  
With	  diminishing	  economic	  growth	  in	  these	  areas	  and	  a	  predicted	  spike	  in	  poverty	  levels	  due	  
to	   loss	   of	   jobs,	   a	   withdrawal	   will	   have	   substantially	   negative	   short	   term	   impacts	   on	   the	  
Cambodian	  economy.	  This	  may	  have	  longer	  term	  impacts	  if	  the	  Cambodian	  economy	  can’t	  find	  
a	  way	  to	  diversify.	  	  
	  
As	   stated	   in	   the	  contextual	   review,	   statistically	   speaking	  EBA	  exports	  are	   significant	   for	   the	  
export	  margins	   of	   Cambodia.	   Cambodia	   accounts	   for	   18%	   of	   all	   EBA	   imports	   into	   the	   EU;	  
Garments	   are	   the	   most	   significant	   Cambodian	   export	   to	   the	   EU.	   In	   2017,	   two	   categories	  
(Knitwear	  and	  Woven)	  accounted	  for	  74.9%	  of	  Cambodia	  exports	  to	  the	  EU,	  while	  exports	  of	  
footwear	  were	  12.8%,	  and	  cereals	  were	  3.6%	  (Ec.europa.eu,	  2019).	  If	  the	  EBA	  is	  lost,	  more	  than	  
93%	  of	  exports	  would	  then	  fall	  under	  the	  MFN	  tariff	  rate	  of	  12%	  (World	  Bank	  Group,	  2019,	  p.	  
25).	   The	   repercussions	   of	   a	   withdrawal	   will	   not	   only	   have	   detrimental	   effects	   on	   garment	  
exports	  which	  account	  for	  approximately	  40%	  of	  Cambodia’s	  GDP,	  but	  many	  garment	  factory	  
workers	  will	   likely	   lose	   their	   jobs	  as	  garments	  account	   for	   roughly	  80%	  of	  Cambodia’s	   total	  
exports	  to	  the	  EU	  market	  (World	  Bank	  Group,	  2019,	  p.	  25).	  If	  the	  EBA	  is	  suspended,	  tariffs	  will	  
increase	   the	   price	   of	   the	   products	   exported	   from	   Cambodia	   to	   the	   EU.	   This	  will	   lead	   to	   a	  
decrease	   in	   the	   quantity	   of	   products	   exported	   and	   so	   have	   negative	   repercussions	   for	   the	  
garment	  industry.	  Cambodia’s	  factories	  supply	  global	  fashion	  brands	  such	  as	  H&M,	  Nike,	  Puma,	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and	   Adidas.	   Adidas	   publically	   stated	   that	   it	   calls	   for	   the	   EU	   to	   “thoroughly	   consider	   the	  
economic,	   social	   and	  human	   rights	   impacts	   of	   such	   a	  withdrawal”.	   Adidas	   said	   24%	  of	   the	  
brands	   products	   are	   manufactured	   in	   Cambodian	   factories.	   Adidas	   stated	   “it	   cannot	   be	  
expected	   to	   absorb	   these	   losses…and	   so	   automatically	   leads	   to	   a	   reallocation	   of	   further	  
investments	  in	  sourcing”	  (Chheng,	  2019).	  	  
	  
Those	  working	   in	   the	   industry	   are	   not	   the	   only	   ones	   to	   feel	   direct	   economic	   impacts	   of	   a	  
withdrawal.	  Their	  family	  members	  and	  dependents	  will	  also.	  This	  would	  make	  the	  number	  of	  
total	  people	  negatively	  affected	  by	  a	  withdrawal	  approximately	  triple	  those	  just	  working	  in	  the	  
industry.	  The	  other	  issue	  these	  workers	  will	  be	  facing	  is	  that	  it	  will	  be	  very	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  
find	  work	  in	  other	  industries	  due	  to	  their	  low	  skill	  level.	  	  
	  
“There	  will	  be	   two	  main	   impacts,	   the	   first	   is	  people	   losing	   their	   jobs	  and	  salary,	  
which	  has	  a	   trickle-­‐down	  effect	   as	  many	  of	   these	  people	  have	   family	  member’s	  
dependent	  on	  these	  incomes	  also.	  We	  are	  talking	  about	  Cambodian	  labourers	  who	  
are	  not	  very	  highly	  skilled.	  You	  can’t	  shift	  them	  into	  another	  type	  of	  job	  easily.	  You	  
cannot	  suddenly	  shift	  and	  change	  a	  whole	  population	  of	  people	  who	  are	  skilled	  at	  
sewing	  to	  be	  construction	  workers”	  (Participant	  2).	  	  	  
	  
If	  the	  garment	  industry	  crashes	  due	  to	  a	  withdrawal	  as	  predicted,	  there	  will	  be	  nowhere	  for	  
these	  single	  skilled	  workers	  to	  go,	  rendering	  them	  redundant.	  This	  will	  have	  negative	  effects	  in	  
terms	   of	   mass-­‐unemployment,	   likely	   shifting	   this	   population	   back	   into	   poverty.	   As	   was	  
explained	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  through	  reference	  to	  Gradeva	  and	  Martines-­‐Zarzoso	  (2009,	  
p.7),	  these	  kinds	  of	  GSP	  programmes	  tend	  to	  promote	  industries	  in	  LDC’s	  with	  little	  potential	  
for	  diversification	  and	  growth.	  If	  these	  GSP	  schemes	  are	  withdrawn	  before	  the	  country	  is	  able	  
to	   graduate	   from	   LDC	   status,	   it	   may	   cause	   industry	   collapse.	   If	   these	   industries	   are	   large	  
enough,	   like	   the	   garment	   industry	   in	   Cambodia,	   a	   withdrawal	   may	   trigger	   an	   economic	  
downturn.	  This	  will	  also	  likely	  induce	  panic	  in	  the	  market	  resulting	  in	  disinvestment.	  This	  panic	  
could	  further	  add	  to	  the	  negative	  impact	  overall.	  The	  RGC	  has	  been	  trying	  to	  mitigate	  this	  by	  
removing	   some	  of	   the	   red	   tape	   for	  business	  owners.	  However,	   regardless	  of	  how	   the	  RGC	  
prepares	  for	  a	  withdrawal,	  panic	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  easily	  put	  to	  rest	  and	  it	  is	  unlikely	  the	  
government	  will	  be	  able	  to	  totally	  absorb	  these	  flow	  on	  impacts.	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6.5   What	  Groups	  Will	  be	  the	  Most	  Effected	  by	  a	  Withdrawal?	  
All	  participants	  labelled:	  garment	  workers,	  middle	  class,	  people	  living	  in	  or	  near	  poverty,	  and	  
women,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  dependents	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effected	  by	  a	  withdrawal.	  
	  
“Because	  of	  the	  pro-­‐poor	  system,	  shock	  will	  be	  more	  distributionally	  diverse.	  The	  
people	  that	  will	  feel	   it	  first	  and	  the	  most	  will	  be	  those	  that	  work	  in	  the	  industry.	  
Workers,	  operators	  and	  owners	  will	  absorb	  the	  costs”	  (Participant	  8).	  	  
	  
This	  is	  most	  concerning	  for	  Cambodia’s	  rural	  women	  who	  make	  up	  85%	  of	  the	  total	  700,000	  
garment	  factory	  workers.	  While	  the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  a	  withdrawal	  will	  threaten	  the	  income	  
of	  another	  3	  million	  people,	  including	  dependents	  and	  service	  providers	  from	  the	  hospitality,	  
accommodation,	  and	  transportation	  sectors	  (Eurocham,	  2019).	   It	  was	  also	  frequently	  noted	  
that	  a	  decline	   in	  the	  availability	  of	   jobs	  will	   likely	  cause	  an	   increase	  of	  migration.	  “If	  people	  
cannot	  work	  in	  their	  communities,	  they	  will	  have	  to	  migrate	  to	  other	  countries	  to	  find	  work”	  
(Participant	  9).	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  migration	  could	  also	  have	  negative	  flow	  on	  effects.	  
For	  example,	  trafficking	  and	  labour	  exploitation	  are	  two	  major	  problems	  that	  were	  regularly	  
referenced	  by	  participants	  in	  the	  study.	  There	  is	  a	  general	  concern	  that	  not	  only	  will	  the	  labour	  
and	   human	   rights	   situation	  worsen	   politically,	   it	  will	   also	  worsen	   socially	   as	   people	  will	   be	  
forced	  to	  take	  desperate	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  find	  work.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  Cambodia’s	  population	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  of	  the	  EBA.	  In	  2018,	  
Cambodia	  has	  been	  measured	  to	  have	  a	  13.5%	  poverty	  rating	  which	  has	  been	  halved	  since	  
2007	  with	  a	  rating	  of	  47.8%.	  Many	  of	  these	  people	  only	  remain	  above	  the	  poverty	  line	  by	  a	  
small	  margin,	  with	  4.5	  million	  people	  remaining	  ‘near	  poor’	  (World	  Bank,	  2019).	  These	  people’s	  
livelihoods	   are	   fragile	   and	   they	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   falling	   back	   into	   poverty	   at	   the	   slightest	  
economic	   shock.	   Particularly	   those	   that	   live	   in	   rural	   communities.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   a	   full	  
suspension,	  EU	  official	  participants	  stated	  that	  the	  Commission	  intends	  to	  take	  some	  mitigation	  
measures	   for	   the	  workers	   of	   the	   industries	  most	   affected	   including	   the	   garment	   industry.	  
However,	   there	   has	   been	   no	   official	   statement	   released	   by	   the	   EU	   that	   outlines	   how	   they	  
intend	  to	  fill	  the	  gaps	  that	  a	  withdrawal	  will	  cause.	  Another	  risk	  mentioned	  was	  the	  government	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may	  try	  to	  promote	  exports	  that	  would	  impact	  on	  minimum	  salary	  which	  will	  put	  pressure	  on	  
the	  workers.	  One	  participant	  stated	  that	  “The	  EU	  will	  try	  to	  take	  measures	  to	  mitigate	  this,	  but	  
ultimately	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  Cambodian	  government	  to	  try	  and	  find	  a	  solution”	  (Participant	  1).	  In	  
terms	  of	  general	  effects	  of	  a	  withdrawal	  on	  the	  people	  of	  Cambodia,	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	  the	  
effects	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  itself.	  As	  stated	  previously,	  participants	  are	  worried	  
about	  the	  loss	  of	  EU	  leverage	  without	  the	  EBA	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  control.	  	  
	  
“There	  will	  also	  be	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  in	  general,	  
because	  once	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  lose,	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  holds	  to	  government	  to	  
try	  and	  promote	  the	  democratic	  system	  and	  respect	  human	  rights”	  (Participant	  1).	  	  
	  
CSO	  participants	  seem	  to	  be	  positive	  that	  the	  process	  is	  underway	  as	  they	  hope	  it	  will	  bring	  
about	  positive	  change.	  However,	  they	  are	  also	  afraid	  that	  if	  the	  agreement	  is	  withdrawn,	  the	  
situation	  would	  tighten	  even	  more.	  It	  is	  briefly	  noted	  that	  civil	  society	  are	  more	  worried	  about	  
the	  impacts	  on	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  as	  these	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  overcome,	  whereas	  
the	  economy	  will	  recover.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  vital	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  consider	  if	  these	  loses	  are	  worth	  it,	  particularly	  as	  these	  measures	  appear	  
to	  have	  little	  to	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  RGC	  at	  this	  time.	  The	  current	  mechanisms	  and	  procedures	  are	  
clearly	  not	  producing	  the	  desired	  result.	  This,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  experiences	  of	  Zimbabwe,	  the	  Ivory	  
Coast,	   and	   Niger	   show	   that	   the	   EU	   needs	   to	   revise	   how	   they	   work	   these	   conditions	   into	  
preferential	   trade	  agreements	  such	  as	  the	  EBA.	   If	   the	  mechanisms	  are	  defective	   in	  the	  first	  
place,	  then	  it	  is	  unlikely	  the	  exercising	  of	  these	  tools	  will	  reap	  intended	  outcomes.	  Although	  
the	  use	  of	   leverage	  and	  political	  pressure	  are	   valuable,	   they	  are	   tantamount	   to	  discussion,	  
dialogue,	  and	  compromise	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  
The	  EBA	  may	  be	  one	  tool	  to	  exercise	  the	  elevation	  of	  these	  values,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  the	  only	  
tool.	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6.6   Perceptions	  on	  the	  European	  Union’s	  Choice	  to	  Launch	  the	  
Withdrawal	  Procedure	  	  
Perceptions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  general	  agreement	  or	  disagreement	  of	  the	  EU’s	  choice	  to	  launch	  
the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  is	  important	  to	  note	  as	  it	  provides	  a	  contrasting	  perspective	  as	  to	  
whether	   these	   measures	   should	   be	   deemed	   appropriate.	   Many	   participants	   noted	   they	  
understand	  why	  the	  EU	  is	  taking	  these	  measures	  and	  that	  it	  is	  fully	  within	  their	  political	  right	  
and	  power	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  EU	  must	  ‘show	  teeth’	  and	  respect	  their	  own	  principles	  above	  all	  else.	  
However,	  most	  participants	  agree	  that	  withdrawing	  the	  EBA	  is	  not	  the	  correct	  route	  towards	  
ensuring	  democratic	   reform	  and	   the	  betterment	  of	  human	  rights	   standards	   in	   the	  country.	  
They	  believe	  that	  these	  actions	  by	  the	  EU	  will	  worsen	  the	  situation.	  One	  participant	  suggested,	  	  
	  
“What	  the	  EU	  and	  Cambodia	  really	  need	  to	  look	  at	  is	  a	  win-­‐win	  strategy.	  If	  most	  
parties	  are	  going	  to	  be	  negatively	  affected,	  there	  should	  not	  be	  a	  withdrawal,	  just	  
communication	  and	  negotiation	  to	  find	  a	  solution.	  If	  you	  simply	  withdraw	  then	  no	  
one	  wins”	  (Participant	  9).	  	  
	  
As	   far	   as	   the	   Cambodian	   governments	   reaction	   to	   the	   EU,	   it	   seems	   they	   remain	   relatively	  
unalarmed.	   The	   Cambodian	   government	   has	   been	   propagating	   that	   a	   withdrawal	   will	   not	  
negatively	   affect	   the	   countries	   “thriving	   economy”	   and	   urged	   CPP	   officials	   to	   not	   trade	  
Cambodia’s	  sovereignty	  for	  the	  EBA.	  	  “This	  is	  our	  outright	  decision	  which	  is	  our	  stance.	  We	  do	  
not	  bow	  down	  our	  head	  for	  trade	  with	  foreigners.	  With	  or	  without	  the	  EBA	  Cambodia	  will	  not	  
die”	  (Narim,	  2019).	  The	  potential	  of	  a	  withdrawal	  is	  already	  having	  the	  opposite	  effect	  intended	  
with	  Hun	  Sen	  stating	  that	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  will	  mean	  the	  complete	  dissolution	  of	  the	  
opposition	  party.	  	  
	  
“The	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  will	  be	  tantamount	  to	  killing	  the	  opposition	  party…..we	  
will	  eliminate	  former	  opposition	  forces	  and	  the	  CNRP’s	  network	  and	  there	  will	  be	  
no	  possibility	  of	  them	  contesting	  the	  2022	  and	  2023	  elections”	  he	  furthered	  “we	  
have	  to	  eliminate	  the	  political	  careers	  of	  traitors	  by	  using	  the	  EU’s	  measures	  taken	  
against	  us”	  (Narim,	  2019).	  	  
	  
	   63	  
There	   are	   other	   avenues	   the	   Cambodian	   government	   can	   take	   that	   do	   not	   threaten	   their	  
power,	  for	  example	  further	  acceptance	  of	  Chinese	  assistance.	  It	  is	  true	  the	  EBA	  provides	  some	  
leverage,	  but	  it	  appears	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  enough	  leverage	  to	  inforce	  changes	  through	  a	  
withdrawal	  context.	  Participants	  expressed	  they	  felt	  a	  withdrawal	  will	  not	  help	  this.	  	  
	  	  
“I	  suspect	  the	  withdrawal	  will	  not	  be	  very	  effective	  as	  the	  government	  is	  already	  
preparing	  for	  a	  withdrawal	  through	  taking	  measures	  to	  reduce	  costs	  on	  business,	  
finding	  new	  markets	  and	  removing	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  red	  tape.	  This	  will	  reduce	  business	  
costs	  which	  would	  make	  the	  equation	  much	  better	  if	  the	  EU	  were	  to	  withdraw.	  They	  
are	   also	   liberalising	   trade	   with	   Vietnam	   and	   China	   trying	   to	   neutralise	   things	  
already,	  so	  I	  am	  suspicious	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  mechanisms”	  (Participant	  
8).	  	  	  
	  
Some	   participants	   expressed	   they	   understood	   the	   need	   for	   the	   EU	   to	   prioritise	   its	   own	  
principles	  in	  order	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  credible	  partner.	  	  
	  
“In	   terms	   of	   the	   agreement,	   they	   have	   the	   right	   to	   withdraw	   based	   on	   these	  
circumstances.	  The	  EU	  must	  comply	  with	  internal	  policy	  and	  guidelines,	  however	  
the	  problem	  post	  withdrawal	  then	  becomes	  how	  do	  we	  solve	  issues	  in	  democracy	  
and	  human	  rights	  without	  it?”	  (Participant	  10).	  	  	  
	  
It	  was	  noted	  by	  participants’	  multiple	  times	  that	  the	  current	  mechanisms	  need	  to	  be	  changed	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  promotion	  through	  the	  EBA.	  	  
	  
“If	  they	  present	  the	  same	  procedures,	  it	  will	  not	  help	  the	  people	  of	  this	  country.	  If	  
the	  EU	  wants	   to	  help	  they	  need	  to	  change	  the	  mechanisms.	  Don’t	   try	  and	  force	  
things	  to	  change,	  rather	  work	  with	  what	  you	  have.	  If	  they	  choose	  to	  keep	  the	  EBA,	  
then	   things	   still	   need	   to	   change	   to	   make	   these	   mechanisms	   more	   effective”	  
(Participant	  11).	  	  
	  
A	  press	  release	  was	  announced	  by	  European	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  Cambodia	  (EuroCham)	  
which	  urges	  the	  EU	  not	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA	  due	  to	  the	  concern	  around	  the	  negative	  impacts	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this	   will	   have	   on	   current	   and	   future	   business	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   Cambodia	   as	   well	   as	  
businesses	  in	  Cambodia.	  EuroCham	  also	  organised	  a	  letter	  addressed	  to	  Cecilia	  Malmström	  at	  
the	  EC,	  signed	  by	  38	  representatives	  from	  Cambodia’s	  private	  sector	  stating,	  	  
	  
“The	  consequences	  of	   such	  a	  decision	  will	   impose	  serious	  economic	  damage	  on	  
Cambodia	   and	   would	   neglect	   the	   tremendous	   efforts	   undertaken	   by	   the	  
Cambodian	  private	  sector	  to	  align	  its	  values	  and	  policies	  with	  the	  economic	  model	  
championed	  by	  the	  European	  Union”	  (EuroCham,	  2019,	  personal	  communication).	  
	  
It	   is	   expressed	   that	   these	   actions	   jeopardise	   the	   past	   and	   future	   achievements	   of	   the	  
partnership	  between	  Cambodia	  and	  the	  EU.	  Concerns	  were	  also	  expressed	  over	  “sending	  the	  
wrong	  signals”	  causing	  panic	  in	  the	  market	  resulting	  in	  the	  threat	  of	  disinvestment.	  This	  would	  
have	  countless	  flow	  on	  effects.	  EuroCham	  views	  this	  decision	  as	  largely	  counterproductive	  to	  
the	  aims	  of	  the	  EU’s	  GSP	  and	  EBA	  schemes	  which	  aim	  to	  eradicate	  poverty	  in	  underdeveloped	  
nations	  through	  improving	  their	  export	  competitiveness	  through	  the	  opening	  of	  EU	  markets	  to	  
these	  countries	  (Eurocham,	  2019).	  	  
	  
Another	  joint	  statement	  signed	  by	  over	  70	  NGOs,	  Associations,	  Trade	  Unions,	  and	  members	  of	  
Cambodian	   civil	   society	   also	   express	   their	   concerns	   about	   the	   EU’s	   decision	   to	   launch	   the	  
procedure	   to	  withdraw.	   It	   states	   that	   they	   fully	  understand	   the	  EU’s	  position	  and	  decision,	  
however,	  they	  believe	  it	  will	  directly	  and	  negatively	  impact	  Cambodian	  people’s	  welfare	  and	  
livelihoods	  (CENTRAL,	  2019).	  The	  EuroCham	  press	  release	  and	  letter	  to	  the	  EC,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
NGO	  and	  civil	  society	  joint	  statement,	  align	  well	  with	  the	  feelings	  of	  participants	  regarding	  the	  
idea	  that	  constructive	  dialogue	  and	  cooperation	  are	  the	  most	  useful	  tools	  for	  the	  EC	  to	  address	  
concerns	  around	  democratisation	  and	  human	  rights.	  As	  opposed	  to	  confronting	  these	  issues	  
through	  mechanisms	  of	  economic	  pressure.	   It	   is	  widely	  felt	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  is	  
going	  about	  attempting	  to	  instil	  these	  values	  is	  counterproductive	  and	  will	  not	  further	  the	  EU’s	  
cause	  in	  Cambodia.	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6.7   Perceptions	  on	  How	  the	  European	  Union	  Can	  Improve	  in	  
its	  Promotion	  of	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  
Cambodia	  	  
Perception	  is	  an	  important	  aspect	  in	  the	  answering	  of	  this	  research	  question,	  as	  it	  provides	  a	  
bottom-­‐up	   explanation	   of	   how	   effective	   the	   EBA	   withdrawal	   can	   be	   in	   the	   promotion	   of	  
democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  It	  also	  provides	  comment	  on	  how	  the	  EU	  can	  improve	  on	  these	  
measures	  in	  the	  future.	  Many	  participants	  agree	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  help	  Cambodia	  the	  
EBA	  must	   be	   kept.	   Several	   participants	   noted	   that	   they	   felt	   the	   EU	   is	   a	   strong	   partner	   for	  
Cambodia	  and	  they	  appreciate	  the	  EU’s	  efforts	  as	  they	  feel	  the	  EBA	  is	  a	  key	  point	  in	  this.	  A	  few	  
participants	   suggested	   the	   EU	  needs	   to	  work	  on	  more	   strategic	  ways	   to	   promote	   an	  open	  
dialogue	   and	   encourage	   compromise	   with	   the	   Cambodian	   government	   to	   ensure	   they	  
strengthen	  their	  communication	  and	  partnerships	  to	  work	  together	  towards	  sustainable	  and	  
future	  orientated	  solutions.	  Another	  main	  theme	  that	  arose	  in	  solution	  building	  was	  improved	  
space	  for	  civil	  society	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  government.	  It	  was	  noted	  by	  participants	  that	  the	  EU	  
should	  focus	  on	  saving	  space	  for	  civil	  society,	  and	  improved	  dialogue	  about	  human	  rights	  and	  
democracy	  to	  ensure	  the	  population	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  own	  rights.	  This	  way	  they	  are	  able	  to	  
make	  informed	  decisions	  and	  communicate	  these	  decisions	  more	  effectively	  in	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  
framework.	  Solutions	  are	  pitched	  by	  the	  direct	  stakeholders	  and	  specifically	  tailored	  to	  ensure	  
sustainability	  and	  effectiveness.	  	  
	  
A	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  effective	   in	  policy	  making	  and	  helps	  alleviate	  
issues	   around	   local	   ownership	   of	   development	   outcomes	   as	   recognised	   in	   the	   literature	  
review.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  why	  it	  is	  vital	  the	  EU	  continue	  to	  support	  and	  
protect	  space	  for	  civil	  society.	  “The	  EU	  needs	  to	  listen	  to	  what	  the	  real	  needs	  of	  the	  Cambodian	  
people	  are,	   they	  need	   to	   see	  how	   their	   funding	   can	  be	  used	  more	  directly	   and	  efficiently”	  
(Participant	  10).	  	  
	  
It	   was	   also	   noted	   by	   one	   participant	   that	   if	   the	   EU	   concentrates	   on	   directing	   their	   efforts	  
towards	  education	  systems	  and	  adequately	  preparing	  the	  population	  for	  the	  job	  market,	  then	  
democracy	  will	  naturally	  follow	  with	  the	  new	  generation.	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“Youth	   are	   really	   engaged	   with	   democracy	   in	   Cambodia.	   98%	   of	   youth	   prefer	  
democracy,	  so	  this	  is	  going	  to	  mean	  something	  for	  the	  future	  when	  the	  population	  
ages.	   The	  EU	  needs	   to	   focus	  on	  helping	  people	   towards	   a	  better	   livelihood	  and	  
education	  and	  I	  think	  democracy	  would	  come	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this”	  (Participant	  3).	  	  
	  
This	   claim	  has	   also	   been	   supported	   through	   literature	   as	   discussed	   in	   the	   conceptual	  
framework.	  As	  Knack’s	  (2001,	  p.	  251)	  study	  suggested	  on	  aid	  and	  democratisation,	  aid	  
can	  influence	  democratisation	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  modernisation,	  in	  the	  funding	  
of	   programmes	   related	   to	   health	   and	   education.	   Literacy	   and	   increased	   incomes	   in	  
particular,	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   demand	   for	   democratisation.	   As	   a	  
consequence	   of	   the	   EU’s	   increased	   expenditure	   in	   better	   education	   in	   Cambodia,	  
increased	  demand	  for	  democracy	  may	  follow.	  	  
	  
The	  topic	  of	  the	  ‘governing	  model’	  was	  also	  raised	  in	  this	  set	  of	  responses.	  The	  question	  of	  
whether	  the	  “EU	  way”	  is	  the	  best	  way	  forward	  for	  Cambodia	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  
the	  debate	  on	  how	  the	  EU	  should	  be	  engaging	  with	  the	  county.	  “It’s	  hard	  to	  find	  the	  right	  moral	  
compass	  in	  a	  globalised	  world.	  There	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  governing	  model	  that	  suits	  the	  needs	  of	  
the	  narrative”	   (Participant	  2).	   In	  a	  generalised	  sense,	   the	  Cambodian	  government	  wants	   to	  
focus	  on	  economic	  development,	  improve	  public	  services	  and	  access	  to	  health	  and	  education,	  
and	  focus	  on	  the	  country	  graduating	  from	  an	  LDC	  to	  a	  middle	  income	  country	  by	  2030.	  	  
	  
“We	  have	  seen	  these	  alternative	  models	  work	  in	  places	  like	  China	  and	  Singapore.	  
There	  is	  proof	  that	  if	  you	  can	  control	  civil	  space	  to	  a	  certain	  level	  where	  there	  is	  not	  
much	  divergence,	   then	  you	  can	  achieve	  efficiency.	  People	  are	   strongly	  believing	  
that	  the	  chaotic	  capitalist	  democracy	  model	  is	  not	  the	  way	  to	  go”	  (Participant	  2).	  	  
	  
This	  participant	  is	  conveying	  that	  Cambodia	  needs	  to	  find	  a	  model	  that	  suits	  their	  cultural	  and	  
societal	  needs,	  which	  are	  different	  than	  that	  of	  the	  EU’s.	  Not	  only	   is	   it	  the	  EU’s	  efforts,	  but	  
those	  of	  other	  development	  partners	  and	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  UN,	  which	  have	  
been	  unsuccessful	  in	  terms	  of	  democratising	  the	  country.	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6.8   The	  Future	  of	  Trade	  and	  Aid	  in	  Cambodia	  	  
The	  RGC’s	  main	  goal	  for	  the	  coming	  years	  is	  economic	  growth,	  as	  they	  aim	  to	  become	  a	  middle	  
income	  country	  by	  2030.	  This	  may	  be	  achievable	  if	  the	  EU	  decides	  to	  keep	  the	  EBA	  agreement	  
in	  Cambodia.	  Cambodia	  has	  enjoyed	  growth	  of	  up	  to	  7%	  per	  year	  over	  the	  last	  decade,	  much	  
of	  which	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  preferential	  trade	  scheme.	  If	  the	  EBA	  is	  lost,	  then	  Cambodia	  
will	   have	   to	   fill	   this	   gap	   by	   expanding	   its	   trade	   identifying	   new	   export	  markets	   or	   growing	  
existing	  ones.	   Still,	   participants	   feel	   positive	   about	  Cambodia’s	   ability	   to	   trade	   and	   recover	  
economically	  post	  withdrawal.	  	  
	  
“I	  think	  it’s	  going	  to	  get	  better.	  Trade	  is	  something	  everyone	  prioritises,	  so	  I’m	  glad	  
the	  EU	  chose	  not	  to	  prioritise	  trade	  over	  their	  principles.	  So	  I	  think	  the	  market	  will	  
only	  grow	  and	  will	  become	  much	  more	  diverse,	  with	  more	  actors”	  (Participant	  2).	  	  
	  
China	  has	  already	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  large	  player	  in	  the	  future	  of	  Cambodian	  aid	  and	  trade.	  
Multiple	   participants	   identified	   that	   ODA	   is	   decreasing	   and	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   is	  
increasing.	  One	  participant	  expressed,	  	  
	  
“’The	  Belt	  and	  Road’	   initiative	  definitely	  has	  a	  presence.	  There’s	  an	   imbalance	  in	  
terms	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	  US	   interests	   and	   China’s.	   If	   there	   is	   a	  withdrawal,	   the	  
balance	  will	  change,	  and	  not	  in	  Cambodia’s	  favour”	  (Participant	  4).	  	  
	  
Many	  participants	  noted	  the	  importance	  of	  Cambodia	  finding	  trade	  with	  other	  countries.	  If	  the	  
EU	  withdraws,	  participants	  do	  not	  seem	  concerned	  about	  Cambodia’s	  ability	  to	  find	  new	  trade,	  
as	  trade	  in	  a	  globalised	  environment	  is	  inevitable.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  withdrawal	  this	  
may	  be	  difficult	  as	  the	  country	  is	  in	  competition	  with	  its	  surrounding	  regions.	  Recovery	  in	  this	  
way	  would	  be	  slow,	  and	  would	  require	  some	  intensive	  structural	  changes.	  
	  
The	   consensus	   among	   CSO	   and	   NGO	   participants	   was	   that	   Cambodia	   is	   still	   in	   need	   of	  
development	  aid.	  A	  few	  participants	  noted	  that	  Cambodia	  is	  still	  in	  a	  fragile	  position,	  as	  much	  
of	  the	  population	  is	  still	  poor	  or	  near	  poor.	  In	  this	  way,	  they	  believe	  that	  ODA	  from	  the	  EU	  is	  
still	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  work	  towards	  other	  values	  such	  as	  improved	  respect	  of	  human	  rights	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and	  better	  health	  care	  and	  education.	  This	  differs	  from	  Chinese	  aid	  which	  focuses	  mostly	  on	  
economic	  growth	  through	  industrialisation.	  If	  the	  EU	  choses	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA,	  participants	  
felt	  there	  would	  be	  much	  less	  western	  investment	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  country	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  
	  
Grant	  and	  loan	  based	  aid	  is	  disappearing	  and	  new	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  AfT	  initiatives	  like	  the	  
EBA	  are	  being	  trialled.	  	  One	  participant	  affirmed,	  “Aid	  is	  declining,	  moving	  away	  from	  grant	  and	  
loan	  based	  aid	  and	  more	  towards	  technical	  assistance.	  So	  conditionality	  is	  where	  things	  seems	  
to	  be	  moving	  towards”	  (Participant	  8).	  When	  commenting	  on	  the	  future	  partnership	  between	  
the	  EU	  and	  Cambodia,	  EU	  official	  representatives	  noted	  the	  importance	  of	  future	  orientated	  
development	  strategy.	  	  
	  
“We	  need	  to	  look	  at	  the	  long	  term.	  Cambodia	  is	  reaching	  the	  end	  of	  a	  cycle,	  soon	  
there	  will	  be	  a	  generation	  of	  change	  and	  we	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  how	  to	  engage	  with	  
these	  new	  generations”	  (Participant	  1).	  	  
	  
The	  Khmer	  Rouge	  generation	  is	  ageing	  and	  soon	  it	  will	  be	  the	  time	  for	  the	  younger	  generations	  
to	  take	  power.	  This	  will	  be	  a	  generation	  that	  did	  not	  come	  from	  a	  time	  of	  the	  Khmer	  Rouge	  and	  
so	   may	   hold	   different	   ideas	   and	   values.	   Cambodia	   has	   a	   unique	   and	   recent	   past	   and	   the	  
environment	   from	  which	   its	  current	  political	   climate	  has	  been	  set	  means	  other	  values	  may	  
need	  to	  be	  more	  of	  a	  priority.	  The	  government	  official	  representative	  furthered,	  	  
	  
“It	   is	  difficult	   in	   the	  sense	  that	   the	  history	  of	  Cambodia	  sets	  an	  environment	   for	  
where	  arguments	  of	  peace	  and	  stability	  win	  over	  arguments	  of	  making	  sure	  human	  
rights	  are	  respected.	  There	  is	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  the	  population	  that	  want	  democracy	  
and	  human	  rights,	  but	  arguments	  of	  stability	  win”	  (Participant	  1).	  	  
	  
When	  asked	  about	   the	   future,	  one	  government	   representative	  participant	  called	   for	  “more	  
coordination	  in	  order	  to	  create	  more	  stability,	  particularly	  related	  to	  communication	  between	  
the	   EU	   and	   the	   Cambodian	   government”	   (Participant	   12).	   In	   terms	   of	   increasing	   EU	  
effectiveness	   in	   its	   development	   partner	   role,	   CSO	   and	   NGO	   participants	   called	   for	   better	  
control	  and	  monitoring	  mechanisms	  on	  the	  ground,	  as	  well	  as	  strategies	  and	  policy	  to	  be	  set	  
on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis	  in	  order	  to	  target	  the	  right	  groups.	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“Everyone	   benefits	   from	   the	   EBA	   but	   those	  who	  will	   feel	   the	   impacts	   from	   the	  
withdrawal	  are	  not	  the	  ones	  causing	  the	  problem.	  We	  need	  to	  target	  and	  identify	  
these	   groups	   and	   apply	   pressure	   directly	   to	   them,	   not	   the	   whole	   community”	  
(Participant	  10).	  	  	  
	  
One	  participant	  summarised	  this	  problem	  in	  providing	  a	  metaphor,	  “The	  diver	  of	  the	  cart	  
is	  angry	  with	  the	  cows,	  but	  instead	  of	  hitting	  the	  cows,	  he	  hits	  the	  cart”	  (Participant	  3).	  
This	   statement	   sums	   up	   well	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   EU	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   withdrawal.	  
Conditionality	  mechanisms	  used	  by	  the	  EU	  need	  reform	  so	  that	  the	  RGC	  is	  targeted	  and	  
feels	  the	  impacts	  of	  such	  actions,	  rather	  than	  society.	  If	  the	  EU	  continues	  to	  target	  the	  
wrong	  groups,	  they	  are	  not	  providing	  the	  correct	  pressure	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  democratic	  
reform	   and	   respect	   for	   human	   rights,	   rather	   just	   inducing	   conditions	   harmful	   for	   the	  
lower	  socio-­‐economic	  classes.	  
	  
6.9   Summary	  of	  Results	  	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  conducting	  these	  interviews	  was	  to	  to	  investigate	  through	  a	  Cambodian	  lens	  
how	  effective	  the	  EU	  is	  at	  promoting	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia	  through	  the	  
mechanism	  of	  the	  EBA	  agreement	  as	  used	  in	  an	  AfT	  context.	  Data	  was	  collected	  from	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  development	  sectors	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  understanding	  into	  perceptions	  on	  the	  current	  
and	  future	  relationship	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  Cambodia,	  and	  insights	  into	  what	  a	  future	  post-­‐	  
EBA	  withdrawal	  may	  look	  like	  for	  Cambodia	  and	  its	  citizens.	  This	  research	  also	  investigated	  the	  
economic	   and	   social	   implications	   of	   a	   withdrawal.	   This	   helps	   build	   a	   well-­‐rounded	  
understanding	  of	  all	   the	   implications	  and	  areas	  of	   impact,	   as	  well	   as	   illustrating	  how	   these	  
impacts	  have	  a	  large	  effect	  on	  human	  and	  social	  rights	  themselves,	  values	  the	  EU	  are	  trying	  to	  
protect.	  Finally,	  the	  findings	  and	  discussion	  concludes	  with	  alternative	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  
might	  approach	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  promotion	  in	  the	  future.	  This	  study	  concluded	  
that	  employing	  the	  use	  of	  conditionality	  through	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  is	  unlikely	  to	  result	  
in	  the	  desired	  outcomes.	  This	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  other	  actors	  such	  as	  China	  who	  are	  at	  play	  
in	  influencing	  Cambodia’s	  reactions	  towards	  the	  withdrawal.	  This	  research	  found	  that	  it	  is	  likely	  
that	  Cambodia	  will	  suffer	  a	  large	  economic	  downturn	  in	  its	  garment	  industry	  which	  employs	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over	  700,000	  citizens.	  Most	  of	  whom	  are	  women	  from	  rural	  areas.	  Participants	  surveyed	  do	  
not	  agree	  with	  the	  EU’s	  position	  in	  terms	  of	  withdrawing	  the	  EBA,	  as	  they	  conclude	  that	  this	  
will	  result	  in	  a	  complete	  breakdown	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia,	  as	  opposed	  
to	  prompting	  reform	  in	  these	  areas.	  Thus	  resulting	  in	  the	  opposite	  outcome	  the	  EU	  was	  trying	  
to	  achieve.	  	  
	  
Loss	  of	  leverage	  for	  the	  EU	  is	  of	  prominent	  concern	  and	  through	  this	  loss	  it	  is	  likely	  the	  future	  
of	  Cambodia	  it	  headed	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  China	  model,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  European	  model.	  It	  
is	  clear	  that	  these	  mechanisms	  need	  to	  change	  in	  order	  to	  become	  more	  effective	  in	  promoting	  
the	  values	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia.	  However,	  it	  was	  noted	  throughout	  
the	  study	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  European	  model	  in	  an	  Asian	  context	  is	  being	  questioned	  in	  
Cambodia	  by	  both	  its	  government	  and	  its	  citizens.	  This	  is	  unsurprising	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  none	  
of	  Cambodia’s	  neighbours	   follow	  the	   liberal	  democratic	  model	  the	  EU	   is	   trying	  to	  promote.	  
Although	   all	   participants	   conveyed	   the	   promotion	   of	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights	   is	   still	  
imperative	  to	  society	  and	  politics	  in	  Cambodia,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  consensus	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  
not	  practicing	  the	  promotion	  of	  these	  values	  in	  an	  effective	  and	  efficient	  way.	  All	  participants	  
surveyed	   believe	   that	   the	   EU	   should	   continue	   to	   pursue	   the	   agenda	   of	   human	   rights	   and	  
democracy	  promotion	   in	  Cambodia,	  as	  this	   is	  within	  Cambodian	  citizen’s	   interest.	   It	   is	  clear	  
that	  the	  mechanisms	  in	  which	  this	  agenda	  is	  pursued	  needs	  reform,	  as	  the	  current	  strategy	  
does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  yielding	  positive	  outcomes	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  
rights	  in	  the	  county.	  	  	  
7.  Conclusion	  
7.1   Directions	  for	  Future	  Research	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  limitations	  section,	  this	  research	  was	  limited	  by	  issues	  around	  timing	  and	  
scope.	  There	  are	  five	  broad	  areas	  future	  research	  could	  investigate	  that	  would	  build	  on	  topics	  
raised	  and	  findings	  from	  this	  thesis.	  The	  most	  promising	  area	  for	  future	  research	  would	  be	  to	  
investigate	   the	   issues	   around	   conditionality	   and	   the	  EBA	  after	   the	  withdrawal	   decision	  has	  
been	  made	  in	  February	  2020.	  The	  EU	  is	  still	  yet	  to	  decide	  if	  they	  will	  employ	  a	  full	  or	  partial	  
withdrawal,	  or	  if	  they	  will	  withdraw	  at	  all.	  This	  leaves	  an	  open	  end	  for	  this	  research	  in	  that	  the	  
conclusions	  are	  somewhat	  speculative.	  Future	  research	  could	  be	  done	  looking	  back	  at	  the	  EU’s	  
	   71	  
decision	  and	  the	  actual	  consequences	  and	  impacts,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  potential.	  This	  would	  
vastly	   change	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   research	   and	   help	   with	   some	   limitations	   faced	   while	  
producing	  the	  research	  at	  this	  time.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  further	  research	  into	  the	  ‘governing	  model’	  that	  was	  referenced	  to	  in	  the	  findings	  
chapter	  would	  help	  to	  expand	  conclusions	  found	  in	  this	  research.	  This	  relates	  to	  Normative	  
Power	  Europe	  theory	  (NPE)	  in	  that	  it	  challenges	  the	  ideas	  around	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  
global	  expansion	  of	  values,	  particularly	  looking	  at	  the	  impacts	  of	  this	  in	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  context.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  difference	  between	  development	  in	  a	  purely	  economic	  context	  or	  
development	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  prosperity,	  and	  where	  these	  two	  intersect.	  	  
	  
A	  third	  area	  of	  research	  that	  would	  expand	  on	  current	  literature	  are	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  aid	  
conditionality	  as	  a	  violation	  of	   sovereignty.	  As	  discussed	  briefly,	   there	   is	  a	   small	  amount	  of	  
literature	  explaining	  the	  legality	  of	  this	  concept.	  However,	  little	  literature	  exists	  on	  the	  violation	  
of	  sovereignty	  through	  aid	  as	  a	  theoretical	  concept.	  This	  both	  challenges	  ideas	  around	  how	  aid	  
is	  delivered	  and	  received	  as	  well	  as	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  conditionality	  clauses	  attached	  to	  
aid	  and	  AfT	  agreements.	  
	  
Fourthly,	  research	  into	  the	  Cambodia	  and	  China	  relationship	  and	  the	  ‘Belt	  and	  Road	  Initiative’	  
effects	  on	  developing	  countries	  would	  be	  an	  increasingly	  important	  area	  for	  future	  study.	  The	  
‘Belt	  and	  Road	  Initiative’	  is	  a	  fast	  expanding	  economic	  and	  trade	  initiative	  that	  many	  developing	  
countries	  are	  turning	  towards	  for	  solutions	  to	  problems	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  development.	  
Whether	   or	   not	   this	   is	   their	   saving	   grace	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   understood.	   As	   this	   initiative	  mostly	  
concentrates	  on	  infrastructure	  development	  and	  trade	  routes,	  it	  is	  speculative	  as	  to	  whether	  
or	   not	   this	   plan	   will	   produce	   development	   in	   all	   areas	   for	   recipient	   countries.	   Further	  
limitations	  are	  that	  China	  aid	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  track	  as	  they	  don’t	  typically	  share	  these	  
totals	  through	  traditional	  reporting	  methods.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  China	  topic	  also	  produces	  another	  area	  of	  study	  through	  how	  this	  initiative	  effects	  
the	   EU’s	   relationships	  with	   its	  ODA	   recipient	   countries.	   The	   ‘Belt	   and	   Road	   Initiative’	   is	   an	  
increasingly	  attractive	  option	   for	  developing	  countries.	  This	  has	  had	  a	   large	   impact	  on	  how	  
Cambodia	   has	   reacted	   towards	   the	   EU	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   employment	   of	   conditionality	   and	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promotion	  of	  normative	  values.	  China	  is	  also	  attempting	  expansion	  of	  its	  own	  ideals	  through	  
the	  ‘Belt	  and	  Road’	  so	  this	  poses	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  that	  China	  is	  providing	  an	  alternative	  
route	  for	  development.	  This	  promotes	  an	  authoritarian	  model	  which	   is	  unsurprisingly	  more	  
appealing	  for	  governments	  like	  the	  RGC.	  	  
	  
7.2   Conclusion	  	  
This	  thesis	  investigates	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  as	  a	  normative	  value	  promoter	  through	  the	  use	  
of	   conditionality	   built	   into	   their	   aid	   and	   trade	   agreements.	   More	   specifically,	   this	   thesis	  
explored	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  using	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal	  as	  a	  form	  of	  conditionality	  to	  
promote	  democratic	  reform	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia.	  This	  thesis	  began	  with	  
a	  contextual	  review	  to	  outline	  Cambodia’s	  history,	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  EU	  in	  aid	  and	  trade	  
partnerships,	  as	  well	  as	  outlining	  contemporary	  political	  events	  that	  have	  impacted	  the	  EU’s	  
decision	  to	  launch	  the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA.	  The	  2018	  Cambodian	  election	  can	  be	  
pointed	  to	  as	  the	  pinnacle	  occasion	  that	  began	  the	  escalation	  of	  events	  surrounding	  the	  launch	  
of	  procedure	  to	  withdraw.	  The	  EU	  criticised	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  2018	  Cambodian	  elections	  
by	   claiming	   “serious	   and	   systemic	   violations	   of	   democratic	   and	   human	   rights	   principles	   as	  
outlined	  by	  core	  UN	  and	  ILO	  conventions”	  (European	  Commission,	  2019).	  These	  accusations	  
were	  based	  on	  actions	  of	  the	  CPP	  during	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  election	  including	  banning	  all	  118	  
members	  of	  the	  opposition	  party,	  the	  taking	  over	  of	  all	  media,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  impinging	  of	  civil	  
rights	  though	  the	  severe	  reduction	  of	  civic	  space.	  The	  EU	  launched	  the	  procedure	  to	  withdraw	  
Cambodian	   preferential	   trade	   access	   to	   the	   EU	   under	   the	   EBA	   due	   to	   the	   deteriorating	  
democratic	  and	  human	  rights	  situation	  throughout	  and	  post-­‐election.	  These	  actions	  have	  been	  
met	  negatively	  by	  the	  RGC	  who	  rejected	  these	  claims	  and	  refuse	  to	  meet	  EU	  demands	  in	  order	  
to	  prevent	  a	  withdrawal.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  create	  an	  understanding	  of	  these	  events	  and	  why	  they	  unfolded	  in	  this	  way,	  this	  
thesis	  investigates	  the	  architecture	  of	  aid	  in	  Cambodia	  through	  a	  literature	  review.	  This	  chapter	  
helps	  to	  explain	  the	  deeply	  seated	  and	  paradoxical	  problems	  within	  aid	  and	  aid	  policy,	  as	  well	  
as	  illustrating	  the	  how	  and	  why	  of	  Cambodia’s	  aid	  dependency	  problems	  in	  both	  the	  past	  and	  
the	  present.	  The	  relationship	  between	  aid	  and	  its	  contemporary	  equivalent	  ‘AfT’	  is	  discussed	  
in	  order	   to	  draw	   the	   connection	  between	  problems	  of	   aid	   and	  how	   the	  EBA	  withdrawal	   is	  
	   73	  
connected.	   AfT	   agreements	   such	   as	   the	   EBA	   are	   designed	   to	   address	   the	  dependency	   and	  
ownership	   problems	   of	   traditional	   aid	   methods.	   When	   these	   initiatives	   are	   attached	   to	  
normative	  value	  conditionality,	  these	  issues	  are	  further	  exacerbated	  and	  the	  wrong	  groups	  are	  
punished.	  	  
	  
The	   conceptual	   framework	   outlines	   how	   aid	   conditionality	   is	   used	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   promote	  
normative	  principles,	  as	  well	  as	  outlining	  the	  pre-­‐established	  debate	  around	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  conditionality	   in	  promoting	  democracy	  and	  development.	  The	  first	  three	  chapters	  of	  this	  
thesis	  provide	  the	  tools	  to	  understanding	  the	  situation	  surrounding	  the	  EBA	  withdrawal	  from	  
Cambodia.	  This	  builds	  upon	  existing	  theory	  to	  help	  with	  analysis	  of	  findings	  of	  the	  primary	  data	  
collected.	  Finally,	   this	   thesis	   included	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  primary	  data	  collected	   through	  
interviews	  with	   employees	   and	   experts	   in	   the	   field,	   in	   local	   and	   international	  NGOs,	   CSOs,	  
international	  political	  and	  economic	  institutions,	  and	  government	  officials.	  The	  research	  sub	  
questions	   are	   addressed	   directly	   to	   investigate	   the	   economic	   and	   social	   implications	   of	   a	  
withdrawal.	   This	   builds	   a	   well-­‐rounded	   understanding	   of	   all	   the	   implications	   and	   areas	   of	  
impact,	  and	  illustrates	  how	  these	  impacts	  have	  a	  large	  effect	  on	  democracy,	  human	  and	  social	  
rights	   themselves.	   This	   data	   is	   then	   supported	   and	   expanded	   through	   references	   to	  
newspapers,	  joint	  statements,	  press	  releases,	  and	  official	  government	  statements,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
comparison	   to	   some	  previous	  examples	  of	  EU	  conditionality	  being	  used	   in	  other	   countries.	  
Findings	  are	  then	  supported	  by	  previous	  research	  identified	  in	  the	  contextual,	  literature,	  and	  
conceptual	  review	  chapters.	  	  
	  
This	  research	  concludes	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  not	  been	  directly	  effective	  at	  promoting	  democracy	  
and	  human	  rights	  in	  Cambodia	  through	  the	  EBA.	  The	  EBA	  is	  seen	  in	  Cambodia	  as	  more	  of	  a	  
mechanism	  for	  economic	  growth	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  jobs	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  tool	  that	  is	  able	  
to	  solidly	  impose	  democratic	  reform	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  principles.	  It	  would	  appear	  
from	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  RGC	  that	  a	  withdrawal	  will	  not	  produce	  the	  EU’s	  intended	  outcome	  of	  
increased	   respect	   for	   these	   values.	   There	   are	   two	  main	   reasons	   for	   this.	   Through	   China’s	  
increased	  presence	   in	   Cambodia,	   as	  well	   as	   their	   pledge	   to	   help	   fill	   the	   gaps	   that	   the	   EBA	  
withdrawal	  may	  cause,	  the	  EU	  has	  lost	  the	  necessary	  leverage	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  create	  the	  
kind	  of	  pressure	  required	  to	  persuade	  the	  RGC	  to	  reform	  in	  these	  areas.	  China	  at	  this	  time	  is	  a	  
more	  attractive	  partnership	  option	  for	  the	  RGC,	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  the	  interests	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of	   the	   RGC	   are	   far	   better	   reflected	   in	   the	   China	   agenda	   than	   that	   of	   the	   EU’s.	   Secondly,	  
Cambodia	   and	   China	   have	  much	   stronger	   cultural	   ties,	  which	   poses	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   liberal	  
democratic	  model	  the	  EU	  is	  attempting	  to	  promote	  in	  Cambodia.	  Finally,	  the	  ‘Belt	  and	  Road	  
Initiative’	   provides	   Cambodia	  with	   access	   to	   one	   of	   the	  world	   largest	   economic	   and	   trade	  
initiatives,	  condition	  free	  in	  respect	  to	  democratic	  and	  human	  rights	  principles.	  Under	  these	  
circumstances	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  RGC	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  take	  positive	  steps	  towards	  
the	  EU	  and	  instead	  is	  favouring	  assistance	  from	  China.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  reason	  the	  withdrawal	  is	  not	  having	  the	  desired	  effect	  on	  the	  RGC’s	  performance	  
in	  these	  areas	  is	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  distinct	  gap	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
EBA	   as	   an	   ideal	   promoter	   and	  how	   this	  mechanism	  actually	  works	   in	   practice.	   This	   can	  be	  
explained	  through	  investigating	  the	  connection	  between	  trade	  agreements	  and	  human	  rights.	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  is	  ambiguous,	  as	  trade	  measures	  may	  be	  imposed	  to	  try	  and	  
improve	  certain	  political	   rights	  but	  may	  come	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  other	  economic	  and	  social	  
rights.	  It	  is	  important	  in	  this	  circumstance	  to	  remember	  that	  all	  rights	  are	  interdependent	  and	  
interrelated.	   The	  way	   the	  EU	   is	   imposing	   conditionality	   connects	   government	  performance	  
with	  a	  market	   that	  supplies	   the	   livelihood	  of	   thousands	  of	  Cambodian	  people.	   If	   the	  EBA	   is	  
withdrawn,	   then	   the	   people	   that	  will	   feel	   the	   repercussions	   of	   this	   are	   Cambodian	   society	  
rather	  than	  the	  government.	  Conditionality	  practiced	  in	  this	  way,	  punishes	  the	  wrong	  groups	  
and	   so	   it	   is	   a	   direct	   contradiction	   of	   EU	   rhetoric	   in	   terms	   of	   human	   rights	   principles.	  
Conditionality	  clauses	  may	  contribute	  towards	  these	  values	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  provide	  a	  basis	  
to	  set	  standards.	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  conditionality	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  EBA	  is	  not	  directly	  
effective	  at	  imposing	  democratic	  reform	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  principles	  in	  Cambodia	  
under	  these	  circumstances.	  	  
	  
In	   terms	  of	   the	  EU’s	  relationship	  with	  Cambodia	   in	  the	  future,	   the	  findings	  show	  that	  open	  
dialogue	  and	  encouraging	  compromise	  may	  be	  the	  best	  way	  forward	  for	  the	  EU	  in	  terms	  of	  
strengthening	   cooperation	   and	   partnerships	   built	   on	   sustainable	   and	   future	   orientated	  
solutions.	   It	   is	   also	   vital	   for	   the	   EU	   to	   continue	   their	   funding	   and	   programmes	   that	   work	  
towards	   increased	   space	   for	   civil	   society	   in	   Cambodia.	   This	   helps	   to	   increase	   community	  
awareness	  of	  civil	  and	  political	  rights,	  and	  builds	  toward	  a	  framework	  of	  better	  communication	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between	  both	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  EU,	  as	  well	  as	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  RGC.	  Both	  vital	  aspects	  
towards	  sustainable,	  community	  orientated	  development.	  	  
	  
Education	  was	  another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  findings	  show,	  needs	  the	  EU’s	  continued	  attention.	  
As	  was	  shown	  in	  the	  conceptual	  framework,	  it	  is	  vital	  funding	  is	  continued	  to	  be	  invested	  in	  
education	  as	  this	  not	  only	  serves	  the	  direct	  needs	  of	  Cambodian	  people,	  but	  also	  produces	  
positive	  flow	  on	  effects	  in	  education	  and	  awareness	  around	  democracy	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  
civic	  participation.	  This	  directly	  helps	  to	  address	  the	  SDG	  goals	  of:	  poverty	  eradication,	  quality	  
education,	  and	  gender	  equality	  (United	  Nations	  Sustainable	  Development,	  2019).	  	  
	  
A	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EBA	  will	  be	  directly	  counterproductive	  towards	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  EU’s	  GSP	  
and	  EBA	  schemes	  which	  aim	  to	  eradicate	  poverty	  in	  underdeveloped	  nations.	  As	  findings	  show	  
a	  full	  or	  even	  partial	  withdrawal	  will	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  Cambodia’s	  economy	  and	  will	  
have	   damaging	   consequences	   for	   the	   livelihoods	   of	   over	   700,000	   people	   in	   the	   garment	  
industry.	   It	  seems	  contradictory	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  improve	  on	  democracy	  
and	   human	   rights	   based	   on	   violations	   of	   those	   same	   issues,	   as	   this	   will	   only	   worsen	   the	  
protection	  of	  these	  rights	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
	  
The	  EU	  must	  uphold	   their	  principles,	  however,	   the	  EBA	  must	  not	  be	   the	  only	   tool	   towards	  
achieving	   these	   outcomes.	   Cambodia’s	   dependency	   and	   development	   problems	   are	  multi-­‐
facetted	   which	   require	   multi-­‐facetted	   solutions.	   The	   solutions	   here	   are	   designed	   to	   work	  
alongside	  development	  initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  EBA,	  to	  ensure	  adequate	  enforcement	  of	  these	  
values	   in	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  framework,	  as	  well	  as	  help	  to	  promote	  action	  on	  the	  SDG’s	  as	   listed	  
above.	  As	  Cambodia	  inevitably	  expands	  its	  trade	  portfolio,	  the	  EU	  must	  look	  toward	  other	  ways	  
in	   which	   they	   can	   assist	   in	   the	   promotion	   of	   these	   values	   in	   a	   productive	   way	   both	  
diplomatically	  and	  in	  the	  communities	  living	  in	  recipient	  countries.	  It	  seems	  a	  loss	  of	  leverage	  
for	  the	  EU	  under	  these	  circumstances	  is	  inevitable	  if	  they	  choose	  to	  withdraw	  the	  EBA.	  If	  the	  
EU	  wish	  to	  keep	  a	  stronghold	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights,	  they	  must	  look	  
to	  other	  creative	  and	  resourceful	  solutions	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  dead-­‐lock	  with	  the	  RGC	  in	  these	  
areas	  in	  the	  future.	  It	  is	  vital	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  people	  are	  put	  first	  in	  aid	  policy	  and	  development	  
assistance.	  The	  societal	  impacts	  of	  a	  withdrawal	  must	  not	  be	  ignored	  in	  favour	  of	  politics.	  It	  is	  
vital	   that	   these	   principles	   are	   addressed	   in	   Cambodia.	   Rather	   than	   drawing	   ambiguous	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connections	  between	  trade	  measures	  and	  social	  rights,	  AfT	  policy	  needs	  reform	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	   it	  works	  productively	  alongside	  development	  programmes	  rather	   than	   in	  contradiction	  
when	  conditionality	  is	  employed.	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